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Preface
Prof. dr. Ashley Terlouw
At the moment of writing this preface to the report of Giota Theodoropoulou on the Greek asylum procedure, a record number of 75.000 
migrants is staying in Greece. The reception centres are overcrowded, thousands of families with minor children are living in the streets 
or in self-built tents. It is clear that Greece is not able to fulfil its obligations under the Common European Asylum System and the EU 
Charter, the Refugee Convention and the European Convention of Human Rights. Asylum seekers in Greece are staying there under 
inhuman and degrading circumstances. This leads to the question whether this is solely the responsibility of Greece or if an obligation 
rests on the other EU Member States as well.  
The situation is at least partly caused by EU Member States that in March 2016 closed a deal with Turkey in order to end irregular migration 
from Turkey to North-West Europe via the so-called Balkan route. According to this deal Turkey would take back migrants that had 
entered Greece in an irregular manner. In exchange for that Turkey would receive financial support for the reception of refugees, the visa 
requirements for Turkish citizens would be abolished and the accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU would be speeded up. 
Furthermore, a so-called one to one exchange was agreed upon. For each Syrian that would be returned from the Greek Islands to Turkey, 
another Syrian would be brought to the EU by Turkey. The legal status of this deal is unclear. According to the Court of Justice of the EU it is 
not an EU-agreement but an agreement of the Member States with Turkey, meaning that EU law is not applicable.  
Greece is according to EU-law, especially Directive 2013/32/EU (on Asylum Procedures), obliged to process every asylum request, also 
requests from asylum seekers who travelled to Greece via Turkey. The Turkey deal is however based on the presumption that Turkey is a 
safe third country. Article 33, par. 2c Directive 2013/32/EU allows Member States to return asylum seekers to a safe third country without 
dealing with their asylum claims on the content. This is also implemented in Greek law. Consequently many asylum applications from 
asylum seekers who travelled via Turkey were declared inadmissible. 
However, is Turkey really a safe third country and does it fulfil the requirements of Article 38 Directive 2013/32/EU? It is known that 
Turkey has returned many Syrian asylum seekers to Syria, without offering them the possibility to lodge an asylum request. Since the 
failed coup d’état the human rights situation in Turkey has deteriorated. Freedom of speech has been restricted and torture, cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment on a large scale were reported. 
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Moreover, Turkey would insufficiently protect particular social 
group like Alevites and Christians against discrimination and 
violence. Finally, Turkey has made a reservation to the Refugee 
Convention. Only people of European origin can be recognized as 
refugees by Turkey, meaning that for example Syrians, Afghans 
and Iranians cannot be recognized as such. Although Turkey offers 
some alternative temporary protection for those groups, this 
cannot be seen as protection as required by the Refugee 
Convention. 
This report is, however, not about the situation in Turkey but about 
the situation for asylum seekers in Greece. Giota Theodoropoulou 
has researched both Greek and EU law and whether the situation of 
asylum seekers in Greece is in compliance with these legal 
requirements. After that she has interviewed many actors 
involved, both on EU, Greek and NGO level. 
 
Her research shows that the Greek asylum procedure and reception 
are failing. In fact there is not one Greek asylum procedure but 
there are two. A fast-track-border procedure on the islands 
Lesbos, Kos, Leros, Samos, Chios and Rhodes (for all not 
vulnerable asylum seekers) and the ‘normal’ procedure on Evros 
and the Greek mainland. Lack of available legal aid is a problem for 
both types of procedures. The involvement of EASO in the Greek 
asylum procedure is questioned, among others by the European 
Ombudsman, who on 5 July 2018 expressed serious concerns about 
‘the quality of the admissibility interviews as well as about the 
procedural fairness of how they are conducted’. Detention of 
asylum seekers takes place based on their nationality and there is 
insufficient attention for the position of vulnerable groups, 
including children.
The research also gives a picture of failing responsibilities and 
lack of solidarity with Greece and with the asylum seekers fixed 
there. Greece is not able to fulfil its obligations under national 
European and international law. The EU is failing to help Greece 
and to take responsibility for resettlement as was promised, 
Turkey cannot really be trusted with asylum seekers, and NGO’s, 
who as a consequence are burdened with de facto responsibility, 
can impossible sufficiently deal with the problems they are faced 
with.
I hope this report makes the reader aware of the obligations of the 
EU and of the importance that these obligations are more than just 
the law in the books and will result in law in action, especially 
where it concerns asylum seekers in Greece. I also hope that every 
actor involved will feel responsible to end the inhuman and 
degrading situation these asylum seekers find themselves in for 
too many years already.
1. Executive Summary
The aim of this research was to identify the main challenges that 
asylum seekers currently face in Greece, to provide suggestions 
for solutions and to indicate who is responsible for the 
implementation of these solutions. The research has a qualitative 
character and is based on legal and empirical data. The empirical 
research exists of interviews with selected professionals 
representing Greece, the EU and other Member States, as MEPs, 
representatives of the Greek Ministry of Migration, the First 
Reception Service and the Asylum Appeals Committees, UNHCR 
and NGOs. 
On March 2016, the EU-Turkey Statement foresaw the return from 
Greece to Turkey of all newly arriving migrants. In the same year, 
Greece adopted a new law, Law 4375/2016, transposing the EU 
Asylum Procedures Directive. This law made it possible to restrict 
the geographical movement of asylum seekers within Greek 
territory and created a special asylum procedure, the ‘fast track 
borders procedure’. 
The newly created Asylum Service decided to oblige asylum 
seekers who arrive on the islands of Kos, Leros, Samos, Rhodos, 
Chios and Lesbos to remain there until a final asylum decision on 
their requests has been reached. The Asylum Service argued that 
this measure, known as ‘geographical limitation’, served public 
interest and was supposed to render the EU-Turkey Statement 
effective by facilitating returns. 
As a result, since March 2016 thousands of migrants who arrived 
on the six islands of the Aegean were unable to move forward to the 
mainland. In 2018, another new Greek law, Law 4540/2018, entered 
into force, aimed at accelerating the processing of asylum claims 
examined under the fast track borders procedures for asylum 
seekers who were stuck on the islands. However, due to the large 
volume of asylum requests and the limited capacity of the 
authorities to deal with them, asylum seekers were kept in a limbo 
for several months and sometimes years, being subjected to harsh 
living conditions. 
 
In order to render the examination more effective, EASO acquired 
a new role. Employees of this organisation started to participate in 
the examination of the asylum claims, conducting interviews at 
first instance, first on the islands and, as of 2018, on the mainland 
as well. This active involvement in a procedure that is the 
responsibility of the State was heavily criticised by NGOs and the 
academia. However, the EU Ombudsman endorsed EASO’s opinion 
on this matter arguing that this organisation is only issuing 
opinions and, ultimately, it is up to the Greek officials to reach a 
decision on each asylum claim. 
Furthermore, asylum seekers examined under the fast track 
borders procedure are not only geographically confined. In fact 
they are also disfavoured in comparison to asylum seekers who are 
examined under the regular procedure. This is the consequence of 
the fact that the Asylum Service with the help of EASO tends to 
apply the ‘safe third country’ concept described in the EU Asylum 
Procedures Directive only in the border procedures. As a result, 
asylum seekers examined on the six islands have to rebut the 
presumption that Turkey is a safe third country for them. 
Otherwise, their asylum claim will be considered inadmissible and 
they can effectively be returned to Turkey. 
The implementation of this concept is not only discriminatory 
against asylum seekers whose claims are examined on the islands 
according to the fast-track borders procedures. The objection that 
asylum seekers can safely return to Turkey also only affects 
asylum seekers with specific nationalities. EASO tends to propose 
the safe return to Turkey of Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis whereas 
the Asylum Service tends to endorse 
the safe third country concept only with regards to Syrians. The 
Greek Council of State ruled that Turkey can be considered safe 
regardless of the fact that Turkey does not fully implement the 
1951 Geneva Convention as it made a reservation by the New York 
Protocol of 1967 with the Convention, which in fact means that the 
Convention is only considered applicable for asylum seekers 
fleeing from Europe
In order to avoid return to Turkey based on the safe third country 
concept, asylum seekers examined under the border procedures 
have had to prove themselves to be vulnerable. Vulnerable persons 
have access by law to special reception conditions. However, in the 
current state of affairs, vulnerability has acquired a new function. 
It has become the only available mechanism for asylum seekers to 
‘escape’ the border procedures and to be examined under the 
regular asylum procedures, thus avoiding return to Turkey. As a 
matter of fact, the majority of asylum seekers examined under the 
border procedures have managed to be recognised as being 
vulnerable. Therefore, vulnerability is no longer an exceptional 
measure; it has become the norm. Nevertheless, due to a serious 
lack of doctors to assess persons claiming to be vulnerable and 
lack in accommodation on the mainland, vulnerable people have to 
remain on the islands for a very long time, living under harsh 
conditions.
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In addition to other vulnerable persons, children are also exposed 
to serious risks due to their prolonged stay in the hotspots or in 
other designated areas that are not suitable for their well-being. 
Reported incidents of sexual exploitation of children have not yet 
resulted in any conviction, allegedly because victims are not 
provided with sufficient safeguards to follow through. Child abuse 
is a symptom of huge systemic deficiencies such as lack of 
adequate shelters, almost inexistent legal aid, lack of guardians, 
obstacles for family reunification, difficulties with age 
assessment, thus forcing many children to stay in the streets and 
do whatever it takes to survive. The Greek Ministry for Migration 
Policy made an official request to other Member States to accept 
the relocation of children, but this effort was met with resistance.
The situation is not only critical with regard to asylum seekers at 
the borders. Access to asylum on the mainland based on a pre-
registration system through Skype has proven to be very 
problematic, whereas push-backs seem to continue.
The interviews in this research have provided explanations for all 
these challenges. They have suggested that the geographical 
limitation is based on Turkey’s interpretation of the EU-Turkey 
Statement. More specifically, Turkey does not take back asylum 
seekers who are not on the islands. Interviewees suggested that 
the EU tolerates Turkey’s approach. However, as it has been 
indicated, return based on the safe third country concept does not 
affect many asylum seekers. In practice, most of them are 
considered to be vulnerable. Some interviewees perceived 
vulnerability as the only means to decompress the islands. In other 
words, instead of it being a special protective mechanism, it has 
become a political tool to mitigate the severe consequences of the 
EU-Turkey Statement.
In addition, interviewees stressed that because it is hard to trace 
asylum seekers who have been rejected and because Turkey tends 
to find excuses so as not to take people back, the return numbers in 
practice are still very low. The interviewees proposed the following 
suggestions: the creation of legal pathways to Europe, a strict 
operating framework for EASO in Greece, the creation of a 
centralised EU asylum authority to deal with all asylum 
applications within the EU, better sharing of asylum seekers, 
better integration, strategic planning and the need to deal with the 
root causes of migration in a more comprehensive way. EASO 
insisted that they are not a decisive authority in Greece. However, 
the difference in perceptions between EASO seconded 
interviewers and the Asylum Service during the admissibility 
check implies the opposite. In fact the participation of EASO is 
beyond what is foreseen in its current mandate.
This research has shown that Greece is responsible to act to the 
needs of asylum seekers within its territory in a more effective 
way, mainly by increasing an adequate infrastructure and human 
resources so that the status of asylum seekers is cleared in a timely 
manner, without compromising the quality of the procedures. The 
EU is also responsible to support national policies that do not 
violate EU law and EU values, especially with regard to the right to 
seek asylum and the prohibition of (indirect) refoulement. In this 
regard, the EU should support the abolishment of geographical 
limitations, the equal treatment of asylum seekers irrespective of 
their origin and location, a more fair distribution of asylum 
seekers over the Member States and ensure that Dublin Regulation 
is applied without unnecessary impediments. NGOs have de facto 
undertaken a large responsibility in Greece but are only 
responsible within their respective mandates. Moreover, their 
activities should not be seen as an excuse for State actors to 
remain passive. On the contrary, they should take more seriously 
the responsibilities that the Refugee Convention, the EU Charter 
and the CEAS obliges them to.
2. Summary in Dutch (Samenvatting) 
Het doel van dit onderzoek is om enerzijds de belangrijkste 
uitdagingen te identificeren voor asielzoekers die zich in 
Griekenland bevinden, oplossingen aan te dragen voor deze 
uitdagingen en te bepalen wie er verantwoordelijk is voor het 
implementeren van deze oplossingen. Het onderzoek heeft een 
kwalitatief karakter en is gebaseerd op juridische en empirische 
data. Het empirische deel van het onderzoek bestaat uit interviews 
met geselecteerde professionals die Griekenland, de EU en andere 
lidstaten vertegenwoordigen, zoals leden van het Europees 
Parlement, vertegenwoordigers van het Griekse ministerie van 
migratie, medewerkers van de Griekse asieldienst en de 
beroepscomités voor asielzaken, de VN vluchtelingenorganisatie 
UNHCR en verschillende maatschappelijke organisaties. 
Met het sluiten van de EU-Turkije overeenkomst in maart 2016 
werd voorzien in de terugkeer van alle nieuw aangenomen 
asielzoekers naar Turkije. In hetzelfde jaar introduceerde 
Griekenland een nieuwe wet die voorziet in de implementatie van 
de Europese Procedure Richtlijn. Deze wet introduceerde een 
geografische beperking voor asielzoekers en een speciale 
asielprocedure, de versnelde grensprocedure.
De recent opgerichte asieldienst besloot om asielzoekers die via 
de eilanden Kos, Leros, Samos, Rhodos, Chios en Lesbos 
Griekenland binnenkomen te verplichten op de betreffende 
eilanden te blijven totdat een definitieve beslissing op hun 
asielverzoeken is genomen. De asieldienst stelt dat deze 
maatregel, bekend als de ‘geografische beperking’, het publiek 
belang dient en voorziet in de effectieve implementatie van de 
EU-Turkije overeenkomst door terugkeer te faciliteren.
Als gevolg hiervan konden duizenden migranten die na maart 2016 
op de zes Egeïsche eilanden aankwamen niet verder reizen. In 2018 
werd een andere Griekse wet geïntroduceerd met als doel om de 
behandeling van asielaanvragen voor asielzoekers op de 
betreffende eilanden, die onder de grensprocedure vallen, te 
versnellen. Vanwege de grote hoeveelheid asielaanvragen en de 
beperkte capaciteit van de autoriteiten om deze te behandelen 
verblijven asielzoekers echter al maanden, soms zelfs jaren, in 
erbarmelijke leefomstandigheden op de Griekse eilanden.
Om de behandeling van asielaanvragen effectiever te maken, 
kreeg het Europees Asielagentschap EASO een nieuwe rol: 
medewerkers van de organisatie gingen deelnemen aan de 
behandeling van asielaanvragen door de asielverhoren af te 
nemen, eerst op de eilanden, later in 2018 ook op het vasteland. 
Deze actieve betrokkenheid bij de nationale Griekse procedure 
werd zwaar bekritiseerd door maatschappelijke organisaties en 
academici. 
De Europese ombudsman onderschreef echter het standpunt van 
EASO in deze kwestie dat de organisatie slechts advies uitbrengt 
en dat de beslissingsbevoegdheid voor iedere asielaanvraag 
uiteindelijk bij de Griekse autoriteiten ligt.
Daarnaast hebben asielzoekers in de snelle grensprocedure niet 
alleen te maken met de geografische beperking. Ze worden ook 
benadeeld ten opzichte van asielzoekers die onder de reguliere 
procedure vallen. Dit komt doordat de asieldienst met steun van 
het EASO het veilig derde land concept dat in de Europese 
procedurerichtlijn verankerd is, slechts in de grensprocedure 
toepast. Asielzoekers die de procedure op de zes eilanden 
doorlopen, moeten daarom het vermoeden dat Turkije een veilig 
derde land is weerleggen. Als hen dat niet lukt, wordt hun 
asielaanvraag niet-ontvankelijk verklaard en kunnen ze worden 
teruggestuurd naar Turkije.
De implementatie van dit concept is niet alleen discriminerend 
rationae loci, het raakt ook alleen asielzoekers met specifieke 
nationaliteiten; EASO is geneigd om de veilige terugkeer naar 
Turkije van Syriërs, Afghanen en Irakezen voor te stellen, terwijl de 
asieldienst dit doorgaans alleen voor Syriërs onderschrijft. De 
Griekse Raad van State oordeelde dat Turkije als veilig beschouwd 
kan worden, ongeacht de beperkte implementatie van de Geneefse 
Conventie van 1951 door Turkije. Turkije heeft een voorbehoud 
gemaakt bij het Protocol van New York van 1967 bij het verdrag met 
als consequentie dat het zich alleen verplicht acht het verdrag na 
te leven als het gaat om asielzoekers die uit Europa zijn gevlucht.
Om terugkeer naar Turkije op basis van het veilig derde land 
concept te vermijden, moeten asielzoekers in de grensprocedure 
bewijzen dat ze kwetsbaar zijn. Kwetsbare personen hebben 
volgens de Griekse wet toegang tot speciale opvang-
voorzieningen. In de huidige situatie heeft kwetsbaarheid echter 
een nieuwe functie gekregen. Het is het enige beschikbare 
mechanisme geworden voor asielzoekers om te ontsnappen aan de 
grensprocedures en om in de reguliere procedure terecht te komen 
en om terugkeer naar Turkije te voorkomen. De meerderheid van de 
asielzoekers van wie de aanvragen in de grensprocedure zijn 
behandeld, is als kwetsbaar erkend. Daarom is kwetsbaarheid niet 
langer een uitzonderlijke maatregel; het is de norm geworden. 
Niettemin moeten kwetsbare mensen, vanwege het grote tekort 
aan artsen om de kwetsbaarheidstoets uit te voeren en vanwege 
het gebrek aan opvangplekken op het vasteland, alsnog heel lang 
op de eilanden blijven. 
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Naast andere kwetsbare personen worden ook kinderen 
blootgesteld aan ernstige risico’s als gevolg van hun langdurige 
verblijf in de hotspots of in andere aangewezen gebieden die niet 
geschikt zijn voor hun welzijn. Gemelde incidenten van seksuele 
uitbuiting van kinderen hebben nog niet geleid tot enige 
veroordeling, naar verluidt omdat er onvoldoende waarborgen zijn 
voor slachtoffers om daadwerkelijk een procedure te starten. 
Misbruik van kinderen is een symptoom van grote systematische 
tekortkomingen, zoals gebrek aan opvang, gebrek aan 
rechtsbijstand, gebrek aan voogden, obstakels voor 
gezinshereniging en problemen bij de leeftijdsanalyse. Hierdoor 
zijn veel kinderen gedwongen om op straat te leven en alles te 
doen wat nodig is om te overleven. Het Griekse Ministerie van 
Migratiebeleid deed een officieel verzoek aan andere lidstaten om 
de herplaatsing van kinderen te accepteren, maar dit stuitte op 
weerstand.
De situatie is niet alleen ernstig wat betreft asielzoekers in de 
lidstaten aan de grenzen. Toegang tot asiel op het vasteland 
gebaseerd op een pre-registratiesysteem via Skype blijkt zeer 
problematisch, terwijl pushbacks lijken te blijven bestaan.
De interviews in dit onderzoek hebben verklaringen gegeven voor 
al deze uitdagingen. Zij hebben gesuggereerd dat de geografische 
beperking gebaseerd is op de Turkse interpretatie van de 
EU-Turkije overeenkomst. Meer specifiek, Turkije neemt alleen 
asielzoekers terug vanaf de eilanden. Geïnterviewden 
suggereerden dat de EU de aanpak van Turkije tolereert. Zoals is 
aangegeven, heeft terugkeer op basis van het concept van een 
veilig derde land echter geen gevolgen voor veel asielzoekers. In 
de praktijk worden de meesten als kwetsbaar beschouwd. Door 
sommige geïnterviewden werd kwetsbaarheid gezien als het enige 
middel om de druk op de eilanden te verminderen. Met andere 
woorden, in plaats van dat het een speciaal 
beschermingsmechanisme is, is het een politiek instrument 
geworden om de ernstige gevolgen van de EU-Turkije 
overeenkomst te verzachten. 
Bovendien benadrukten de geïnterviewden dat de terugkeercijfers 
nog steeds erg laag zijn. Dit komt doordat het moeilijk is om 
asielzoekers te vinden wiens asielverzoek is afgewezen en omdat 
Turkije geneigd is excuses te vinden om mensen niet terug te 
nemen.. Sommige geïnterviewden stelden voor om te voorzien in 
legale routes naar Europa, evenals een strikt operationeel kader 
voor EASO in Griekenland en de oprichting van een 
gecentraliseerde Europese asieldienst, een eerlijker verdeling van 
asielzoekers, betere integratie, strategische planning en een 
betere aanpak van de fundamentele oorzaken van migratie. EASO 
beklemtoonde dat het geen doorslaggevende autoriteit in 
Griekenland is, maar het verschil in perceptie tussen de EASO 
medewerkers en de Griekse medewerkers van de asieldienst 
impliceert het tegenovergestelde: dat de invloed van EASO verder 
gaat dan haar huidige mandaat.
Uit dit onderzoek blijkt dat Griekenland verantwoordelijk is om op 
een effectievere manier te voorzien in de behoeften van 
asielzoekers die zich op haar grondgebied bevinden, met name 
door de infrastructuur en menselijke capaciteit te versterken, 
zodat asielaanvragen snel worden behandeld zonder dat dit de 
kwaliteit van de procedures ondermijnt. De EU is ook 
verantwoordelijk voor het ondersteunen van nationaal beleid 
zodat het in lijn is met Europees recht en Europese waarden, met 
name met betrekking tot het recht om asiel aan te vragen en 
bescherming tegen refoulement. In dit verband dient de EU de 
afschaffing van de geografische beperking te bevorderen, evenals 
de gelijke behandeling van asielzoekers ongeacht hun herkomst en 
locatie, en een eerlijker verdeling van asielzoekers. Ook dient de 
EU ervoor te zorgen dat de Dublinverordening zonder 
belemmeringen wordt toegepast. NGO’s hebben de facto een grote 
verantwoordelijkheid op zich genomen in Griekenland. Maar zij 
kunnen alleen verantwoordelijk worden gehouden binnen hun 
respectievelijke mandaten. Bovendien mogen hun activiteiten 
niet worden gebruikt als excuus voor rijksambtenaren om passief 
te blijven. Integendeel, zij zouden de verantwoordelijkheden waar 
het Vluchtelingenverdrag, het EU Grondrechtenhandvest en het 
GEAS hen toe verplichten, serieuzer moeten nemen. 
3. Introduction
Greece, situated at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa, has 
always hosted a large number of migrants. After a sharp increase 
of arrivals in 2015, the EU Member States made a joint declaration 
to facilitate the return of refugees from Greece to Turkey 
(hereafter the EU-Turkey Statement). Moreover, the asylum 
system in Greece was reformed. This reform has affected the 
rights of asylum seekers in Greece considerably, more concretely 
their ability to move freely in the territory, their access to the 
asylum procedure and their main procedural rights. This research 
addresses the main challenges that asylum seekers currently face 
in Greece, who is responsible to provide solutions and which 
solutions can be proposed.
 
The Legal Reform
Due to an increase in the number of arrivals in the years 2010-
2011, pressure by organisations such as UNHCR to dissociate 
asylum from security concerns and the EU’s incitement to deal with 
asylum in a harmonised and comprehensive manner, there was a 
legal reform transferring asylum from the Ministry of Public Order 
and Citizens’ Protection to the newly established Asylum Service.1
According to Law 4375/2016,2 the Asylum Service has become 
responsible, inter alia, for the examination of asylum claims, 
family reunification, cooperation with the EU and international 
organisations on international protection. The Asylum Service 
comprises the central Asylum Service located in Athens, the 
Regional Asylum Offices (RAO), as well as independent Asylum 
Units (AUs) covering emergency situations all around Greece. 
The creation of the Asylum Service was a major step in the reform 
of the asylum system in Greece, in conformity with the 
Commission’s action plan towards a Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS), stating that Member States should ensure access 
for those in need of protection: asylum in the EU must remain 
accessible.3
1   Law 3907/2011 ‘on the establishment of an Asylum Service and a First 
Reception Service’, transposition into Greek legislation of Directive 
2008/115/EC ‘on common standards and procedures in Member States for 
returning illegally staying third country nationals’ and other provisions, 
Gazette 7/A/26-01-2011.
2   Law 4375/2016 ‘Organisation and functioning of the Asylum Service, 
Appeals Authority, Reception and Identification Service, establishment of 
General Secretariat for Reception, transposition of Directive 2013/32/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council ‘on common procedures for 
granting and withdrawing international protection (recast)’ (L 
180/29.6.2013), provisions on employment of beneficiaries of international 
protection’ and other provisions, Gazette 51/A/3-4-2016.
3  Brussels, 17.6.2008 COM (2008) 360 final Communication from the 
Commission to the Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions policy plan on asylum 
an integrated approach to protection across the EU.
Article 4 Law 4375/2016 also establishes an Appeals Authority to 
deal with applications for international protection at second 
instance, as an independent service that is part of the Ministry of 
Interior. 
Initially, the law required that members of the Appeals Committee 
should have a university degree in legal, political, humanitarian or 
social science and experience in international protection of 
human rights, international law or administrative law. However, 
Law 4399/2016 changed the composition of the appeals 
committees. This reform followed the EU-Turkey Statement.  
The EU-Turkey Statement
According to this Statement, Turkey would take back irregular 
migrants crossing into Greek islands as from the 20th of March 
2016, and for every Syrian returned to Turkey from Greek islands 
another Syrian would be resettled from Turkey to the EU. The EU 
would accelerate visa liberalisation procedures and allocate 
considerable funds to Turkey for the benefit of the refugee 
community.4
The EU-Turkey Statement was based on the assumption that Turkey 
is a safe country for all persons seeking international protection. 
The concept of safe third country is described in the recast of 
Directive 2013/32/EU as a reason to refuse international 
protection to an applicant.5 The concept of safe third country was 
also transposed into Greek law6 referring to an EU as well as a 
national list of safe third countries. 
Furthermore, in 2013 Greece adopted a new law on asylum7 in 
accordance with the Directive 2011/95/EU that, in some cases, is 
more favourable than the standards set by the Directive.8 
4 EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016, press release 144/16, 18/03/2016.
5  Article 33 par.2 c Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection (recast).
6 Article 57 Law 4375/2016.
7  Presidential Decree 141/2013 ‘on the transposition into the Greek 
legislation of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 December 2011 (L 337) on minimum standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees 
or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the 
protection granted (recast)’, Gazette 226/A/21-10-2013.
8  For instance, it provides beneficiaries of subsidiary protection with a 
3-year residence permit, instead of one year foreseen in the Directive.
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Since the EU-Turkey Statement obliges the Greek authorities to 
return to Turkey persons coming to Greece after 20 March 2016 as 
soon as their application for international protection is concluded, 
a geographical limitation of movement was imposed to migrants 
arriving at 6 eastern Aegean islands.9 As a result, Greece has a 
hybrid asylum system, leading to a differential treatment of 
asylum seekers depending on their point of entry. 
Moreover, Greece allowed the European Asylum Support Office 
(‘hereafter EASO’), which initially provided operational and 
technical support, to conduct asylum interviews.10 This has been 
heavily criticised by organisations stating that this is against the 
EU Regulation 439/2010, not allowing the Agency to decide on 
individual asylum claims.11
 
Vulnerability Assessment
Furthermore, ‘vulnerability’ is recognised by law12 as a factor that 
requires special treatment of the persons concerned, regarding 
their reception and detention conditions. The law enlists certain 
categories of people such as separated minors, people with 
special needs and mental disorders, victims of torture etc. 
Persons found to be vulnerable may exit the fast-track border 
procedures and enter the regular asylum procedure. Initially, 
vulnerability was also a factor that allowed asylum seekers to 
leave the islands despite the general geographical restriction of 
movement.13 Vulnerability has been used by the Greek 
administration as an argument to support the lawfulness of the 
geographical limitation.14
The active role of EASO in the admissibility assessment has 
allegedly made it more difficult for many applicants to prove that 
their return to Turkey is unsafe. They are forced to prove 
themselves extremely vulnerable in order to have their asylum 
claims examined on the merits.
9  Article 41 Law 4375/2016 gives the authority to the Director of the Asylum 
Service to place restrictions to the movement of asylum seekers in Greece. 
See also: Decision 10464/2017 of the Director of the Asylum Service on 
restriction of movement of applicants for international protection, Gazette 
B/1977/07.06.2017 and Decision 8269/2018 of the Director of the Asylum 
Service on restriction of movement of applicants for international 
protection.
10  Article 86 par. 13 Law 4399/2016 mentioning that the authorities may allow 
the EASO staff to conduct asylum interviews. See also Article 3 Decision no. 
13257/2016 describing the skills that EASO staff must have in order to 
participate in the asylum examination procedure.
11	 	ΕΣΠ,	Παρατηρήσεις	του	ΕΣΠ	πάνω	στο	νομοσχέδιο	για	τη	διαδικασία	
εξέτασης	αιτημάτων	διεθνούς	προστασίας,	το	οποίο	συζητείται	σήμερα	
στη	Βουλή, see: www.immigration.gr/2018/05/blog-post_15.html.
12 Law 4540/2018 on the transposition of the Directive 2013/33/EU.
13  Article 14 par. 2 Law 4375/2016 states that the Director of the Reception and 
Identification Centre (RIC) may decide to transfer vulnerable people to the 
mainland to continue the registration and identification process.
14  Interview of the Director can be found here:  
refugeeobservatory.aegean.gr/en/interview-ex-director-greek-asylum-
service
Although vulnerability allows some asylum seekers to leave the 
islands and travel to Athens, they still remain in a precarious 
situation. This is due to the large number of asylum seekers 
waiting for their case to be examined and the inability of the 
central Asylum Service to examine their applications in a 
reasonable time. Having escaped the islands, asylum seekers who 
are not eligible for a shelter have to cover housing and living 
expenses on their own. 
In addition, although there is no legal provision for the profiling of 
asylum seekers, in practice asylum seekers with specific 
nationalities such as Pakistanis and Moroccans are considered to 
have a low asylum recognition rate and, as a result, they are often 
transferred to pre-removal centres soon after their arrest. 
Protection of Minors
Regarding minors, Article 10 Law 4540/2018 (incorporating 
Article 11 Directive 2013/33/EU into Greek law) suggests the 
avoidance of detention of minors and allows detention only as a 
last resort and for the sole reason of their safe referral to a 
suitable shelter. However, in practice, unaccompanied and 
separated children still reside in safe zones of hotspots, and many 
of them are homeless in Athens. 
Although children have access to asylum and have the right to free 
legal assistance if their guardian is not a lawyer, different 
procedures are followed in Greece in different areas regarding age 
assessment. 
Moreover, due to a strict interpretation of the Dublin III deadline 
for the submission of a transfer request to another Member State15 
many children are deprived of their right to get asylum in another 
Member State where they have family links.
 
15  Article 21 Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national or a stateless person (recast).
Access to Asylum
Finally, because of the large number of pending asylum cases, the 
registration and examination rate is still very low. Asylum seekers 
in Greece remain in uncertainty for very long periods.16 At the same 
time, organisations accuse the authorities of engaging in push-
backs that prevent access to international protection. 
Based on the above-mentioned considerations, this research will 
focus on the following key areas of concern regarding the 
challenges that persons in need of international protection face in 
Greece:
-  The challenges that Law 4540/2018 creates for asylum seekers 
in Greece.
-  The impact of the geographical limitation on the examination 
of asylum claims. 
-  How the ‘safe third country’ concept applies in the Greek 
asylum system. 
-  The impact of the vulnerability assessment in asylum 
procedures.
- EASO participation in the asylum procedures.
-  The de facto profiling of asylum seekers based on their 
nationality.
-  The impact of current age assessment methods and Dublin 
transfers to the right of children to seek asylum.
- Access to asylum in the mainland and at the borders.
 
Methodology
The aim of this research is to identify the core challenges that 
asylum seekers face nowadays in Greece, whether this is in 
conformity with the CEAS, who may have responsibility for any 
shortcomings and to investigate which solutions are proposed by 
people working at organisations that protect the rights of 
refugees.
Part I of this research is based on desk research of the Greek 
legislation, Greek and EU jurisprudence, reports of international 
and human rights organisations and academic Articles. Part II is 
based on interviews with representatives of the Greek 
administration, parliamentarians, the EU and prominent 
organisations. 
16  According to the statistics of the Asylum Service, 5.091 cases are pending at 
first instance as of 07/09/2018. Statistical Data of the Greek Asylum Service 
(from 7.6.2013 to 31.08.2018).
This research is conducted in the context of the Common European 
Asylum System and, more concretely, of the Recast Procedures 
Directive,17 Directive 2011/95/EU18 and Directive 2013/33/EU.19 
It is also based on the provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention on 
the Status of Refugees.20 With regard to the Greek legal context, it 
is based on the amended Law 4375/201621 transposing Directive 
2013/32/EU and Law 4540/2018 on the transposition of the recast 
Directive 2013/33/EU.
For the purpose of this research, the term ‘refugee’ refers to a 
third-country national who, owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the 
country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that 
country, or a stateless person, who, being outside of the country of 
former habitual residence for the same reasons as mentioned 
above, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it, and 
to whom Article 12 Directive 2011/95/EU does not apply.22
The term ‘asylum seeker’ is synonymous to the term asylum 
applicant meaning a third-country national or a stateless person 
who has made or wants to make an application for international 
protection in respect of which a final decision has not yet been 
taken.23 
The term ‘minor’ refers to a third-country national or stateless 
person below the age of 18 years.24 
The term ‘migrant’ refers to a third country national who is not an 
asylum seeker or a refugee, falling out of the scope of Directive 
2011/95/EU, meaning a person not granted refugee status or 
subsidiary protection who has not made an asylum application nor 
is willing to do so. 
17  Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international 
protection.
18  Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals 
or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a 
uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, 
and for the content of the protection granted.
19  Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for 
international protection.
20  UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 
1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137. 
21  Law 4375/2016 on the organization and operation of the Asylum Service, the 
Appeals Authority, the Reception and Identification Service, the 
establishment of the General Secretariat for Reception, the transposition 
into Greek legislation of the provisions of Directive 2013/32/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council ‘on common procedures for granting 
and withdrawing international protection (recast)’ (L 180/29.6.2013), 
provisions ‘on employment of beneficiaries of international protection’ and 
other provisions. 
22 Article 2(d) Directive 2011/95/EU. 
23 Article 2 (i) Directive 2011/95/EU.
24 Article 2 (k)Directive 2011/95/EU . 
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EASO is the European Asylum Support Office established for the 
implementation of the CEAS, to strengthen practical cooperation 
among Member States on asylum and to provide and/or coordinate 
the provision of operational support to Member States subject to 
particular pressure on their asylum and reception systems.25
The term ‘vulnerable persons’ in this research refers to the 
categories of persons mentioned in Article 21 Directive 2013/33/
EU.26  
The term ‘safe third country’ refers to the concept described in 
Articles 36-39 of Directive 2013/32/EU.
Finally, ‘CEAS’ refers to the European Union’s objective of 
establishing progressively an area of freedom, security and 
justice open to those who, forced by circumstances, legitimately 
seek protection in the Union. This entails that the principle of non-
refoulement will be respected, ensuring that nobody is sent back 
to a country where he has well-founded fear to be persecuted. It 
also aims at the establishment of common standards for fair and 
efficient asylum procedures in the Member States and, in the 
longer term, Union rules leading to a common asylum procedure in 
the Union.27
25  Article 1 Regulation (EU) No. 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 19 May 2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office. 
26  This list includes minors, unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly 
people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, victims of 
human trafficking, persons with serious illnesses, persons with mental 
disorders and persons who have been subjected to torture, rape or other 
serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence, such as victims 
of female genital mutilation.
27 See par. 2-4 of the preamble Directive 2013/32/EU. 
4. Part I: Legal framework
 
Introduction
The first part of this research is mainly based on Greek legislative 
reforms after the EU-Turkey Statement. Before the endorsement 
of this Statement, asylum procedures in Greece were based on 
Presidential Decree 141/2013, transposing Directive 2011/95/EU28 
and Law 3907/2011 creating the Asylum Service and the First 
Reception Service in Greece. Directive 2013/32/EU had not yet 
been transposed into Greek legislation. The legal framework 
before 2016 did not foresee any restriction of movement for 
asylum seekers within the Greek territory. It did not contain any 
reference to the special treatment of vulnerable persons either. 
Furthermore, the safe third country concept had not been 
introduced. Any returns of asylum seekers to third transit 
countries (Turkey) were taking place according to the Protocol of 
Readmission signed between Greece and Turkey.29  
As will be analysed further in this part, despite the fact that this 
Joint Statement is not officially recognised as anything more than 
a political declaration, it has become the source of serious 
changes in the treatment of asylum seekers in Greece. These 
changes aim at accelerating the asylum determination procedures 
and facilitating the returns to Turkey of these categories of 
asylum seekers included in the Statement. 
One of the main changes was the restriction of movement of 
asylum seekers who enter Greece from the sea borders and arrive 
in islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea. As will be explained, this 
geographical limitation has not only affected the reception of 
asylum seekers. It has also created a distinct asylum examination 
procedure, known as ‘fast track border procedure’. Under this 
procedure, Syrian applicants are most likely to have their claims 
rejected as inadmissible, because Turkey is considered to be a safe 
country for them, unless they prove that they are vulnerable. 
Moreover, nationalities that have a low recognition rate face a 
greater risk of detention. The EASO participation in the asylum 
examination procedure was meant to help speed up the process. 
This newly acquired role has challenged the traditional State 
owned responsibility to decide on asylum requests. 
28  Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals 
or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a 
uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary 
protection, and for the content of the protection granted. 
29  Protocol of Readmission signed between Greece and Turkey on 09/01/2001 
and ratified with Law 3073/ 2002.
Furthermore, after the closure of the Balkan route in 2016, asylum 
seekers have been confined in a limbo situation in Greece. Since 
they are unable to leave, more and more people choose to apply for 
asylum. As a result, the GAS has a considerable backlog, therefore 
asylum examination can be considerably delayed. Access to 
asylum is also hampered by the alleged continuation of pushbacks 
at the land borders with Turkey. Finally, unaccompanied and 
separated children are also facing serious difficulties since many 
of them are homeless or remain in places of high risk. The limited 
reception capacity in combination with the tendency of other EU 
Member States to deny Dublin transfers has exposed them to 
exploitation.
Part I will use the CEAS as a context for analysing how the above-
mentioned factors affect the rights of asylum seekers in Greece, 
and whether this is in respect of the relevant EU legislation. 
 
I.   The Challenges that Law 4540/2018 Brings 
to Asylum Seekers in Greece
 
On May 2018, Greece adopted a new law30 transposing Directive 
2013/33/EU and, at the same time, partially reforming the asylum 
procedures and the rights of asylum seekers in Greece as 31 they 
had been set in Law 4375/201632 they had been set in Law 
4375/2016. The main challenges that the new law specifically 
brings to asylum seekers, irrespective of the geographical area 
where they lodge their asylum application, are listed below.
30  Law 4540/2018, Adaptation of Greek legislation to the provisions of 
Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 on the requirements for the reception of applicants for 
international protection (recast, L 180/96 / 29.6.2013) and other 
Amendments to Law 4251/2014 (A ‘80) adapting Greek legislation to 
Directive 2014/66 /EU of 15 May 2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals 
in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer, reform of asylum 
procedures and other provisions, Gazette A 91 / 22-05-2018.
31  Law 4375/2016, ‘Organisation and functioning of the Asylum Service, 
Appeals Authority, Reception and Identification Service, establishment of 
General Secretariat for Reception, transposition of Directive 2013/32/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council ‘on common procedures for 
granting and withdrawing international protection (recast)’ (L 
180/29.6.2013), provisions ‘on employment of beneficiaries of 
international protection’ and other provisions. Gazette 51/A/3-4-2016, 
amended by: Law 4399/2016, Gazette 117/A/22-6-2016, amended by: Law 
4461/2017, Gazette 38/A/28-3-2017, amended by: Law 4485/2017, Gazette 
114/A/4-8-2017.
32  This law mainly aims at reforming the reception of asylum seekers in Greece 
and the enjoyment of rights such as education and access to work, including 
the treatment of unaccompanied children and minors. Reception aspects 
are not examined in this research.
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1.   First of all, the new law provides a definition of asylum seekers 
that limits their scope of protection. More concretely, Article 
34 of the previous Law 4375/2016 stated that an asylum seeker 
is a person who declares either orally or in writing to any 
authority at the entry points of Greece or in the mainland that 
he/she asks for asylum or subsidiary protection or not to be 
deported to a country where he/she has a fear of persecution 
according to the 1951 Geneva Convention; he/she is also a 
person that has applied for asylum in another Member State 
and is transferred to Greece according to the Dublin 
Regulation. 
  Nevertheless, Article 2 par. b Law 4540/2018 is a mere 
translation of the text of Directive 2013/33/EU according to 
which an asylum seeker is somebody who has already 
submitted an asylum application while a final decision is 
pending. This definition, although it is in conformity with the 
Directive, excludes a large number of persons who did not have 
the opportunity to register and submit a formal asylum claim 
because of the delays in the registration and pre-registration 
procedure and excludes them from the enjoyment of the rights 
accorded to an asylum seeker.33 
2.   Article 7 Law 4540/2018 states that the Director of the Asylum 
Service, by means of a general decision, may place restrictions 
to the free movement of asylum seekers in Greece, thus 
assigning them to stay in a specific geographic area. This 
practice has already been followed before the adoption of the 
new law,34 creating what is nowadays called ‘geographical 
limitation’. The new law reaffirms this practice. This provision 
affects the examination of asylum claims in the designated 
geographical areas as it will be further explained in the chapter 
concerning the geographical limitation. 
3.   Article 23 par. 1 Law 4540/2018 mentions that victims of 
torture, rape or other serious acts of violence can only be 
certified by a public hospital, military hospital or by public 
doctors. This provision is stricter than the provision of 
Directive 2013/33/EU, which states ‘Member States shall 
ensure that persons who have been subjected to torture, rape 
or other serious acts of violence receive the necessary 
treatment… in particular access to appropriate medical and 
psychological treatment and care’35 without limiting this to 
public health institutions.
  Certification of torture, rape or serious acts of violence plays a 
crucial role in the examination of the asylum claim and the 
granting of international protection. Greece has ratified the 
UN Convention on Torture.36 
33  Article 36, par.1 b Law 4375/2016.
34  Before the adoption of the new law, 2 general decisions have already been 
issued by the Director of the Asylum Service ordering the restriction of 
movement for asylum seekers on the islands of eastern Aegean. 
35  Article 25 Directive 2013/33/EU.
36 Law 1782/1988.
Since in Greece there is no public service specialised in certifying 
torture, this provision makes it harder for these vulnerable groups 
to enjoy more favourable reception conditions37 and use this 
vulnerability in their asylum claim. 
4.   Article 28 par. 20 Law 4540/2018 modifies the modalities for 
the delivery of appeals decisions to asylum seekers adding the 
possibility to upload the decision to a webpage. Directive 
2013/32/EU does not describe the modalities for the delivery 
of a decision to the applicant or his/her counsellor, though it 
requires that:
   ‘they shall be informed of the result of the decision by 
the determining authority in a language that they 
understand or are reasonably supposed to understand 
when they are not assisted or represented by a legal 
adviser or other counsellor. The information provided 
shall include information on how to challenge a negative 
decision in accordance with the provisions of Article 
11(2).’38
  This provision does not exclude the possibility for notifying 
the applicant via internet. However, the language of the 
Directive implies that it is necessary for each applicant to be 
able to understand the content and the consequences of the 
decision, as well as the legal remedies at his/her disposal. 
Otherwise, the right to be informed and the right to seek 
asylum would be devoid of meaning. If the applicant cannot or 
does not know how to use the internet, he will lose the 
possibility to learn the decision to his asylum claim and make 
use of a legal remedy. By analogy, if the Directive wants to 
guarantee the proper information of the applicant through 
language, this would also require information by a means that 
is accessible to the applicant. The provision of the Greek law 
does not guarantee that the person will actually be informed 
of the content of this decision.39
5.   Article 28 par. 5 Law 4540/2018 defines what is a final asylum 
decision without giving it a suspensive effect against 
deportation. More concretely, this Article replaces Article 34 
par. e Law 4365/2017 which defined a final decision as ‘a 
decision upon which a foreigner or stateless person is 
recognised as a refugee or beneficiary of subsidiary 
protection and that cannot be challenged by the appeal of 
article 64’ meaning an appeal at the Council of State. 
  With the new law, a final decision is ‘a decision upon which a 
foreigner or stateless person is recognised or not as a refugee 
or beneficiary of subsidiary protection, issued after the appeal 
of second instance, or a decision that cannot be appealed 
because the deadline has expired. Against a final decision 
there can only be an appeal at the Council of State.’ 
 
37 Article 20 Law 4540/2018.
38 Article 12 par.1 e Directive 2013/32/EU. 
39  M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application no. 30696/09, Council of Europe: 
European Court of Human Rights, 21 January 2011, par. 290 on the 
prerequisites for a legal remedy.
  This means that a decision by the appeals committees of second 
instance (or having lost the deadline to submit such an appeal) 
is currently a final decision allowing the deportation of the 
applicant, something that was formerly possible after the 
decision of the Council of State. It is doubtful if this reform is in 
conformity with the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR).40
6.   Law 4540/2018 reduces deadlines that are of utmost 
importance to asylum seekers, thus limiting their right to an 
effective protection. For instance, if the first instance decision 
is not delivered to the applicant for any reason, he used to have 
a 60 days deadline to file an appeal counting from the expiry of 
his asylum ID card or, if this expires before the issuing of the 
decision, from the date of the decision. With the new law, he 
only has 30 days. Moreover, the deadline for delivering a first 
instance asylum decision in the fast-track procedure is now 30 
days (instead of 3 months). 
  The new provisions provide for an acceleration of the 
examination procedures at the borders that is sometimes 
beneficial for asylum seekers because from the 
administration’s point of view it speeds up the clarification of 
his/her status. In other cases, due to time pressure, it makes it 
very difficult for the asylum seeker to prepare and claim his/her 
rights.
  According to Directive 2013/32/EU, the authorities should 
reach a decision at first instance within 4 weeks.41 The legal 
reform in Greece followed this guideline. However, the same 
Article of the Directive obliges the authorities to allow the 
applicant to enter mainland if such a deadline has not been 
respected. In Greece, applicants remain in the islands where a 
geographical limitation applies much longer than this period. 
In addition, taking into account the lack of capacity of the 
relevant examining authorities, there are doubts as to the fair 
and efficient examination of asylum claims.42 
7.   Law 4540/2018 allows the Asylum Service, in cases of 
emergency to use Greek speaking EASO staff in the registration 
of asylum seekers and ‘in any other administrative act that has 
to do with the examination of requests of international 
protection’.43 This means that EASO staff cannot only 
participate in the examination of asylum claims at the fast 
track border procedures, as it happened until now, but they can 
also participate in the regular asylum procedures anywhere in 
the country. 
40 Ibid.
41 Article 43 par. 2 Directive 2013/32/EU. 
42  See also the reaction of the Commissioner of the Council of Europe towards 
France for reducing the deadline for submitting asylum applications to 90 
days. Given the many obstacles faced by asylum seekers when they arrive in 
the country, this deadline may be difficult to comply with. He also considers 
that the processing under an accelerated procedure of asylum applications 
filed after the expiry of the proposed deadline will not take into account the 
vulnerability of asylum seekers and the complexity of their cases. Letter: 
The Commissioner is concerned by certain provisions of the draft law on 
immigration and asylum in France, 12/03/2018.
43 Article 28 par. 7 Law 4540/2018.
  This provision, as it will be further explained in chapter V, is not 
foreseen in the Statute of the organisation44 and challenges 
State sovereignty in respect to the assessment of individual 
asylum applications. 
8.   Law 4540/2018 lowers the procedural standards for the 
selection of the Director of the Asylum Service. More 
concretely, according to the previous law, he was selected by a 
tripartite committee comprising a representative of the Greek 
Ombudsman, a representative of the Greek Supreme Council for 
Civil Personnel Selection (ASEP) and one University Professor, 
all of them proposed by UNHCR. With the new law, he/she is 
selected directly by the Minister of Migration. Taking into 
account the importance of this authority for the asylum policies 
in Greece, this legal reform casts doubts on the transparency of 
the selection procedure. 
  Although the afore-mentioned concerns have also been raised 
before the adoption of this law by the National Commission for 
Human Rights,45 they have not been taken into account by the 
legislator, thus compromising the protection of asylum seekers 
in Greece. A detailed analysis of the main current challenges 
that asylum seekers face in Greece follows in the next chapters 
of Part I. 
 
II.   The Impact of Geographical Limitatio on the 
Examination of Asylum Claims
 
 The Geographical Limitation in the Framework of the 
EU-Turkey Statement
On March 2016, the Council of the European Union announced that 
  ‘All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek 
islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey… All 
migrants will be protected in accordance with the relevant 
international standards and in respect of the principle of non-
refoulement. It will be a temporary and extraordinary measure 
which is necessary to end the human suffering and restore 
public order. 
44  Regulation (EU) No. 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 19 May 2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office, Article 2(6) 
states: ‘The Support Office shall have no powers in relation to the taking of 
decisions by Member States’ asylum authorities on individual applications 
for international protection’.
45  ΕΕΔΑ,	Παρατηρήσεις	στο	σχέδιο	νόμου	του	Υπουργείου	
Μεταναστευτικής	Πολιτικής	‘Προσαρμογή	της	ελληνικής	νομοθεσίας	
προς	τις	διατάξεις	της	Οδηγίας	2013/33/ΕΕ	του	Ευρωπαϊκού	
Κοινοβουλίου	και	του	Συμβουλίου	της	26ης	Ιουνίου	2013,	σχετικά	με	τις	
απαιτήσεις	για	την	υποδοχή	των	αιτούντων	διεθνή	προστασία	
(αναδιατύπωση,	L	180/96/29.6.2013)	και	άλλες	διατάξεις	–	Τροποποίηση	
του	ν.	4251/2014	(Α’	80)	για	την	προσαρμογή	της	ελληνικής	νομοθεσίας	
στην	Οδηγία	2014/66/ΕΕ	της	15ης	Μαΐου	2014	του	Ευρωπαϊκού	
Κοινοβουλίου	και	του	Συμβουλίου	σχετικά	με	τις	προϋποθέσεις	εισόδου	
και	διαμονής	υπηκόων	τρίτων	χωρών	στο	πλαίσιο	ενδοεταιρικής	
μετάθεσης	–	Τροποποίηση	διαδικασιών	ασύλου	και	άλλες	διατάξεις’,	
07/05/2018.
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  Migrants arriving in the Greek islands will be duly registered 
and any application for asylum will be processed individually 
by the Greek authorities in accordance with the Directive 
2013/32/EU, in cooperation with UNHCR.’ 46 
In this context, an Afghan who was going to be returned to Turkey 
brought actions to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) claiming that this so-called Statement is in fact an 
international agreement. Although some scholars support this 
opinion,47 the Court declared that it lacks jurisdiction to hear and 
determine the actions because ‘neither the European Council nor 
any other institution of the EU decided to conclude an agreement 
with the Turkish Government on the subject of the migration 
crisis’.48 In this way, the CJEU denied any EU legal responsibility 
regarding the implementation of this measure. 
Despite the fact that this Statement has direct consequences for 
the legal status and treatment of asylum seekers who come from 
Turkey to Europe, it was officially acknowledged by the EU that it is 
only a political statement between the Heads of State of Member 
States. According to the Court, the EU-Turkey Statement, as 
published by means of Press Release No. 144/16, cannot be 
regarded as a measure adopted by the European Council, or, 
moreover, by any other institution, body, office or agency of the 
European Union. It is a declaration of the Heads of State of the EU 
and their Turkish counterparts.49 Nevertheless, the EU monitors 
closely the implementation of this Statement.50 
Although the nature of the Statement is contested, Greece 
nonetheless decided to restrict the movement of asylum seekers 
that would arrive from Turkey after the 20th of March 2016 by 
means of a general decision of the Director of the Asylum Service. 
Based on the provision of Article 41 par.1 Law 4375/2016 that 
allows the Director of the Asylum Service to restrict the movement 
of persons in some geographic areas,51 Ms. Stavropoulou, former 
Director of the Asylum Service ordered the RAO of Kos, Leros, 
Samos, Lesbos, Chios and Rhodes to mention on the asylum ID 
cards of persons coming to Greece after the 20th of March 2016 that 
they have to remain in those areas. 
46 EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016, press release 144/16, 18/03/2016.
47  Maarten den Heijer & Thomas Spijkerboer, ‘Is the EU-Turkey refugee and 
migration deal a treaty?’, EU Law Analysis, 7 April 2016. The authors suggest 
that the EU cannot invoke non-compliance with its own internal procedural 
rules in order not to be legally bound by a treaty, based on Article 46 VCL. 
They also claim that such a declaration does not only repeat pre-existing 
obligations but creates new ones stretching from the quotas in returns and 
resettlement of Syrian refugees to financial aid and technical support.
48  General Court of the European Union, Press Release No. 19/17, Luxembourg, 
28 February 2017.
49  CJEU, Case T193/16, Order of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended 
Composition), 28 February 2017.
50  EU Commission, Seventh Report on the Progress made in the implementation 
of the EU-Turkey Statement, Brussels, 6.9.2017; EU Commission, press 
release, ‘The European Agenda on Migration: EU needs to sustain progress 
made over the past 4 years’, 06/03/2019, COM(2017) 470 final
51 The same provision lies in Directive 2013/33/EU, Article 7 par.1.
It was added that this restriction would not change even if the 
examination of their asylum case would be referred to an asylum 
service in the mainland.52 
This decision did not make any explicit reference to the EU-Turkey 
Statement or to the principle of proportionality. In this decision, 
the Greek administration avoided to make reference or to 
acknowledge responsibility for the implementation of the 
EU-Turkey Statement. 
The Greek Council for Refugees and the Bar Associations of 
Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Kos lodged an appeal at the Council of 
State against this decision. The Council of State accepted the 
appeal and stressed that although a restriction of movement is not 
illegal, the respective decision was not well reasoned by the 
administration because it does’ not mention how it serves public 
interest, it leads to an uneven distribution of asylum seekers in 
Greece and places an excessive burden on some islands.53 
However, after the annulment from the Council of State of that 
respective decision, the new Director of the Asylum Service, Mr. 
Karavias, issued a 2nd decision54 that justifies the need for a 
geographical restriction of movement. This decision explicitly 
mentions the EU-Turkey Statement, reasons of public interest and 
the need for a more efficient migration policy in Greece. More 
concretely, the decision states that this measure is supposed to 
contribute to a faster and more efficient supervision of the 
requests for international protection, the administration of 
asylum seekers in the Greek territory and the realisation of the 
EU-Turkey Statement. It is also stated that this is a temporary 
measure that does not violate the right to private life, nor access 
to the rights for asylum seekers as prescribed in the Greek, 
European and international law. In this way, Greece assumes part 
of the responsibility for the implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Statement.
On the 5th of October 2018, the Director of the Asylum Service 
issued a 3rd decision that prolongs the geographical limitation.55 
The new decision justifies this restriction of movement by 
referring to the general interest and migration policies and more 
concretely, the fast and efficient monitoring of asylum claims, the 
administration of asylum seekers found on /at Greek territory, and 
the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement. 
52  Decision 10464/2017 of the Director of the Asylum Service on restriction of 
movement of applicants for international protection, Gazette 
B/1977/07.06.2017 and Decision 8269/2018 of the Director of the Asylum 
Service on restriction of movement of applicants for international 
protection.
53  Council of State, Decision 805/2018.
54 Decision 8269 of 20/04/2018.
55  Decision of the Director of the Asylum Service no. 18984 of 05/10/2018, 
Asylum Service Director Decision 18984, Gov. Gazette B 4427/05.10.2018.
This decision repeats the conditions for the restriction of 
movement of asylum seekers as described in Directive 2013/33/
EU: 
  2.   Member States may decide on the residence of the 
applicant for reasons of public interest, public order or, 
when necessary, for the swift processing and effective 
monitoring of his or her application for international 
protection.
 3.   Member States may make provision of the material 
reception conditions subject to actual residence by the 
applicants in a specific place, to be determined by the 
Member States. Such a decision, which may be of a 
general nature, shall be taken individually and 
established by national law.
 4.   Member States shall provide for the possibility of 
granting applicants temporary permission to leave the 
place of residence mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 and/
or the assigned area mentioned in paragraph 1. 
Decisions shall be taken individually, objectively and 
impartially and reasons shall be given if they are 
negative.56
The decision stresses the need to respect the principle of 
proportionality and to issue individual decisions based on this 
general decision. The decision excludes from this limitation 
vulnerable persons and those waiting to be transferred to another 
Member State according to the Dublin Regulation. 
The restriction of movement is linked to the hotspot policy in 
Europe. Despite the severe criticism on the reception conditions, 
the ECtHR was reluctant to find violations. The Court of Strasbourg 
was called to decide on the case of three Afghans who were 
detained in Vial hotspot in Chios, in 2016.57 Initially the applicants 
were detained on the basis of fear of absconding. Then the centre 
became semi-open. The applicants complained that their 
detention was arbitrary, violating the right to liberty (Article 5 
ECHR) and protection against torture (Article 3 ECHR). The Court 
found no violations of the respective Articles, arguing that the 
reception conditions in the hotspots in Greece may be 
problematic, since there is a lack of doctors, lawyers, water and 
food of good quality, yet the refugee crisis that Greece had to face 
somehow justified these deficiencies, which are by no means equal 
to torture or degrading treatment.
 
56 Article 7 par.2-4 Directive 2013/33/EU. 
57 ECtHR, J.R. et autres c. Grèce – 22696/16, Arrêt 25.1.2018.
Geographical Limitation and the Right to International 
Protection
If the objective of the geographical limitation was to facilitate 
returns to Turkey, then the goal has proved to be far-fetched. Only 
1.843 persons have been returned from April 2016 until the end of 
March 2019 under the EU-Turkey Statement.58 Bearing in mind that 
only in 2017 the sea arrivals from Turkey to Greece were 29.718,59 
the return number is extremely low. 
Moreover, the geographical limitation created two asylum 
procedures; the fast-track border procedure applicable on the 
islands of Lesbos, Kos, Leros, Samos, Chios and Rhodes for all 
non-vulnerable asylum seekers who have to remain there and the 
regular procedure applicable to asylum seekers present in the rest 
of the country. 
More concretely, asylum seekers who arrive at the islands of 
Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Leros, Rhodes and Kos are examined 
according to a fast-track borders procedure60 as described in 
Article 60 par. 4 of Law 4375/2016. On the contrary, persons in 
need of international protection who arrive in Evros61 go through 
the regular asylum procedure and, although they have to apply for 
asylum in the regional asylum office of Evros, they do not have a 
restriction of movement. As a result, in Greece there are de jure 
and de facto double standards regarding the treatment of persons 
in need of international protection based on their point of entry. 
The fast-track border procedure is described in Article 60 par. 4 of 
Law 4375/2016 which introduces shorter deadlines throughout the 
asylum examination process. For instance, the fast-track 
applicant has one day to prepare before the asylum interview (it is 
7 days for the rest of the applicants), 15 days to lodge an appeal if 
the first instance decision has not been delivered (the normal 
deadline is 30 days), 2 days for the appeals authority to reach a 
decision after the examination of the file, one day for the applicant 
to submit a note relevant to the examination of his appeal. The first 
instance asylum decision must be delivered the day after the 
interview.
As it has already been mentioned, Directive 2013/32/EU allows for 
border procedures to set a deadline of 4 weeks for completion of 
an asylum examination, on the condition that if this fails, the 
person must be allowed to enter the mainland.62 This is not the case 
for applicants under the fast-track border procedures. In addition, 
fast-track border procedures in conjunction with the geographical 
limitation make it hard for asylum seekers to meet the deadlines 
and prepare themselves for the examination of their case. 
58 data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/68670. 
59 data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179. 
60  Decision of the Ministers of Interior and Defence no. 13257/2016 specifying 
the areas where the borders procedure is applied. 
61  Migrants still cross the Evros border in big numbers. According to UNHCR, 
on July 2018, 2.550 migrants arrived by sea and another 1.500 by land. See: 
UNHCR Factsheet, 1-31 July 2018,  
reliefweb.int/report/greece/unhcr-greece-factsheet-july-2018
62 Article 43 par. 2 Directive 2013/32/EU.
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Furthermore, although Evros and Crete are also border areas of 
Greece, the afore-mentioned procedure is not applicable. As a 
result, applicants who enter Evros and Crete are examined under 
the regular procedure and they have no restriction of movement. 
This means that under Article 60 par. 2 of Law 4375/2016, they may 
leave the border reception facility and travel to the mainland if 28 
days have passed from the day of the submission of their asylum 
application and a decision has not been issued. 
In any case, this is not the only negative impact on the 
examination of asylum claims under the fast-track border 
procedure. Except for Directive 2013/33/EU at the overcrowded 
islands of the Aegean and the extremely limited legal aid,63 the 
safe third country concept leads to the inadmissibility of asylum 
claims mainly affecting Syrians. Moreover, EASO has been 
criticised for participating in the asylum examination process in 
the fast-track border procedure. Finally, the only way for such an 
applicant to go to the regular procedure that offers more rights 
and guarantees is to prove that he/she is vulnerable. An analysis of 
these factors follows suit. 
III.   The ‘Safe Third Country’ Concept in the 
Greek Asylum System
 The Safe Third Country Concept in EU and Greek 
Legislation
According to Article 39 Directive 2013/32/EU 
  ‘Member States may provide that no, or no full, examination of 
the application for international protection and of the safety 
of the applicant … shall take place in cases where a competent 
authority has established, on the basis of the facts, that the 
applicant is seeking to enter or has entered illegally into its 
territory from a safe third country ...’
The Directive sets out a list of criteria to determine whether a non-
EU country is safe; whether the country has ratified and observes 
the provisions of the Geneva Convention without any geographical 
limitations;64 whether it has in place an asylum procedure 
prescribed by law; whether it has ratified the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and observes its provisions, including the standards relating to 
effective remedies.
63  On January 2018 there was only one registered lawyer to provide free legal 
aid to the thousands of migrants in Lesbos, one in Chios, one in Rhodes, one 
in Kos and none in Samos, Leros and Crete. See Decision 2848 of 29/01/2018 
for the distribution of registered lawyers to the registry of the Asylum 
Service. 
64  However, the Commission has stated in a communication of 2016 that ‘the 
Commission underlines that the concept of safe third country as defined in 
the Asylum Procedures Directive 39 requires that the possibility exists to 
receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention, but does not 
require that the safe third country has ratified that Convention without 
geographical reservation’. See: European Commission, Communication on 
the State of Play of Implementation of the Priority Actions under the 
European Agenda on Migration, Brussels, 10.2.2016, COM (2016) 85 final.
Article 38 prescribes that Member States can apply this concept 
only if they are satisfied that the country respects the following 
conditions:
(a)  life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion;
(b)  there is no risk of serious harm as defined in Directive 
2011/95/EU;
(c)  the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the 
Geneva Convention is respected;
(d)  the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom 
from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as 
laid down in international law, is respected; and
(e)  the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found 
to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the 
Geneva Convention.
Law 4375/2016 (transposing these Articles into Greek legislation) 
mentions that a country is safe for an individual if:
a)   his/her life and freedom are not in danger because of his/her 
race, ethnicity, belonging to a specific social group or because 
of his/her political beliefs;
b)   the country respects the principle of non-refoulement 
according to the Geneva Convention;
c)   there is no risk of serious harm according to the definition of 
serious harm in the subsidiary protection norms;
d)   the specific country forbids the removal of the person to 
another country where he/she risks to be subjected to torture 
or inhuman or degrading treatment, as defined in 
international law;
e)   the person can seek refugee status and receive protection 
according to the 1951 Geneva Convention;
f)   the person has a link to the specific country and therefore it 
would be reasonable for him/her to go to this country. 
 
If a country is deemed safe for an applicant, his/her asylum 
application is considered inadmissible, according to Article 54 par. 
d of the same law. This law refers to a national list of safe countries 
that until today has not been created.  
How the Safe Third Country Concept is Applied in Greece
Since there is no list of safe third countries in Greece, the safe 
third country concept applies on a case-by-case basis or 
depending on the specificities of the geographical area of Greece 
where each person is examined. This concept was not applied in 
Greece before the adoption of the EU-Turkey Statement. 
Therefore, this research will only assess how this concept is 
applied in the context of the EU Turkey Statement. 
 As it has already been mentioned, the concept is mostly applied in 
the context of the Fast-Track Border Procedure under Article 60 
par. 4 Law 4375/2016 on 6 eastern Aegean islands for those arrived 
after 20 March 2016 who are subject to the EU-Turkey Statement. It 
has particularly affected asylum seekers with nationalities with a 
high recognition rate over 25%, thereby including Syrians, 
Afghans and Iraqis. Consequently, the admissibility rate for these 
nationalities has dropped considerably.65 Taking into account that 
the State funded lawyers in the eastern Aegean islands are very 
few,66 the lack in legal aid is making it difficult for applicants to 
challenge the presumption of Turkey being a safe third country.
In addition, due to the fact that Greece does not require for a 
country to be safe, that is has fully implemented the 1951 Geneva 
Convention without any restrictions, asylum seekers in Greece 
risk to be deported to Turkey with less guarantees than those 
described in the current EU legislation. This risk exists for persons 
who apply for asylum at the islands.
Moreover, although Greek law demands a thorough check of 
whether a third country can be safe for an applicant, in 2016 
Greece decided to replace the independent committees of the 
Appeals Authority with new ones. According to the new law,67 the 
independent appeals committees consist of three members; two of 
them being judges of the regular Greek administrative courts, 
selected by their own respective service, taking into account their 
experience in refugee law, whereas the third member is selected 
by UNHCR. However, it is doubtful if these committees are truly 
independent, taking into account that the majority of their 
members are no longer independent experts but judges. 
Although the participation of judges is not supposed to have a 
negative effect on the right to seek asylum, in practice, as it will 
be explained further on, the new appeals committees tend to 
recognise fewer Syrians as refugees.
The new Law 4540/2018 maintains the status of the appeals 
committees adding the possibility of the replacement of their 
members if there are delays in the delivery of decisions68 and 
makes it mandatory for the appeals committees, if they accept an 
appeal, to examine the case in substance instead of referring it 
back to the first instance.69 Considering the low recognition rates 
of the second degree, this provision reduces the possibility of 
receiving international protection.
65  Greek Council for Refugees, Asylum Information Database (AIDA), Safe 
third country, Greece, Athens: GCR 2017. This report mentions that in 2017, 
71.4% of the applications for asylum of Syrian nationals have been 
considered inadmissible under the third safe country concept. 
66  From 31/09/2017 to 31/12/2017 there was one lawyer per island, see: 
https://www.asylumineurope.org/ reports/country/greece/asylum-
procedure/procedures/fast-track-border-procedure-eastern-aegean. 
67 Article 86 Law 4399/2016, Gazette 117/A/22-6-2016.
68 Article 28 par. 3 Law 4540/2018.
69  Article 28 par. 16 Law 4540/2018. With the exception of appeals on 
decisions of interruption of the examination of the case. 
The impact of this reform on the examination of asylum in Greece 
has been tremendous; the percentages of international protection 
at second instance have dropped significantly and they are much 
lower than those of first instance. More specifically, according to 
the statistics of the Asylum Service for the year 2018, out of 2.8921 
applications, 7.705 were given refugee status and 1.540 subsidiary 
protection. Taking into account applications that were found 
inadmissible, there is a 40,59% of recognition rate for the year 
2018 at first instance.70
However, in the same year, until the 3rd of June 2018, the new 
appeals committees had a 2,98% recognition rate (refugee status 
and subsidiary protection). Regarding the appeals submitted in 
the mainland, they rejected 2.210 out of 3.180 appeals and 
regarding the islands, they rejected 203 out of 978 appeals, in the 
same period.71 
Many organisations have criticised this amendment.72 The Greek 
Council for Refugees (GCR) and two Syrians whose cases have 
been dismissed based on the argument that Turkey is a safe 
country for them, appealed to the Council of State. In these 
appeals, GCR requested the annulment of the decrees that ordered 
the participation of judges in the new committees in replacement 
of the committees of the Presidential Decree 114/2010 and it 
challenged the safety of Turkey. GCR argued that the participation 
of judges in administrative organs that examine the international 
protection of aliens is against constitutional and EU law. It argued 
that this newly formed organ is not comparable to administrative 
organs of other Member States where the judges work exclusively, 
to avoid any conflict of interests. If the organ is not truly 
independent, there does not exist an effective remedy concerning 
the examination of asylum claims. 
On 15 February 2017, the Greek Council of the State issued a 
decision that referred these appeals to the plenary, whilst 
nonetheless stating that Turkey is a safe country for these 
applicants; it is not necessary for Turkey to have ratified the 
Geneva Convention. According to the Court, what is important is 
that Turkey grants the same level of international protection as 
the one afforded by the Geneva Convention.73
70 See tinyurl.com/gas-statistics2018
71 The program of legal aid of GCR at second instance, June 2016-August 2018. 
72 See UNHCR supra. 
73 Council of State, decision 447/2017 of 15/02/2017. 
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 The Court indeed argued that the EU legislation does not require 
such a ratification, although Directive 2013/32/EU makes explicit 
reference to the need for ratification without any geographical 
limitations: 
  ‘A third country can only be considered as a safe third country 
for the purposes of paragraph 1 where:
 (a)   it has ratified and observes the provisions of the Geneva 
Convention without any geographical limitations; 
 (b)   it has in place an asylum procedure prescribed by law; 
and 
 (c)   it has ratified the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and observes its provisions, including the standards 
relating to effective remedies.’74 
The Court also finds that the new appeals committees are lawful 
because the judges are selected by the Commissioner of 
administrative courts of Greece. 
The plenary session of the Council of State issued two decisions 
that reject these actions.75 Decision 2348/2017 mentions, inter 
alia, that:
1)   The appointment of judges in administrative committees that 
provide justice is not against the Constitution. Their 
appointment by the Commissioner of administrative courts as 
prescribed by the Constitution is a guarantee of their legal and 
functional independence.
2)  The appeals committees were not obliged under Greek law to 
invite the appellant to an interview about his case. They have 
the discretional power to decide whether an oral examination is 
necessary. For this the Court interprets Articles 47 and 48 of the 
Charter on Fundamental Rights, and finds that an appeals 
authority may reject a case without conducting a personal 
interview if there are sufficient facts on this case and if the 
person had the opportunity to present his arguments orally at 
first instance. 
3)  The Court finds that the guarantees of Article 38 Law 4375/2016 
on what makes a third country safe are fulfilled in this 
respective case. The Court mentions that in 2016 Greece and 
Turkey activated a common action plan concerning aid to Syrian 
beneficiaries of international protection and migration 
management. In this context, it was agreed that migrants who 
come to the EU through Turkey and who either do not apply for 
asylum or whose applications are rejected as inadmissible or on 
merits, would be returned to Turkey. The Court states that 
according to Directive 2013/32/EU, if a country has not ratified 
the Geneva Convention or imposes geographical restrictions, 
this is not a sufficient reason to consider the country as unsafe. 
A ‘protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention’ as 
74 Article 39 par. 2 Directive 2013/32/EU. 
75 Council of State, plenary session, decisions 2348/2017, 2347/2017. 
prescribed in the Directive, does not exclude the possibility for 
Turkey to impose restrictions of movement, residence and work 
for non-Turkish citizens. Turkey is not obliged to treat them as 
it treats Turkish nationals. 
4)  The appellant during the asylum examination cannot 
successfully provide arguments that are irrelevant to the 
recognition of refugee status or subsidiary protection. The 
Court considers that the claim of the appellant that Turkey does 
not respect the principle of non-refoulement regarding Syrians 
is therefore irrelevant and the appeals committee had good/
sufficient reasons to reject this argument. 
5)   The Court decided that there is no need to request from the CJEU 
a preliminary ruling (although 12 judges stated that there is 
ambiguity regarding the implementation of Article 28 Directive 
2013/32/EU).
  Following this decision, an appeal was lodged to the ECtHR by a 
Syrian of Armenian origin concerning his asylum procedure in 
Greece and the decision to return him to Turkey on the grounds 
of safe third country. According to the applicant 
  ‘a full, Convention-compliant assessment must be carried out, 
with the required “anxious scrutiny”, to determine whether 
Turkey can be considered as systemically or systematically a 
safe third country76… a return that exposes applicants to the 
risk of refoulement, and deprives them of rights guaranteed by 
international law, including the Refugee Convention in 
particular, clearly violates these principles, regardless of 
whether the third country is listed as a “safe third country” or 
not.’77
On 18 May 2017, the ECtHR communicated to the Greek government 
inter alia the procedural obstacles faced. The case has been 
prioritised by the Court under Rule 41 of the Rules of the Court.  
A decision is pending. Vulnerability is a factor that influences the 
safe third country concept and not only allows applicants to be 
examined according to the regular procedure, but also, to rebut the 
assumption that Turkey is a safe country for the person in 
question. 
 
76  Such assessment must entail: (i) an analysis and assessment of reports of 
international and civil society organisations on that country, including 
whether such organisations, in turn, are able to carry out independent 
human rights monitoring activities, including the situation of returnees, in 
that country; and (ii) an assessment of the ability to credibly monitor the 
relevant human rights situation in a country under a state of emergency. In 
addition, in relation to each individual, there must be a detailed and 
individualised assessment of whether Turkey will be safe for the particular 
asylum seeker.
77 ECtHR, J.B v. Greece, Application No. 54796/16.
IV.  The Impact of Vulnerability Assessment in 
Asylum Procedures
Vulnerability in EU Law and Greek Legislation
Article 21 Directive 2013/33/EU requires Member States to take 
into special account the situation of vulnerable persons when they 
implement the Directive. It provides a non-exhaustive list of 
vulnerable persons including 
  ‘…minors, unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly 
people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, 
victims of human trafficking, persons with serious illnesses, 
persons with mental disorders and persons who have been 
subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of 
psychological, physical or sexual violence, such as victims of 
female genital mutilation…’.
Article 14 par. 8 Law 4375/2016 adds to this list persons suffering 
from post-traumatic stress disorder, survivors of shipwrecks, 
relatives of victims of shipwrecks and victims of human 
trafficking, thus enlarging the scope of protection. The same 
Article requires that the Director of the Hellenic Centre for Disease 
Control and Prevention (HCDCP) refers such persons to the most 
appropriate social protection unit.
However, Article 20 par. 1 Law 4540/2018 transposing Directive 
2013/33/EU provides another, non-exhaustive list of 
vulnerabilities including minors (unaccompanied or not), 
separated minors, persons with special needs or mental disorders, 
suffering incurable or very serious disease, elders, pregnant or 
pre-natal women, victims of torture, victims of rape or any other 
form of serious psychological, physical or sexual violence or 
exploitation, victims of genital mutilation and victims of 
trafficking. Although victims of shipwreck and persons suffering 
post-traumatic stress are not included in this list, the authorities 
are allowed to broaden the scope of protection by adding new 
categories.78  
Vulnerability assessment takes place during the reception and 
identification procedures79 irrespective of the evaluation of the 
need for international protection. As a result, the authority that is 
responsible in Greece to provide a vulnerability assessment is the 
Service for the Reception and Identification that belongs to the 
Ministry of Interior. 
78  The Article provides a list of vulnerabilities using the words ‘such as’. 
79  Article 9 Law 4375/2016.
Special reception conditions are offered to vulnerable people 
from the moment of the submission of the asylum application and 
their recognition as vulnerable, except for minors where it applies 
from the moment of the identification. Article 20 par. 3 Law 
4540/2018 states that 
‘the special conditions of asylum seekers, even if they 
become apparent in a later stage of the examination process, 
they are taken into consideration throughout the whole 
procedure and their state evolution is being followed 
systematically’.
Article 28 par. 10 of Law 4540/2018 added a new paragraph to Law 
4375/2016 allowing the authorities that receive asylum 
applications and decide upon them, especially RAO or independent 
AUs, to refer asylum seekers to the HCDCP in order to assess the 
vulnerability. As soon as the medical and psychological 
assessment is concluded, the HCDCP issues an opinion that is 
forwarded to the Director of the Asylum Service and of the 
Reception and Identification Centre. This provision opens the way 
for the evaluation of vulnerability during the asylum procedures 
as well. However, in practice the HCDCP is operational in the six 
above-mentioned islands but not in Athens. 
 
The Meaning of Vulnerability for Asylum Seekers 
Examined under the Border Procedures
Vulnerability has proved to be a crucial factor not only with regard 
to the enjoyment of better reception conditions but also with 
regard to the examination of the asylum case. More concretely, 
Article 60 par. 4(f) Law 4375/2016 states that persons belonging 
to vulnerable groups are excluded from the fast-track border 
procedures described in the same Article. As a result, vulnerable 
people, although they find themselves on/at the islands where 
there is a geographical limitation of movement and the asylum 
examination is accelerated, they go through the regular asylum 
process, thus benefiting from less strict deadlines for the 
submission of applications, appeals and interviews. It is estimated 
that 2.961 applicants were exempt from the fast-track procedures 
on these grounds in 2016 (13.404 asylum applications were 
submitted in the 6 eastern Aegean islands during the same year) 
and 5.665 in the first semester of 2017.80
More so, vulnerability is taken into account by the examining 
authorities, rebutting the presumption that Turkey is a safe 
country for the specific applicant. Since the asylum authorities 
should take into account vulnerability at any stage of the 
examination procedure that this becomes apparent, there are two 
possibilities for the assessment of vulnerability. 
80 www.immigration.gr/2017/10/blog-post_3.html. 
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One during the reception and identification dealt by the reception 
and identification authorities and another one that, although it is 
not prescribed by law, may take place during the asylum 
examination, initiated by the asylum authority. Since their 
electronic databases are not connected, there are significant 
delays in the recognition of vulnerable people.81
What does this mean in practice? In many cases, first asylum 
decisions under the fast-track border procedures are decisions of 
inadmissibility based on the safe third country concept. If 
vulnerability becomes known after the asylum examination at first 
instance and the delivery of the asylum decision, the asylum 
authorities tend to withdraw the first asylum decision and replace 
it with a new one that takes into account vulnerability. However, if 
an appeal has already been submitted, the appeals authority has 
to accept the appeal and invite the applicant for an interview for 
the first time directly at second instance.82 
However, several organisations report that vulnerable persons are 
not treated accordingly in Athens. More concretely, it is reported 
that due to the large number of persons who try to register at the 
central Asylum Service, vulnerable people have to queue for hours 
outside the entrance. Moreover, although there is a special asylum 
office in Athens for vulnerable people, it is reported that this is not 
widely known to the applicants, it is hard to have access to it 
without the intervention of a lawyer or an NGO and there is no 
transportation for persons with special needs.83
Vulnerability, if seen in the general context of geographical 
limitation, is of immense value, allowing the person to be 
examined in the same way that he/she would be examined if such a 
limitation did not exist, without the fast-track asylum procedures 
and without the argument of rejection due to the existence of a 
safe third country. Asylum examination in the fast-track border 
procedures means the issuing of several identical asylum 
decisions that reject the request without deciding on the merits.84 
As a result, it becomes obvious that ‘vulnerability’ is an 
exceptional system that de facto replaces the traditional 
protection mechanisms for persons seeking international 
protection in Greece. 
81  See p. 5 par. 5 of the report of the National Commission for Human Rights, 
supra. 
82  As it has been explained before, with the new law of 2018 the appeals 
committees can no longer refer the case back to first instance if they accept 
the appeal. They would have to examine the case on the substance. If the 
first asylum decision was inadmissibility of the claim, this means that no 
interview was taken at first instance. The appeals authorities would thus 
need to interview the appellant on the merits of the case for the first and last 
time. 
83  AITHMA, Stin anamoni, Aithountes asilo stin Ellada, Opseis tis diadikasias 
asilou, report, April 2017.
84   See p. 4 of par. 3 of the report of the National Committee for Human Rights, 
cited in footnote 30. 
Although in the past persons could move freely and decide where 
to lodge their asylum application, for persons arriving at the six 
eastern Aegean islands this is no longer possible unless they are 
considered to be vulnerable. However, the treatment of vulnerable 
people is also affected by the fact that more often than not it is 
EASO that conducts the asylum interviews at the islands. EASO not 
only participates in the Greek asylum procedures taking place at 
the eastern islands, but it also conducts vulnerability 
assessments,85 thus making it hard for applicants to rebut the safe 
third country presumption in these geographical areas. In Evros, 
the tendency is not to invoke the safe third country concept in 
most asylum cases.
Consequently, it is important to examine the role of the EASO in 
the Greek asylum procedures and its responsibility. 
 
V.  EASO Participation in Asylum Procedures
EASO Mandate in Greece
The mandate of the European Asylum Support Office is described 
in Regulation no. 439 of 19 May 2010 establishing a European 
Asylum Support Office. More concretely, EASO was established in 
order to promote a Common European Asylum System. It is 
explicitly stated that it provides support for Member States 
subject to particular pressure.86 In this sense, it is entitled to 
facilitate an initial analysis of asylum applications under 
examination by the competent national authorities and to deploy 
asylum support teams. The asylum support teams provide 
expertise in relation to interpreting services, information on 
countries of origin and knowledge of the handling and 
management of asylum cases within the framework of the actions 
to support Member States.
The same Regulation clarifies that the Executive Director of the 
EASO decides the deployment of experts. Regarding the civil 
liability of these officers, the Regulation mentions that the host 
Member State shall be liable in accordance with its national law for 
any damage caused by them during their operations, except for 
cases of gross negligence or wilful misconduct.87
85  EASO Operating plan agreed by EASO and Greece, Valetta Harbour and 
Athens, 13/12/2017, Measure EL AS 1: Support for the implementation of the 
EU-Turkey statement on the Greek islands.
86  Article 8 Regulation no.439/2010 states: ‘The Support Office shall 
coordinate and support common action assisting asylum and reception 
systems of Member States subject to particular pressure which places 
exceptionally heavy and urgent demands on their reception facilities and 
asylum systems.’
87  Article 21 Regulation no. 439/2010. 
At the beginning of the migration crisis, EASO and Greece signed 
an operational action plan.88 This plan foresees the deployment of 
asylum support teams in Greece. EASO has built up a significant 
presence on the ground in Greece, working with Asylum Support 
Teams supported by interpreters in the hotspots of Lesbos, Chios, 
Samos, Leros and Kos. On the mainland, EASO is present in several 
locations, the RAO in Alimos, Attika, Piraeus, Thessaloniki, 
Alexandroupoli, Fylakio and Corinth, as well as over 30 reception 
sites throughout mainland Greece. There is also an EASO 
Operational Office in Athens. The main area of focus has been the 
identification, categorization and referral of vulnerable persons.
In this operational plan it is mentioned that 
  ‘In view of the changed operational environment, due to the 
completion of the relocation programme and the challenging 
needs on the ground, the Greek authorities have requested 
EASO to foresee a shift in the operational focus on mainland 
Greece, from supporting relocation to support to the regular 
asylum procedure.’ 
However, in this operational plan it is stressed that it is the staff of 
the Greek regional asylum offices (RAO) and the autonomous AUs 
who receive, examine and adjudicate at first instance applications 
for international protection. Regarding fast-track border 
procedures, the action plan mentions that the regional asylum 
offices of Greece remain responsible for handling individual 
cases. However, in order to further the implementation of the 
EU-Turkey Statement and in line with the conclusions of the JHA 
Council meetings of 9-10 June 2016, support from EASO is offered 
to the Greek authorities for processing applications of 
international protection on the Greek islands.89 
 
As a consequence, joint processing of asylum claims has being 
undertaken in accordance with Law 4375/2016, in particular 
Article 60 par. 4, b. This Article prescribes that when it comes to 
the interview of asylum seekers during the examination of the 
asylum claims at the borders, the Asylum Service may be assisted 
by EASO staff. 
88  EASO Operating plan agreed by EASO and Greece, Valetta Harbour and 
Athens, 13/12/2017.
89  As a result, EASO specialist support is being provided for the asylum 
procedures on the five hotspot islands (Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Leros and 
Kos). Procedures and workflows have been put in place in order to ensure 
cooperation with the Greek authorities and appropriate processing of 
applications for international protection, including applications of 
vulnerable persons and of persons with special needs.
The new Law 4540/2018 expanded the possibilities for the 
participation of EASO in the examination of asylum claims by 
prescribing that 
  ‘if there is an emergency, the Asylum Service may be assisted 
by Greek speaking EASO staff for the registration of requests 
for international protection, for cases of article 60 para. 4, b 
and for any other administrative act related to the 
examination of requests for international protection’.90
The latest provision allows EASO to participate in the asylum 
examination procedures all over Greece and not only on the 
islands.  
EASO and Responsibility
Do the newly acquired EASO competences, supported by the Greek 
law and the operational action plan, also imply a shift in 
responsibilities? As from 2016, EASO has been conducting asylum 
interviews and vulnerability assessments, as well as best interest 
assessments for unaccompanied minors at the islands where there 
is a fast-track procedure. EASO officers first conduct the 
interviews, which are then signed by representatives of the Greek 
regional asylum offices. Despite this practice, it is not officially 
acknowledged that EASO bears responsibility for the examination 
of these claims. On the contrary, responsibility still lies with the 
Greek authorities. 
 
The EASO unwillingness to assume responsibility derives first of 
all from the statute of the Agency mentioning that 
‘The Support Office shall have no powers in relation to the taking 
of decisions by Member States’ asylum authorities on individual 
applications for international protection.’91
Furthermore, migration and asylum are fields where the EU has a 
shared competence with Member States, as described in Article 4 
TFEU. When exercising such a shared competence, it are therefore 
the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity that need to be 
respected, meaning that the EU should act only in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by Member States and the content of the action shall not exceed 
what is necessary to achieve this objective. In order for a shared EU 
competence to become exclusive, the internal rules that serve as 
the foundation for external activity should have evolved to 
common rules, which, with regard to asylum, is far from the being 
the case. Readmission is the only external competence on 
migration explicitly transferred to the EU under title V of the 
Treaty. Therefore, the EU does not have an exclusive competence 
on migration. This competence still primarily lies with the Member 
States. 
90 Article 28 par. 7 Law 4540/2018.
91 Article 2 par. 6 of the establishing regulation. 
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The participation of EASO in asylum interviews has raised 
complaints, accusing the agency of misconduct and of the 
dismissal of asylum claims on admissibility grounds without 
proper reasoning. Although Greek asylum directors remain 
responsible for the examination of the claims and they sign the 
interviews and decisions, the fact is that these interviews have 
been conducted not by the signatories but by EASO officers. This 
raised liability and transparency concerns.  
The European Ombudsman opened an inquiry to find out 1) if EASO 
is acting beyond its mandate under EU law by effectively deciding 
on the admissibility of applications for international protection in 
the context of the ‘admissibility interviews’ it carries out; 2) when 
conducting interviews in the hotspots on the Greek islands, EASO, 
if it fails to comply with the provisions on ‘the right to be heard’ in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 41), as well as EASO’s 
own guidelines.  
 According to the complainant,92 EASO’s Concluding Remarks, 
drafted after admissibility interviews, look like decisions, rather 
than recommendations to the authority responsible. Moreover, 
since there is no representative of the relevant Greek asylum 
authority (GAS) present during interviews, and the transcripts of 
interviews exist in English only, the concluding remarks appear to 
have greater importance than what was envisaged in the 
applicable provisions.  
EASO justified the absence of Greek asylum officers during 
interviews by referring to ‘time and effort efficiencies’.93 It added 
that Greek officers have never found that because the interview 
transcript and the opinion prepared by EASO experts are drafted in 
English this constitutes an obstacle to take decisions on 
admissibility. EASO insisted that, by assisting the Greek officers 
in examining the admissibility of an application or the assessment 
of protection needs of an applicant, EASO experts provide 
technical and operational support to the Greek Asylum Service 
(GAS). That support is limited to providing an opinion which could 
facilitate the analysis of the asylum application under 
examination, as envisaged in Article 10 of EASO’s founding 
Regulation, but which is not binding on Greek officers, since the 
decision to grant or refuse international protection falls within 
the sole authority of the Member State. According to EASO, the 
(non-binding) reasoned opinion of the EASO expert highlights the 
relevant factors to support the Greek decision-makers.
The Ombudsman94 acknowledged that EASO is being encouraged 
politically to act in a way which is, arguably, not in line with its 
existing statutory role and that there are genuine concerns about 
the quality of the admissibility interviews as well as about the 
procedural fairness of how they are conducted. 
92  European Ombudsman, Decision – case 735/2017/MDC – opened on 
Thursday, 13 July 2017 – Decision on Thursday, 5 July 2018.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid. 
Nevertheless, it found that ultimate legal responsibility for 
decisions on individual asylum applications rests with the Greek 
authorities. Greek authorities must, once they have seen the 
interview transcript, determine whether there were shortcomings 
in the interview which require that it be repeated; or it is open to 
them to disagree with the EASO expert’s opinion and consider the 
application admissible. 
Moreover, it added that under Greek law, if a claim is considered 
inadmissible, the applicant can appeal this decision to the relevant 
Appeals Committees. Finally, the Ombudsman noted that it is 
likely that EASO’s founding Regulation will be amended in the near 
future to provide explicitly for the type of activity in which EASO is 
currently engaged, thus resolving the issue of EASO possibly 
operating beyond its statutory brief. After the decision of the EU 
Ombudsman there has been no further development on this issue.
The Commission has already made a proposal95 to replace EASO by 
a new agency, the European Union Agency for Asylum. In this 
proposal, the new agency has more autonomy to act in cases of 
disproportionate pressure on a Member State. The provision of 
Article 2 par. 6 of the current regulation stressing that EASO has no 
power to take decisions on individual asylum applications is 
deleted in the new text. 
As it becomes obvious, the legal reforms are expected to justify 
and expand the participation of EASO in asylum examination, 
challenging State sovereignty. 
The expansion of the role of EASO is expected to bring serious 
changes in the way asylum applications are dealt with everywhere 
in Greece. Taking into account that EASO usually suggests the 
inadmissibility of asylum claims of Syrians, Iraqis and other high 
refugee profile nationalities, this practice will probably also take 
place in the rest of the Greek territory, including Athens. The 
negative effect of this practice on the rights of refugees has 
already been analysed in the chapters about geographical 
limitation and safe third country.
As we have seen, the role of EASO raises concerns on the fairness 
of the asylum examination. In the next paragraph, we will see that 
the profiling of asylum seekers based on their country of origin 
creates a prejudice and makes access to asylum for many persons 
very difficult. 
 
95  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the European Union Agency for Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) No. 
439/2010, COM/2016/0271 final - 2016/0131 (COD). 
VI.   De Facto Profiling of Asylum Seekers Based 
on their Nationality
 
The Detention of Asylum Seekers 
Article 8 Directive 2013/33/EU emphasises that 
  ‘Member States shall not hold a person in detention for the 
sole reason that he or she is an applicant in accordance with 
Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting 
and withdrawing international protection (1)’. 
Detention must be necessary and only apply if less coercive 
alternative measures cannot be applied effectively. 
This Article enlists the legitimate grounds for the detention of 
asylum seekers. These grounds are 1) in order to determine or 
verify his or her identity or nationality, 2) in order to determine 
those elements on which the application for international 
protection is based which could not be obtained in the absence of 
detention, in particular when there is a risk of absconding of the 
applicant, 3) in order to decide, in the context of a procedure, on 
the applicant’s right to enter the territory, 4) when he or she is 
detained subject to a return procedure, 5) when protection of 
national security or public order so requires, 6) in accordance with 
the Dublin Regulation. 
Law 4307/2016 stresses that a person who asks for international 
protection cannot be detained only for this reason, or because he/
she entered the country irregularly, or because he/she resides in 
the country without residence permit.96 The law specifies that a 
person who submits an asylum application whilst being in 
detention may remain in detention if this is necessary in order to 
determine or verify his or her identity or nationality; in order to 
determine those elements on which the application for 
international protection is based which could not be obtained in 
the absence of detention, in particular when there is a risk of 
absconding of the applicant; when protection of national security 
or public order so requires; in accordance with the Dublin 
Regulation. 
These requirements correspond with the categories enlisted in the 
Directive. The Greek law adds one more category; if the person had 
already access to the asylum procedures and there are legitimate 
reasons to believe that he/she is submitting an asylum application 
in order to delay or prevent a return decision and on the condition 
that such a decision can be implemented. 
96  Article 46 Law 4375/2016.
The same law specifies that detention of asylum seekers for 
reasons of public order supposing that there is a fear of 
absconding before a Dublin transfer takes place, cannot exceed 3 
months. For all the other categories, detention cannot exceed the 
period foreseen in Law 3907/2011, which mentions a maximum of 
18 months of detention. 
In addition, the same Article makes it mandatory for the Police 
Directors to forward their decision of detention to the president of 
the administrative court of first instance of the geographical area 
where the person is detained. The president has to decide on the 
legality of the detention or of its prolongation and the asylum 
seeker must be heard by the judge.  
Pilot Project
The tendency of the police to detain almost immediately persons 
who have expressed their desire to ask for asylum whilst being 
free because they have a specific profile contradicts the general 
provision of the law stating that persons who apply for asylum 
when they are free should not be detained. It also constitutes 
discrimination and differential treatment based on nationality 
and/or the person’s individual status. 
This practice is commonly referred to in Greece as ‘pilot project’.97 
The EU-Turkey Statement and the need to return to Turkey large 
numbers of persons and stop irregular migration inspired this 
pilot project. In fact, this practice takes place in Lesbos in order to 
facilitate the readmission to Turkey of newly arrived persons 
belonging to particular nationalities with low recognition rates. 
These persons are immediately placed in detention upon arrival 
and after the conclusion of their registration and identification 
process. They remain in closed centres, like prisons, known as 
pre-removal centres, during the entire asylum procedure. These 
centres are used for the detention of persons who are waiting for 
deportation. While the project initially focused on nationals of 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, the list 
of countries was expanded to 28 in March 2017 and the pilot project 
was rebranded as ‘low-profile scheme’. 
As a result, these persons go through a very quick identification 
and registration process at the Reception and Identification 
Service (RIS) of Lesbos and then they are transferred to detention, 
whereas persons having other nationalities spend more time at 
the RIS without being detained and therefore can benefit from a 
thorough and detailed analysis of their vulnerability. They can 
also receive proper information regarding their right to seek 
asylum and regarding the examination procedure of their case. 
They have better access to legal aid. 
97  Greek Council for Refugees, AIDA, Country report Greece, update 2018, p. 
33.
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The detention of persons having the nationality of countries of low 
recognition rates is a sign that it is very unlikely for these persons 
to be granted international protection, since they are already 
detained with persons awaiting deportation. Therefore, although 
the person can ask for asylum and is indeed guided to all the steps 
of the procedure, there is a negative prejudice already against 
him/her that he is not entitled to receive it. Although recognition 
rates are based on the statistics of the Asylum Service, they create 
2 categories of asylum seekers; those detained for reasons of 
public order because of their nationality and those who are not. 
Moreover, since November 2017, a ‘pilot’ practice of detention of a 
number of Syrian nationals upon arrival, despite their explicit wish 
to apply for asylum and without being subjected to reception and 
identification procedures as provided by the law, has started on 
Lesbos and Chios, subject to available detention capacity. In 
addition, according to the practice, applicants on the islands 
whose asylum application are rejected at second instance under 
the Fast-Track Border Procedure are immediately detained upon 
notification of the second instance negative decision.98
The detention of asylum seekers based on their nationality has 
even more severe consequences when it comes to the case of 
unaccompanied minors with wrong age assessments. Children are 
considered to be vulnerable ex officio. However, due to the 
problematic nature of age assessments in Greece, some teenagers 
may face expulsion to Turkey. In addition, because of a strict 
interpretation of the deadline for family re-unification provided in 
the Dublin Regulation, they very often miss the opportunity to get 
refugee status in another Member State where they have family 
members. 
 
VII.   The Challenges for Unaccompanied Children 
Seeking Asylum
 
Protection of Unaccompanied Children in Greek 
Legislation
According to Article 45 Law 4375/2016, when an unaccompanied 
minor submits an application for asylum, the authorities have to 
nominate a legal guardian to represent the minor during the 
asylum process and to guarantee the efficient legal support and 
legal representation of the child. The guardian is invited to and can 
participate in the asylum interview. These provisions are in 
conformity with the provisions of Article 25 Directive 2013/32/EU. 
98 Ibid. 
Moreover, Article 21 Law 4540/2018 stresses that the best interest 
of the child99 should be the main focus of the authorities when they 
apply the new law on reception to minors. Article 22 states that the 
RIS is responsible for unaccompanied children in the RIC 
(Reception and Identification Centre)s and for this reason it 
facilitates through the Public Prosecutor the appointment of the 
child’s guardianship to an adult member of his/her family. If such a 
family member is not available, the authority responsible for the 
child is the National Centre for Social Solidarity (NCSS, in Greek 
EKKA). NCSS is an authority of the Ministry of Labour responsible 
inter alia, for the provision of shelter to minors and most 
importantly for the nomination through the Public Prosecutor of a 
legal guardian.100 
Article 10 Law 4540/2018 stresses that minors can be detained 
only as a last resort, taking into account their best interest and 
only if other alternative and less restrictive measures cannot 
apply. Their detention is for the purpose of their removal to a 
shelter and cannot exceed 45 days. However, there is no time limit 
for minors who are under protective custody in safe zones or 
elsewhere, since protective custody is not considered to be 
detention.101 Apart from these two categories of unaccompanied 
children who are either detained or guarded until they can be 
transferred to a shelter, there is a 3rd category of persons who have 
declared to be minors and whose age has been contested. These 
children may face return to Turkey and are deprived of the special 
treatment that the law grants to children in respect of their 
reception modalities and the examination of their asylum.
 
Age Assessment
According to Directive 2013/33/EU:
  ‘Member States may use medical examinations to determine 
the age of unaccompanied minors within the framework of the 
examination of an application for international protection 
where, following general statements or other relevant 
indications, Member States have doubts concerning the 
applicant’s age. If, thereafter, Member States are still in doubt 
concerning the applicant’s age, they shall assume that the 
applicant is a minor.
 
99  Article 21 mentions that in order to assess the child’s best interest the 
authorities should focus on the possibility for family re-unification, the 
quality of life and social development, security and protection issues, risk 
of smuggling and the views of the minor depending on his/her age and 
maturity. 
100  The new Law 4554/2018 reforms the system of guardianship, thus creating a 
pool of legal guardians who will be persons remunerated by the State with a 
background in social work or psychology. They will represent the child and 
will be monitored by a council that belongs to the NCSS.
101  Article 118 Presidential Decree 141/1991 mentions that minors can be placed 
under protective custody but this is not considered to be an arrest. 
  Any medical examination shall be performed with full respect 
for the individual’s dignity, shall be the least invasive 
examination and shall be carried out by qualified medical 
professionals allowing, to the extent possible, for a reliable 
result.’
Article 45 Law 4375/2016 states that if there is a doubt regarding 
the age of the child during the asylum procedure, the authorities 
can refer them to the procedures of age assessment which are set 
in the Common Ministerial Decision 1982/2016. During this 
process there must be a legal guardian to represent the child, the 
child must be fully informed and consent (if it has the right age). If 
after the age assessment it is still doubtful if the person is a minor, 
then he/she must be considered to be a minor.102 Apart from the 
age assessment that takes place during the asylum examination, 
Article 14, par. 9 of the same law stresses that if at any stage of the 
reception and identification there are doubts regarding the child’s 
real age, the Director of the RIS requests an age assessment and 
the child is considered to be a child during the whole process.103 
At the reception and identification stage, the competent 
authorities should provide an age assessment and if there is a 
legitimate doubt, the evaluation is made by the HCDCP. This centre 
is present in the reception centres of the 6 islands where the 
geographical limitation applies but not in the mainland. This 
means that age assessment modalities are different from one 
place to another.
The Greek age assessment system both during asylum and upon 
registration provides 3 steps of evaluation. First of all there is an 
examination by a podiatrist of the child’s general characteristics. 
If this fails, there is a psychological assessment and if this also 
fails the child is referred to a public hospital. This evaluation is 
sent to the Director of the HCDCP that issues an opinion. During 
these steps, there are procedural guarantees regarding the right 
to information, equal treatment and presumption in favour of the 
child. 
In the asylum process, the same procedure is followed, giving 
priority first to a general examination by a doctor, then a 
psychological assessment and finally clinical tests based on 
X-rays. 
The above-mentioned procedures have proved to be problematic 
in practice. More specifically, according to a report of the Doctors 
of the World104 medical examinations and psychological 
examinations are of relative credibility. 
102 Article 45 par. 5 Law 4375/2016.
103  This age assessment takes place according to Decision 92490/2013 of the 
Minister of Health. 
104  S. Poularakis, Age assessment of unaccompanied minors, thoughts and 
concerns, Athens: MdM Greece, August 2016.
The assessment based on body features may be false because it 
does not take into account the socio-economical background of 
the child, the influence of diseases and ethnic origin. Depending 
on culture and ethnic origin, the likelihood of a subjective 
psychological evaluation may increase. Doctors of the World find 
that because of the large numbers of arrivals at the Greek islands 
and the inadequacy in numbers and expertise of the staff that is 
responsible to do the age assessment, and the lack of time, age 
assessments are inefficient and may prove to be to the detriment 
of the child. 
Furthermore, as it has already been mentioned, it seems that 
practice varies depending on each geographical area and each RIC. 
According to a report of the Greek section of DCI,105 in Lesbos, age 
assessment relies on a psychological examination and possibly a 
medical one. Children are first interviewed by the HCDCP and if 
they are found to be minors, in practice, sometimes these opinions 
are challenged by the Service for Reception and Identification, 
referring them to public hospitals for further examination. In 
many of these cases, they have been found to be adults. NGOs 
question this practice, implying that there may be a link with the 
lack of adequate shelters for children in Greece and the need to 
limit the number of children so that underage newcomers can also 
be protected. In addition, children tend to be in detention until the 
age assessment is finalised. 
However, in Evros the HCDCP was not operational until August of 
2018 and as a result the Prosecutor used to refer children 
immediately to the public hospital for X-rays. There was no 
psychological examination whatsoever. The absence of these 
examinations leads to the unequal treatment of children.
 
Family Reunification under the Dublin Regulation
Children who arrive in Athens and want to be reunited with their 
family members residing legally in another Member State often do 
not have this opportunity. Article 21 par.1 Dublin III Regulation 
(No. 604/2013) foresees that
  ‘Where a Member State with which an application for 
international protection has been lodged considers that 
another Member State is responsible for examining the 
application, it may, as quickly as possible and in any event 
within three months of the date on which the application was 
lodged within the meaning of Article 20(2), request that other 
Member State to take charge of the applicant.’106
105  Defence for Children International, Greek section, DCI Report of the mission 
to Lesbos and Evros, Athens: DCI, July 2018. 
106  Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining 
the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national or a stateless person.
28 | Games of Responsibility Games of Responsibility | 29
According to this regulation, Greece would need to make a request 
to another Member State to take charge of a child within 3 months 
from the moment the child applies for asylum. However, some 
Member States including Germany consider that the starting point 
of this deadline is not the moment when the child submits the 
application for asylum but the moment when he/she declares at 
the borders and upon arrest that he/she wishes to apply for 
asylum. Often, children who are caught at the borders are not 
aware of this possibility or are not aware of the presence of their 
family members in another Member State. When they are informed 
about it and make the request through the Greek authorities, they 
are told that they have missed the deadline. 
This legal interpretation is based on a decision of the CJEU107 
concerning the case of an Eritrean who was facing return to Italy, 
the country of his first entry to Europe. According to the claimant, 
Germany made a transfer request to Italy after the 3 months 
deadline imposed by the Dublin Regulation. According to the 
Court, 
  ‘Article 20(2) of Regulation No 604/2013 must be interpreted 
as meaning that an application for international protection is 
deemed to have been lodged if a written document, prepared 
by a public authority and certifying that a third-country 
national has requested international protection, has reached 
the authority responsible for implementing the obligations 
arising from that regulation, and as the case may be, if only the 
main information contained in such a document, but not that 
document or a copy thereof, has reached that authority’.
Based on this ruling, some Member States refuse to take charge of 
the child because they consider that the application for asylum 
was lodged way before the child’s registration, at the moment 
when the Asylum Service received a notification of the police 
regarding the wish of a child to submit an application for asylum. 
 
Homelessness and Access to International Protection
Children who manage to be recognised as such but have not been 
transferred to another EU State are in a limbo situation. They find it 
hard to apply for asylum and to follow through. Why is that? First 
of all, the majority of children who arrive in Greece are homeless. 
In July 2018, it was estimated that there were 3.510 unaccompanied 
children in Greece, without including unregistered children.108 The 
number of available places in shelters all over Greece is 1.191 while 
there were 2.485 children on the waiting list for a shelter, during 
the same month. Children out of shelter may either stay in 
prolonged detention or protective custody but the majority live in 
the streets of Athens.109
107  C-670/16, Tsegezab Mengesteab v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Judgment 
of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 26 July 2017.
108  EKKA, national centre for social solidarity, Situation update: 
unaccompanied children in Greece, 15/07/2018.
109 Ibid.
According to UNHCR, children are exposed to on-going protection 
risks, including sexual exploitation and abuse, due to insufficient 
security, sub-standard and overcrowded reception sites, lack of 
specific services and insufficient access to formal or non-formal 
education, and lengthy asylum procedures for reuniting families, 
which also severely impacts their psychosocial well-being. The 
national capacity for accommodating unaccompanied and 
separated children is still far from meeting the needs – roughly, 
half of the approximately 2.100 unaccompanied and separated 
children in Greece currently do not receive adequate or 
appropriate care.110
The lack of adequate shelters all over Greece and the incapacity of 
the National Centre for Social Solidarity to hire a sufficient number 
of legal guardians have a negative effect not only on the well-
being of the child but also on the possibility to apply for 
international protection and receive adequate legal 
representation. This representation is necessary for them to 
access the Asylum Service and exercise their basic rights such as 
family reunification. According to a member of the asylum appeals 
committees, most minors are not represented at the examination 
of their asylum claim.111
 
The difficult access to the asylum procedures is not only limited to 
children. As it has been discussed before, the Asylum Service 
continues to receive an increasing number of asylum applications 
while it lacks adequate staff to face this challenge. At the same 
time, the overall tendency is to limit the number of asylum seekers 
in Greece, supported by an increase of the number of push-backs 
from Greece to Turkey that prohibit access to asylum and put the 
individuals in great risk for their lives and physical integrity. 
VIII.  Limited Access to Asylum to the Mainland 
and at the Borders
 
Limited Access to the Mainland
According to the statistics of the Asylum Service, the number of 
asylum applications in Greece since 2013 has been continuously 
rising. In 2017, Greece received 8.5% of the total number of 
applications submitted in the EU, while it was the country with the 
largest number of asylum seekers per capita among EU Member 
States.112 In 2017 the situation was no better: 58.661 persons 
applied for asylum and by the end of the year, 36.340 applications 
were still pending.113 About half of these applications were lodged 
in the mainland. There has also been a substantial increase in 
applications from Turkish nationals (1.827 in 2017 compared to 189 
in 2016).
110 UNHCR Recommendations for Greece in 2017.
111 Interview of a member of the Greek asylum appeals committees. See Part II.
112  Asylum Service, The work of the Asylum Service in 2017, Athens: AIDA, 25 
January 2018, available at: http://bit.ly/2BsCDGd.
113  Asylum Service, Asylum Statistics, Athens: AIDA, December 2017; 
information provided on 15 February 2018.
Only in 2018, 54.968 persons applied for asylum (until October), 
which equals an 11,9% increase since 2017. From 2017 to 2018 there 
has been an increase in asylum applications up to 14.2%.114 Attiki is 
the second region in Greece with the largest number of asylum 
applications, after Lesbos.115 There are 62.418 asylum applications 
still pending at first instance.116 According to UNHCR, at the end of 
October 2018 there were 67.100 refugees and migrants in Greece, 
17.900 in the islands and 49.200 in the mainland. In March 2019 
there were 76.000 refugees and migrants in Greece.117 From June 
2016 to October 2018, 37.700 persons were transferred from the 
islands to the mainland,118 but this has not solved the problem. The 
examination of asylum applications in the mainland is delayed. 
This delay renders access to asylum inefficient. It deprives asylum 
seekers of the possibility to be registered in due time and hampers 
the enjoyment of basic rights such as application for family 
reunification, access to education, access to work, health coverage 
and many more. Moreover, as it will be explained further, the large 
number of applications has a negative effect on the quality of the 
asylum procedures. For all those applicants, there are only 13 
lawyers paid by the State to represent them at second instance.119 
All those thousands of applicants, whose cases are pending at first 
instance, can only rely on NGOs and volunteers for their 
representation.
In addition, most of its operating procedures are not accessible to 
the public. More concretely, as it appears on the website of the 
Asylum Service,120 from the moment of the creation of the Asylum 
Service until today, only one circular has been issued and it 
concerns the revocation of refugee status because of the 
commission of a crime.121 A circular is according to the Greek 
legislation an administrative act that can be challenged in court. 
Greek lawyers have criticised this lack in transparency, claiming 
that as public authority the Asylum Service cannot operate and 
take decisions by relying mainly on standard operating 
procedures (SOPs), which remain secret to the public and 
therefore create ambiguity.122 
 
114 Asylum Service Statistics from 07/06/2013 to 31/03/2019.
115  In 2018, 6.699 new asylum applications were submitted in Athens, 1.625 in 
Pireus and 2.137 in Alimos (all of them to be found in central Greece, Athens 
and nearby municipalities). See: asylo.gov.gr/wp-content/
uploads/2018/11/Greek_Asylum_Service_Statistical_Data_GR.pdf. 
116  asylo.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Greek_Asylum_Service_
data_March2019_gr.pdf.
117 UNHCR, Factsheet Greece, Geneva: UNHCR, March 2019. 
118 UNHCR, Factsheet Greece, Geneva: UNHCR, 1-31 October 2018.
119   Decision 15044 of the Asylum Service, 26/07/2018
120  asylo.gov.gr/?page_id=141.
121  asylo.gov.gr/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/pdf.
122  E. Poularakis, Internal guidelines (SOPs) and asylum, transparency or 
administration à la carte?,  
www.immigration.gr/2017/05/sops-la-carte.html
Pre-registration of Asylum Claims
In order to deal with a huge number of asylum applications that 
started increasing dramatically since 2016, the Greek authorities 
decided to pre-register persons who wanted to seek asylum. What 
exactly is pre-registration?
Pre-registration is based on Article 36 Law 4375/2016:
  ‘1.a. Each alien or stateless person has the right to apply for 
international protection. The application is submitted to the 
Receiving Authorities immediately who have to fully register 
it. 1b. If, for whatever reason, it is not possible to complete the 
registration, in accordance with point (a), following a decision 
by its Director Asylum Service, the Receiving Authorities may 
do so at the latest within three (3) working days after the 
submission of the application, by simply registering the 
minimum necessary data and then complete the registration 
as soon as possible and as a matter of priority. 
  c. an application for international protection shall be deemed 
to have been lodged from the date of its full and complete 
registration in accordance with subparagraph (a) from which 
the relevant time limits for its examination start, in 
accordance with Article 51 herein.’
These provisions transpose Article 6 Directive 2013/32/EU that 
stipulates inter alia:
  ‘When a person makes an application for international 
protection to an authority competent under national law for 
registering such applications, the registration shall take place 
no later than three working days after the application is 
made… 
  Member States shall ensure that a person who has made an 
application for international protection has an effective 
opportunity to lodge it as soon as possible…
  Notwithstanding paragraph 3, an application for international 
protection shall be deemed to have been lodged once a form 
submitted by the applicant or, where provided for in national 
law, an official report, has reached the competent authorities 
of the Member State concerned.’
As it becomes obvious, pre-registration was not included in the 
Directive. It allows applicants to launch the procedure without 
being able to enjoy the rights linked with this procedure. 
 
Applications for international protection are received and 
registered by the Regional Asylum Offices (RAO) and Asylum Units 
(AUs) and Mobile AUs, depending on their local jurisdiction. For 
third-country nationals willing to apply for asylum while in 
detention or under reception and identification procedures, the 
detention authority or Registration and Identification Centre 
registers the intention of the person on an electronic network 
connected with the Asylum Service, no later than within 6 working 
days. 
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In order for the application to be fully registered, the detainee is 
transferred to the competent Regional Asylum Office or AU.
The time limits of 3 or 6 working days respectively for the basic 
registration of the application may be extended to 10 working 
days in cases where a large number of applications are submitted 
simultaneously and render registration particularly difficult.
No time limit is set by law for lodging an asylum application. 
However, Article 42 Law 4375/2016, which transposes Article 13 
Directive 2013/32/EU that refers to applicants’ obligations, 
provides in paragraph 1a that applicants are required to appear 
before competent authorities in person, without delay, in order to 
submit their application for international protection. Applications 
must be submitted in person, except under force majeure 
conditions.
Skype Pre-registration
In order to make a personal request to submit an asylum 
application at the RAO, persons are requested to contact the 
Asylum Service via Skype. For those languages that a Skype line is 
available, an appointment through Skype should be fixed before 
the person in question can present him- or herself before the 
Asylum Service in order to lodge an application. However, although 
the use of Skype is almost the only way to access the asylum 
procedure, it proves to be ineffective and it virtually deprives 
persons of their right to ask for asylum. 
As a matter of fact, NGOs report that many people try 
unsuccessfully for three and four months to make an appointment 
via Skype.123 
At the same time, in his recent Annual Report for 2016, the Greek 
Ombudsman states:
  ‘The Ombudsman has previously (Annual Report 2015, p. 37) 
made extensive reference to access problems only through 
Skype, where this practice is considered as a restrictive system 
that appears to be at odds with the principle, universal, 
continuous and unhindered access to the asylum procedure. 
Therefore, this problem intensifies in 2016 and the 
Ombudsman receives many reports for inaccessibility despite 
repeated attempts to connect to Athens and Thessaloniki.’124
In June 2016, the Greek authorities in cooperation with UNHCR and 
EASO proceeded with the pre-recording process of about 49.000 
refugees that were in the mainland. The completion of the 
procedure was announced on 1/8/2016. It was expected that in 
April 2017 pre-recording would have been completed. 
123  Report of AITIMA, Asylum Seekers On Hold. Aspects of the asylum procedure 
in Greece, Athens: AITIMA 2017. 
124  The Greek Ombudsman, Annual Report 2016, Athens: The Greek Ombudsman 
2017.
However, until the end of March 2017 it was not completed. The 
choice of the pre-registration process resulted in a further delay 
of ten months for the initiation of the asylum procedure (since it 
starts with full registration), the processing of requests of 
relocation and family reunification. For people who already 
arrived in Greece by January 2016 it could take up to eleven months 
to submit an application for family reunification on the basis of 
the Dublin III Regulation. People were forced to stay in Greece, 
separated from their family members, in particularly precarious 
conditions.125
UNHCR has also criticised the long delays in the asylum 
examination procedures in Greece. UNHCR found that six months 
after their arrival, many asylum seekers are still waiting for the 
full registration and processing of their asylum claims. 
Discriminatory practices, which delay the registration of claims of 
some nationalities (such as Afghans and Iraqis), are not in line 
with EU and Greek standards. UNHCR estimates that on the 
mainland, first instance decisions for those pre-registered during 
the summer of 2016 will take approximately two years. It stresses 
that the lack of capacity to fully process asylum claims within a 
reasonable timeframe needs to be addressed urgently, as this 
directly contributes to the significant tensions in many of the 
asylum seeker sites, it generates onward movement.126
According to the Greek Council for Refugees, the system for 
granting appointments for registration of asylum applications 
through Skype, inaugurated in 2014, did not solve the problem and 
thus access to the asylum procedure has remained one of the 
persistent major issues of concern for the Greek asylum system, 
considering especially that the number of people wishing to apply 
for asylum on the mainland remained high.127 
The delays in the procedures are mainly due to the lack of staff of 
the Asylum Service and the precarious working conditions of many 
of the officials. More concretely, the number of employees of the 
Asylum Service at the end of 2017 decreased from 654 staff 
members in January 2017 – 275 permanent staff and 379 on a fixed-
term contract – to 515 active staff members in December 2017. This 
included 264 staff members with a permanent status and 251 staff 
members on fixed-term contracts.128 
The short-term working status of almost half of the total number 
of the employees of the Asylum Service staff, coupled with the 
precarious working environment for employees, can create 
problems in the operation of the Asylum Service. 
125  AITIMA 2017.
126  UNHCR Bureau for Europe, Recommendations for Greece in 2017, Geneva: 
UNHCR, February 2017.
127  Greek Council for Refugees, AIDA, Registration of the asylum application – 
Greece, Athens: GCR 2016.
128 Information provided by the Asylum Service, 15 February 2018
For example, on 1 and 2 November 2017, the Asylum Service fixed-
term employees went on a 48-hour nationwide strike due to 
payment delays and the termination of about 100 fixed-term 
contracts at the end of 2017. In addition, between 5 and 21 March 
2018, fixed-term staff have stopped providing their services as 
they have remained unpaid for a period exceeding three months.129 
Consequently, as a number of RAO such as Lesbos and Samos are 
mainly staffed with fixed-term employees, they have temporary 
halted their operation.
As a result, it can be concluded that access to asylum in the 
mainland is a difficult task that takes too much time. Asylum 
seekers do not receive any financial aid in Greece and, on top of 
that, they are forced to remain in Greece for prolonged periods 
without being able to exercise their rights that are conditioned 
upon asylum application. However, access to asylum is also 
hampered because of the alleged numerous push-backs at the 
borders, thus raising concerns about refoulement to Turkey.
 
Push-backs and Non-refoulement
According to Article 33 par.1 1951 Geneva Convention 
  ‘No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee 
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where 
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion.’ 130
This provision constitutes one of the basic Articles of the 1951 
Convention, to which no reservations are permitted. It is also an 
obligation under the 1967 Protocol by virtue of Article I (1) of that 
instrument. Unlike various other provisions in the Convention, its 
application is not dependent on the lawful residence of a refugee 
in the territory of a Contracting State.
The principle of non-refoulement is also acknowledged by the EU. 
Back in 1999 at the Tampere meeting of the European Council it was 
mentioned that CEAS means respecting non-refoulement and 
ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution. Non-
refoulement is mentioned in Directive 2013/32/EU, with respect 
to the third safe country concept and as a safeguard during 
extraditions and deportations. It is also mentioned in Article 21 
Directive 2011/95/EU with the exception of a refugee being 
considered as a danger in a Member State or having been convicted 
of a serious crime. 
129  The Press Project, ‘Ξεκίνησαν	επίσχεση	εργασίας	οι	εργαζόμενοι	της	
Υπηρεσίας	Ασύλου’,	7 March 2018, available in Greek at: bit.ly/2IdZYzR.
130  The only exception being a refugee for whom there are reasonable grounds 
for regarding him as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or 
who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious 
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
Furthermore, Article 8 par. 1 Directive 2013/32/EU stresses 
  ‘Where there are indications that third-country nationals or 
stateless persons held in detention facilities or present at 
border crossing points, including transit zones, at external 
borders, may wish to make an application for international 
protection, Member States shall provide them with 
information on the possibility to do so.’
According to this provision, if a person crosses the borders and 
expresses his/her wish to apply for international protection, he/
she should be given instructions on how to do this in a language 
that he/she understands. The same Article guarantees access to 
organisations providing advice and counselling that can be limited 
but it cannot be severely restricted or made impossible.
 
There is no provision directly obliging Member States to accept 
asylum applications and no subsequent right of a person to ask for 
asylum in a specific State. There is, though, an indirect incitement 
to the authorities to take into account the willingness to apply for 
asylum of a person that has just crossed the borders and to 
facilitate access to the asylum procedures by providing relevant 
information and access to counselling. Although there is no duty 
to accept the person to the territory, the above-mentioned 
provisions would be devoid of meaning if Member States could 
remove a third-country national without giving them the 
possibility to launch such an application. 
Respect for non-refoulement was also mentioned in the EU-Turkey 
Statement, thus obliging the Greek authorities to examine the 
individual asylum application before returning a person to Turkey. 
As a matter of fact, Turkey cannot be considered safe for an 
applicant if there is evidence that the person will risk to be 
refouled in this respective country.
Respect for non-refoulement and access to asylum are also 
reiterated in Greek legislation. Article 36 Law 4375/2016 
transposing Articles 6 and 7 Directive 2013/32/EU is even more 
favourable for asylum seekers than the provisions of Directive. It 
states that ‘every alien or stateless person has the right to submit 
a request for international protection’. The Article entitled ‘access 
to the procedure’ further mentions how this request can be 
lawfully submitted. The right of the person to make such a request 
is recognised, whereas in the EU Directive there is no such explicit 
provision.
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In Sharifi v. Italy,131 the ECtHR ruled that non-admission of aliens at 
the borders could equal to refoulement. The Court found that by 
expelling the applicants to Greece, a country that lacked the means 
of a proper examination of the asylum claims, Italy ran the risk of 
indirectly refouling the applicants to Afghanistan. Interception at 
Adriatic ports by Italian authorities had taken place in the past and 
in the present case the applicants upon arrival to Italy were 
immediately sent back to Greece, denying them the possibility of 
applying for asylum and their procedural and material rights. The 
fact that the applicants were not yet present in the territory of 
Greece, nor properly admitted to the Italian territory was 
irrelevant for the implementation of non-refoulement.
In Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy,132 the ECtHR ruled that it is not 
decisive whether expulsions started in the territory of a State 
party. The Court found that territorial applicability should be the 
norm. Nevertheless, if a Contracting State has, exceptionally, 
exercised its jurisdiction outside its national territory, it does not 
see any obstacle to accepting that the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction by that State took the form of collective expulsion.
Although the right to request asylum is recognised in Greek law, 
and protection from non-refoulement is mentioned when the 
authorities want to return a person to a first country of asylum or to 
a third safe country, there have been continuous allegations of 
massive push-backs from Greece to Turkey in the last couple of 
years. This phenomenon has been reported by several NGOs and 
UNHCR. 
More concretely, in 2017 the Hellenic League for Human Rights 
issued a press release claiming that the unofficial refoulement 
from Greece to Turkey of persons who are possibly entitled to 
international protection seems to be conducted in concert with 
Turkish authorities. The Hellenic League presented the case of a 
Turkish national, Murat Çapan, who was expelled to Turkey.
Murat Çapan was a journalist for the magazine Nokta. He was 
prosecuted and finally sentenced in absentia to 22,5 years in 
prison for participation in a terrorist group and attempting to 
overthrow the constitution. He crossed the river Evros to the Greek 
side at 06:00 in the morning on May 24th, 2017, along with two of 
his friends. They reached Didymoteicho where they were arrested 
by police and asked to apply for asylum. They were told they would 
be transferred to the UNHCR and were put in a white unmarked van. 
The van met with another car and they were taken to a field. A group 
of five masked gunmen, dressed in camo, led them to the river 
without saying a single word. The Turkish nationals saw that there 
was an inflatable boat waiting there and they repeated their 
demand to apply for asylum. 
131  ECtHR, Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, Application No. 16643/09, 21 
October 2014.
132  ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application no. 27765/09, Council of 
Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 23 February 2012.
Their hands were tied and they were all put on the boat which 
crossed to the opposite shore with two of the masked gunmen, near 
an outpost of the Turkish army, where they were abandoned. After 
a while, they were found by Turkish police officers. Murat Çapan is 
already in prison, with everything this entails. The family is 
likewise in detention.133
The unlawful returns to Turkey have been criticised by NGOs and 
prominent representatives of international organisations.
Nils Muiznieks, the Council of Europe’s former commissioner for 
human rights, called for an immediate probe. Muiznieks said:
  ‘No doubt Greece has been under immense migratory pressure 
in recent years and the help received from other EU member 
states has been far from effective in alleviating both this 
pressure and the suffering of refugees in the country.’ 
  ‘However, even in particularly challenging situations, states 
cannot resort to practices – such as collective expulsions – 
which are not in compliance with the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the non-refoulement principle enshrined in 
the UN Refugee Convention,’ he added.134
On the 9th of June 2017, the Greek Ombudsman decided to 
investigate ex officio whether Turkish nationals seeking 
international protection have been expelled to Turkey and what 
was the involvement of the Greek police, the Asylum Service and 
the RIS.135  
Moreover, in 2018 the Greek Council for Refugees published a 
report136 describing cases of push-backs that involved victims of 
torture, pregnant women, recognised refugees of other Member 
States as well as persons who had already applied for asylum. It 
states that after crossing the borders of Evros river, people are 
arrested on Greek land, detained and led to the borders escorted 
by the police, where they are returned to Turkey. Testimonies refer 
to arbitrary arrests in detention centres under deplorable 
conditions, violence, and their subsequent transport to the river 
bank, crammed into small vans, from where they cross the river on 
overcrowded boats to the other side, risking their lives one more 
time.
According to GCR, third country nationals who enter the country 
irregularly, who sometimes even have legal residence documents, 
report that, when arrested, they are transferred in vans, which 
usually look like police vehicles, to detention centres. 
133  Hellenic League for Human Rights, Coordinated refoulements to Turkey?, 
Immigration-Asylum press releases, Athens, 29/05/2017.
134  www.ekathimerini.com/219016/article/ekathimerini/news/top-
human-rights-official-concerned-over-alleged-pushback-operations
135  Greek Ombudsman, Decision of investigation, protocol number 105, Athens 
09/06/2017.
136  GCR, Reports and testimony of systematic pushbacks in Evros, Athens: GCR, 
February 2018.
As soon as they are arrested, all of their personal belongings 
(mobile phones, money, identity cards, legal residence 
documents) are removed and never returned to them. The people 
that arrest, guard and oversee the expulsion process from Greece 
to Turkey sometimes wear Greek police uniforms, at other times 
they wear camouflage that resembles military uniforms, on some 
other occasions, they are dressed in black clothes, and at times 
they cover their faces. People stay in these sites for a few hours or, 
less often, a few days, in the evening they board vans and are 
driven to Evros, where other armed men await, put them on boats 
and lead them to Turkey. During this process, victims report 
violence. 
These incidents have happened, according to the reports, to 
people that have entered the country and have been returned to 
Turkey without being documented, without being officially 
arrested and allowed to seek international protection. In addition, 
these kinds of incidents have also happened to people who have 
already applied for asylum in Greece or have been granted 
international protection in another European country.
The above-mentioned allegations raise concerns with regard to 
Article 3 ECHR regarding the prohibition of torture and humiliating 
or degrading treatment and the non-refoulement provisions 
mentioned before. 
The EU external borders are managed jointly by Frontex and the 
Member State involved. Although the responsibility of Greek 
border guards for push-backs is not contested, it is worth 
examining if Frontex also be held accountable for push-backs in 
Evros. The establishment of such responsibility is dependent on 
the possibility for the EU to be responsible for human rights 
violations taking place by agents working for its agencies and 
operating in the territory of Member States, as well as outside EU 
territory.
Frontex Responsibility for Push-backs in Evros
Frontex is involved in identifying and defining the objectives of 
border surveillance operations, defining the execution of joint 
operations (Operational Plans) and Joint Returns Operations, as 
well as their implementation. Although the reformed Frontex 
mandate provides that the agency can ‘initiate’ or ‘coordinate’ an 
operation, there is no text defining the responsibility of the 
agency in cases of irregularities or human rights violations.137
The Code of Conduct provides in Article 7 that participants are 
primarily and individually responsible for their actions in their 
work;138 the liability of the agency as a body is not mentioned. 
137  FIDH, Migreurop, EMHRN, Frontex between Greece and Turkey, At the border 
of denial, Paris, May 2014.
138  FRONTEX, Code of conduct for all persons participating in Frontex activities, 
Warsaw: Frontex 2011. 
Moreover, the Regulation139 establishing the agency provides that 
‘the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of the European 
Communities shall apply to the agency’.
The Frontex Fundamental Rights Strategy, adopted in March 2011, 
states, in paragraph 13, that although Member States remain 
primarily responsible for the actions of participating officers, this 
does not relieve Frontex of its responsibilities as the coordinator. 
According to some scholars,140 the EU could be held responsible for 
the actions of the agency pursuant to Article 340 TFEU: 
‘In the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in 
accordance with the general principles common to the laws 
of the Member States, make good any damage caused by its 
institutions or by its servants in the performance of their 
duties.’ 
However, in November 2013, the European Union Ombudsperson 
recommended that Frontex set up an internal complaint 
mechanism for violations of human rights for which the agency 
and its officers are responsible. Frontex rejected this 
recommendation, with the argument that ‘individual incidents are 
the responsibility of the respective Member State’.141
139  Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.
140  Y. Pascouau & P. Schumacher, Frontex and the respect of fundamental rights: 
from better protection to full responsibility, EPC Policy Brief 03/06/2014, 
Brussels: European Policy Centre 2014. The authors invoke the provision of 
monitoring for all incidents occurring in joint operations and the possibility 
for the Frontex Executive Director to suspend or terminate, in whole or in 
part, joint operations if they consider that violations of fundamental rights 
or international protection obligations in the course of joint operation are 
of a serious nature or are likely to persist as an indication of a subsequent 
responsibility. 
141  Special Report of the European Ombudsman in own-initiative inquiry 
OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ concerning Frontex, 12/11/2013. As regards the issue 
of a complaints mechanism for persons affected by fundamental rights 
violations, Frontex pointed at the possibility for third parties to report 
possible violations. It also emphasised that it would deal with any complaint 
about fundamental rights violations and that it would give ‘appropriate 
consideration’ to such complaints. At the same time, Frontex highlighted 
that it has no authority to decide on individual cases, since these fall within 
the competence of the Member States concerned.
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The newly established European Border and Coast Guard disposes 
of more operational powers and in cases of emergency it can 
directly intervene and take over:
‘Where control of the external border is rendered ineffective 
to such an extent that it risks jeopardising the functioning of 
the Schengen area, either because a Member State does not 
take the necessary measures in line with a vulnerability 
assessment or because a Member State facing specific and 
disproportionate challenges at the external borders has not 
requested sufficient support from the Agency or is not 
implementing such support’.142
However, its officers still enjoy immunity and the possibility to 
submit an individual complaint for human rights violations is 
examined internally without touching upon the accountability of 
the agency.143
In conclusion, it seems that an increase in EU competencies 
regarding the external border management is not followed by a 
parallel increase in accountability. Access to asylum is being 
restricted without this being officially acknowledged by the State 
or by the EU, therefore without endorsing the complaints and 
without assuming any accountability for the alleged violations.
 
IX.  Conclusions Part I
As it becomes apparent, the EU-Turkey Statement has 
considerably marked the protection of asylum seekers in Greece. 
Since 2016, several legal reforms took place so as to reduce the 
number of persons entering the EU territory and to facilitate their 
return to Turkey. These reforms include an increase of asylum 
claims found to be inadmissible based on the safe third country 
concept. Although there is no national list of safe third countries 
mentioning Turkey and despite the fact that this concept has 
mostly been used on the islands, it has nonetheless caused the 
dismissal of many claims of international protection and the 
subsequent reform of the status of the appeals committees 
supports this as well. 
142  Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 
September 2015 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending 
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 
2005/267/EC, Article 28 of the Preamble. 
143  F. Ferraro & E. De Capitani, ‘The new European Border and Coast Guard: yet 
another “half way” EU reform? ’, Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer, 17(3) ERA 
Forum 2016, p. 385-398. The writers argue that the regulation fails to define 
the grounds for fair responsibility sharing. Moreover, although the 
regulation states that European integrated border management is a 
responsibility of the EU institutions, the Agency is mandated to establish an 
operational and technical strategy for the European integrated border 
management, something that is not in compliance with the Treaties. The 
writers express their concern with regard to the Council and Parliament 
charged with deciding in cases of emergencies (a procedure according to 
which Member States are going to vote) instead of opting for more 
communitarianism.
The Council of State failed to acknowledge that according to EU law 
a country cannot be deemed safe if it applies the 1951 Geneva 
Convention with restrictions, as Turkey does.
Moreover, the geographical limitation is a restriction of movement 
permissible under EU law and Greek law. However, taking into 
account the relatively high numbers of arrivals on the islands 
concerned, the lack of free legal aid, the strict deadlines imposed 
during the asylum procedure and the deplorable living conditions, 
this measure renders the legal and physical protection of these 
asylum seekers very difficult. If seen in comparison with the 
absence of such limitation at the Evros border, it also leads to 
differential treatment of asylum seekers. 
Vulnerability assessment was presented as a magical solution that 
would still allow some asylum seekers to escape this limitation. It 
was also presented as such by the authorities in order to render the 
limitation lawful. However, it dehumanises asylum seekers having 
to prove themselves as weak and as needy as possible in order to 
be allowed to enter the mainland. The dehumanisation of asylum 
seekers is based on the fact that they are subjected to extremely 
harsh reception conditions on the islands for a very long time, 
often years, and the only possibility they have to escape this 
reality is to prove that they are vulnerable. Having to prove oneself 
vulnerable in order to be able to escape a very miserable life at the 
hotspots is against human dignity.
The EASO participation in the Greek asylum procedures has rapidly 
expanded, challenging State sovereignty in dealing with 
individual asylum cases. It also casts doubts as to the lawfulness 
of the interviews that have been conducted without the presence 
of Greek asylum officers who sign the respective decisions. 
Moreover, the detention of asylum seekers based on their 
nationality is not prescribed by law but it nonetheless happens. 
The de facto incapacity of these persons to effectively go through 
their asylum claims leads to their unequal treatment. 
Unaccompanied children face serious problems with regard to 
their right to be transferred to another EU Member State where 
they have close relatives, following the Dublin Regulation. A strict 
interpretation of the Regulation’s provisions and deadlines leads 
to the rejection of their claim, in spite of them being unable to 
respect the deadline due to lack of information. In addition, since 
there is no standard procedure regarding age assessment and 
without always acting according to the presumption in favour of 
the child, many children are subject to wrong age assessment and 
face deportation. 
Finally, migrant organisations report continuous push-backs from 
Greece to Turkey, especially at the northern border with Evros. 
This practice takes place under the radar. It creates risks for the 
life and physical integrity of the persons involved and it is a de 
facto refusal to provide access to international protection to those 
who have entered EU territory. The authorities have denied 
responsibility and Frontex has done the same relying mainly on its 
operational and coordinating statute. These allegations have not 
yet been adequately investigated or brought to justice.
To conclude, the EU-Turkey Statement was introduced as a soft law 
document, a political declaration of the EU Heads of State for 
which the EU has refused to assume any legal responsibility. It has 
nonetheless produced severe consequences to the rights of 
asylum seekers in Greece, affecting disproportionately applicants 
from countries of high rate refugee recognition and new 
applicants arriving on the islands where the geographical 
limitation applies. Greece has officially acknowledged the 
implementation of this Statement, through its decision to impose 
the geographical limitation and through setting up the pilot 
project. The EU has refused to do the same. However, the active 
participation of EASO in the asylum examination procedures and 
the close monitoring of this measure is a sign of the opposite. That 
makes the EU also responsible. 
The second part of this research will be based on interviews with 
prominent officials of EASO, the Greek State, MEPs and 
organisations that deal with migration and asylum. The outcome 
of these interviews will verify if the present conclusions 
correspond to the migration reality.
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5. Part II: Interviews
 
Introduction/Methodology
The second part of this research will present the interviews that 
have been conducted in the period from February to April 2019. This 
part is a qualitative research. For the purpose of this research, we 
chose thirteen interviewees who represent 1) the Greek 
administration, 2) the EU and Greek Parliament, 3) international 
and non-governmental organisations that support asylum seekers 
in Greece, 4) the Dutch Embassy. They were chosen based on their 
active role regarding asylum and migration, as well as their 
knowledge of the current asylum challenges in Greece. Moreover, in 
order to make this research more diverse and more balanced, we 
chose interviewees who represent Greece, the Netherlands and the 
EU. All interviewees are high-ranking professionals, who have a 
broader understanding of the challenges for asylum seekers in 
Greece. Regarding the administration, we chose persons 
representing the First Reception Service, the Ministry for Migration 
Policy, the Asylum Appeals Committees. The Greek Asylum Service 
was invited to participate but declined. These interviewees cover 
the main stages of asylum procedures in Greece. 
We included Greek and Dutch MEPs of the EU Parliament actively 
pursuing political debates on migration as well as national MEPs in 
order to include the opinions of representatives of the people. We 
chose EASO in order to better understand its role in Greek asylum 
procedures. Finally we included organisations that play an 
important role concerning the protection of refugees in Greece, 
such as UNHCR, and NGOs such as the Greek Council for Refugees. 
The interviewees were presented with the topics analysed in Part I, 
and were asked to express their views freely on any of these topics, 
as well as to introduce new topics that have not been initially 
envisaged.144 They were then asked to reply to the general 
questions: what are the main challenges for asylum seekers in 
Greece, which solutions do you see and who can provide these 
solutions. They were encouraged to propose short-term and long-
term solutions that would benefit asylum seekers and to specify if 
these solutions should be sought on a national or an EU level. The 
transcripts of the interviews were sent to the interviewees, who 
were invited to suggest changes. Some interviewees indeed 
provided considerable changes, which were subsequently taken 
over in this research paper.
The majority of the interviews were conducted in person, in English 
and in Greek language. This presents the main messages of each 
interviewee with regard to the general questions. 
144 See Annex I. 
I.   Interview with Mr. Constantinos 
Papadimitriou, Secretary General of the 
Greek Ministry for Migration Policy
Mr. Papadimitriou acknowledged the delays in the examination of 
the status of asylum seekers in Greece and their long stay at the 
islands as one main challenge. He identified different reasons 
behind this phenomenon.
First of all, he mentioned that as a Ministry they have to follow the 
regulations of the EU regarding procurement and supplies and that 
these procedures are lengthy and bureaucratic, whereas migration 
needs immediate action and flexibility. From 2021 to 2027 the EU 
budget for migration increases, therefore a better strategy is 
needed so that the services can become more efficient.
He admitted that public administration in Greece should be 
modernised and that more staff is needed. The existing staff of 
the Ministry of Migration only covers 30% of the necessary posts, 
therefore the imminent employment of 133 persons by the Asylum 
Service and 50 persons by the Ministry, together with the 
clearance of costs to providers, will allow them to accelerate 
procedures. He specified that although it was difficult for the 
Ministry to employ more civil servants, due to the financial 
agreements with the creditors, they managed to find the budget to 
add 200 employees in the asylum sector and 50 permanent, to the 
Asylum Service previously counting 650 employees. 
He added that the payment of the staff mobile AUs should also be 
accelerated in order for them to become operational. At the same 
time, the Ministry had a hard time finding medical staff for the 
islands. They decided to give extra incentives to doctors, such as 
double salary and the possibility to cover with this work their 
mandatory training, in order to persuade them to work for HCDCP 
at the islands. 
Regarding vulnerability assessments, Mr. Papadimitriou found 
that the large number of persons considered vulnerable makes the 
geographical limitation less valid. However, the EU is not insisting 
on this; what they do insist on is the need to increase the returns of 
rejected asylum seekers to Turkey. He explained that returns are 
delayed because it is often difficult to find those who have been 
rejected and because Turkey often finds reasons so as not to 
accept returnees. 
He gave the example of a number of persons who are in the process 
of being returned, and Turkey, based on some problem, for 
instance in the spelling of a name, rejecting the whole list of 
persons who are already on the route. Mr. Papadimitriou clarified 
that the Prime Minister, the Minister for Migration and the 
Minister of External Affairs are trying to solve this problem 
through diplomacy.
The creation of an observatory for migration flows to the EU, based 
in Greece and funded by Norway was presented by Mr. 
Papadimitriou as a long-term solution that will allow them to plan 
1 or 2 years in advance and therefore, be better prepared to face all 
kinds of migration challenges. This means that they would be 
ready to deal with them in terms of infrastructure. 
Concerning the challenges for unaccompanied minors in Greece, 
Mr. Papadimitriou stated that Greece has made a request for their 
relocation to other EU Member States but for the moment only 
Portugal has replied positively, whereas Hungary has already 
denied. 
Mr. Papadimitriou insisted that in terms of responsibility, 
migration is a European issue and that the EU should have one 
common policy. He welcomed the support of EASO but criticised 
the differences in salaries, compared to the Greek staff. He found 
that reliance on non-EU countries should not be expected to solve 
the problem, referring to the refusal of these countries to create 
hotspots in their territories according to the latest proposal of the 
EU Council. He found platforms and the blocking of sea routes to 
be inhuman. He proposed more solidarity in the EU and the need 
for criteria in order for asylum seekers to be distributed where 
they can be well integrated. Nevertheless, he estimated 73.000 
refugees to be in Greece as of today. Taking into account the 15% 
increase of migration flows this year and the closure of the Balkan 
borders, he admitted that it is highly likely that a large number of 
people will remain in Greece. Therefore, a detailed national 
system of integration is highly needed.
Finally, he emphasized that if the EU does not take concrete steps 
on a political and technocratic level to tackle the real root causes 
of migration, such as climate change and wars, no other long-term 
solution will be able to solve the problem.
 
II.   Interview with Ms. Manon Albert, Dutch 
Embassy in Greece
Ms. Albert covers migration at the Dutch Embassy in Athens, 
working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. She 
explained that she visited the hotpots in Greece and was alarmed 
by the bad reception conditions in Moria, the tension between 
different groups/nationalities, the bad smell, the overcrowded 
hotspot of Samos with hundreds of people still living in tents all 
over the place. 
She visited the pre-removal centre in Fylakio, where migrants 
(even families with children) were kept together in large prison 
cells. On the other hand, she also mentioned there are some 
relatively well-functioning reception facilities like Elaionas in 
Athens.
Ms. Albert found that asylum seekers would not be blocked in the 
islands for so long if the asylum procedures and returns to Turkey 
were faster and more efficient. Concerning the vulnerability 
assessment, she believes that the way it is functioning now 
(almost everyone is declared vulnerable) undermines the 
EU-Turkey Statement. The criteria used by the Hellenic Centre for 
Disease Control and Prevention (KEELPNO) and EASO are very 
broad and the long stay at the islands renders people vulnerable 
eventually. The assessment takes too long because there is a 
shortage of doctors on the islands. She stated that something 
should be done to make the procedure better (more credible) 
because this is also at the expense of people who are really 
vulnerable.
When asked if there is a lack of lawyers to assist asylum seekers in 
Greece, Ms. Albert felt there are more urgent needs and gaps to 
fill. Furthermore she expressed concerns that certain lawyers from 
NGOs actually hamper the system by advising asylum seekers how 
to be considered vulnerable or encourage them to appeal over and 
over again even when they do not stand a chance.
As a solution to this challenge, Ms. Albert proposed to focus on 
returns to Turkey, not only of Syrians but also other nationalities 
who would be safe (or even better off) in Turkey. This way, it would 
be possible to break the smugglers networks. However, in her view 
if we allow the present situation where arrivals have increased and 
returns continue to be low, migrants - and more importantly: 
smugglers - will not be discouraged since they know that sooner or 
later they will be able to arrive in Athens and from there to try to 
find ways to continue their journey to western Europe.
In order to achieve this goal, Ms. Albert suggested that the asylum 
service should make quicker procedures to determine who has a 
right to stay and who does not. They need a greater capacity and 
more staff. EASO can help but they need to have permanent Greek 
staff, no quick fix. Concerning the quality of asylum examination, 
it is difficult to judge from her position. Based on stories from 
EASO experts she could imagine that the procedures are less 
thorough than they are for example in the Netherlands.
Concerning unaccompanied minors, she found that they should 
not be in the RIC’s on the islands and not be used as a means of 
deterrence policy. At the same time, the EU should avoid any 
policies that will promote the phenomena of using an ‘anchor 
child’: families sending a child on a dangerous journey to Europe in 
order to get a status through family re-unification.
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When it comes to responsibility, Ms. Albert found that Greece sees 
itself as a transit country and tends to frame this as a European 
problem. The only durable solution is when Greece takes 
responsibility for the situation and creates humane reception 
conditions, quicker asylum procedures, effective returns and 
inclusion through integration. With the support of the EU, of 
course. Some progress has been made in these areas, but there is 
still a lot that needs to be done and that needs to be improved. A 
strong Common European Asylum System is desirable and 
something we should continue to strive for, but it is not likely to be 
achieved in the near future, she concluded. 
 
III.   Interview with Mr. Georgios Pallis, Greek 
MEP
 
Mr. Pallis is an MEP of Syria party, coming from Lesbos. He first 
mentioned that right after the EU-Turkey Statement, all migrants 
in Greece started applying for asylum. Arrivals decreased after 
this Statement and the closure of the Eidomeni border. This 
dramatically increased the number of asylum seekers who had to 
remain in Greece. 
Mr. Pallis found that asylum examination is nowadays faster but it 
takes a while for decisions to be issued. Two years after the 
Statement, refugees of low recognition rate who have been unduly 
delayed are now examined at a much faster pace. However, due to 
the fact that these persons have already waited on the islands for 
such a long time (1-2 years), they should at least be given a 
humanitarian status.
Concerning vulnerability, Mr. Pallis explained that it has become a 
machinery, since vulnerable people are more than the non-
vulnerable. He accepted the fact that it has become a tool, but 
given the EU pressure to keep the hotspot policy and the 
geographical limitation, he found no other better solution.
With regard to the quality of the asylum examination, Mr. Pallis 
found that interviewers from northern Europe, with the exception 
of Scandinavians, tend to be stricter, whereas Portuguese and 
Spanish case workers tend to follow the average recognition rates. 
There are not enough interpreters because the Greek State always 
gives a smaller wage than NGOs. 
When it comes to the change of the legal status of the asylum 
appeals committees, he was against it and believes that we need a 
second level of independent experts and judges only at a final 
stage. He mentioned that the previous Minister for Migration tried 
to promote the principle that ‘if you make an appeal, you will go 
back to Turkey’, but he was a fierce opponent of this idea. 
Mr. Pallis claimed that EASO is taking very long when it comes to 
the support of asylum examination. He specified that only half of 
the staff from that was initially promised came to Greece and that 
most of them are Greek contractual agents. 
Permanent staff is needed. He also proposed the employment in 
the EU of case workers who are well-integrated and educated 
migrants themselves, and therefore, they can better understand 
other cultures and assess these claims. 
As a long-term solution, Mr. Pallis proposed a central 
administration of asylum by the EU, with the possibility to conduct 
remote interviews by a central authority and their subsequent 
distribution over Member States according to their capacity for 
integration. However, he highlighted that this should happen when 
there is a change in policy from fortress Europe to an open borders 
policy. He was against the creation of platforms of disembarkation 
and suggested giving refugees the possibility to apply for 
international protection in embassies and other designated areas 
abroad and then to travel legally to Europe in order to be examined. 
On the short-term, he supported inter-cultural mediation so as to 
avoid fights in the hotspots, family violence and disrespect for 
women’s rights. He underlined the need to prioritise the 
examination of asylum seekers who have been involved in criminal 
activities, in order not to upset too much the local population. 
 
IV.   Interview with Ms. Judith Sargentini, Dutch 
MEP, EU Parliament.
 
Ms. Sargentini first observed that there is an unwillingness to 
solve the migration problem both in Greece and in the other EU 
Member States. The latter demonstrate their unwillingness by not 
supporting relocation of asylum seekers. However, Greece is not 
willing to find the solution because if the situation improves, the 
authorities are afraid this would be a pull factor and they surely do 
not want to receive more people. At the same time, Turkey only 
takes people back from the islands and not the mainland. She 
found that there is no political will to solve the problem. 
Ms. Sargentini added that asylum procedures take too long in 
Greece for two reasons: because of lack of capacity and because 
they try to prevent more people from coming. In times of economic 
crisis, why would someone prioritise migration, she wondered.
Concerning the cooperation of the Greek officials with EASO, Ms. 
Sargentini noted that EASO is an EU Agency, therefore they have 
different visions. They try to clean up the situation in Greece, 
sometimes using unorthodox methods. Concerning the proposed 
change of EASO’s mandate in order to become more operational in 
Member States, Ms. Sargentini doubts if there will be a consensus 
in the EU to support this change. Asked if she supports the idea of 
EASO taking over asylum in Member States, she replied that there 
are pros and cons, and that this depends on the standards that will 
be set.
Regarding unaccompanied minors, she emphasized that the 
situation is inhuman and that they should not be allowed in the 
camps; they should all have their own guardian. 
Moreover, Ms. Sargentini found that vulnerability assessments in 
Greece take too long and as a result, vulnerable people have to 
remain for prolonged periods on the islands. She stressed that 
other Member States actually like it that asylum seekers have to 
remain confined in the Greek islands. 
Concerning the EU Turkey Statement, she noted that since, legally 
speaking, this is not an EU agreement, it is not negotiable by the 
EU, therefore not tangible. However, it is indeed illegal, out of 
democratic scrutiny and not respecting the principle of non-
refoulement. She explained that returns from Greece to Turkey 
take place under the bilateral readmission agreement and not the 
EU-Turkey Statement. Nowadays, accession of Turkey to the EU has 
frozen, but the economic support to Turkey for refugees will 
indeed continue. Ms. Sargentini stressed that although the 
Statement helped in decreasing the number of arrivals through 
Greece, the decisive factor was the closure of the Balkan route. 
However, people are still arriving.
In addition, Ms. Sargentini clarified that Turkey may be a safe third 
country for Greece but this is not a European policy; there is no EU 
list of safe third countries that includes Turkey. In any case, there 
should always be an individual assessment of each case.
In terms of long-term solutions, Ms. Sargentini supported the 
creation of legal pathways for refugees to enter the EU and the 
possibility to provide refugees with humanitarian visas. Asylum 
seekers who have to wait for too long to receive a decision, should 
be given refugee status. Third countries do not have an interest as 
such to assume responsibility for refugees and become the trash 
bag of Europe, she noted. 
 
V.   Interview with Ms. Alexandra Tzanedaki, 
First Reception Service in Moria, Child 
Protection 
Alexandra Tzanedaki is working for the First Reception Service, 
child protection unit, inside the safe zone for unaccompanied 
minors in Moria. Her testimony focuses on family reunification, 
registration, asylum examination, child abuse and exploitation.
First of all, she stressed that family reunifications according to the 
Dublin Regulation are very difficult. Children need to provide all 
the documents and proof within very strict deadlines and they 
have to make their claim to Germany within 3 months counting 
from the moment they arrive on the island.145 Receiving States 
tend to find excuses to reject these claims because for instance 
there is a small misspelling in the name of the applicant. Children 
find it extremely hard to collect all the required documents and to 
go through the DNA tests that many countries require. 
145  For the rest of the Member States, 3 months delay starts from the moment 
the children apply for asylum.
They lack proper information regarding Dublin transfers. They 
may stand a chance if they are supported by a guardian/lawyer. 
The procedure is very lengthy taking 1-2 years and a follow-up is 
often missing.
Ms. Tzanedaki also stressed the importance of registration. 
Frontex is the first to register newcomers. Most often, the First 
Reception Service asks children to verify if their personal data are 
correct, following the pre-registration of Frontex. However, 
sometimes children complained that Frontex has discouraged 
them from providing data that are essential for their protection, 
such as their age, nationality etc. Although children may indeed be 
accompanied by a guardian during their registration, this is not 
feasible in the case of massive arrivals. Registration is very 
important because if a child changes something during the asylum 
examination, this may be used against him, rejecting the child as 
ineligible. 
In general, there is a lack of legal assistance in Moria. There are 
only a few NGOs who provide legal aid, such as European Lawyers, 
Danish Refugee Council, GCR, but no State funded lawyers. As a 
matter of fact, Alexandra estimates that only 10% of the asylum 
seekers have access to a lawyer in Moria. This means that only 
children under 15 years of age are represented by a guardian, 
whereas children over 15 will not have a guardian or a lawyer to 
represent them at the asylum examination. The majority of 
unaccompanied minors are above 15, as a result, only 1/3 of 
children have a legal representation. In addition, due to a lack of 
HCDCP doctors, children have to wait for months for their 
examinations to be evaluated by doctors in Athens, and as a 
consequence, their asylum examination is also pending.
She added that there are considerable delays in the asylum 
interviews. EASO case workers tend to schedule interviews for 
2020, although children are examined much faster. Many asylum 
seekers go to the interviews without any preparation. Rejected 
asylum seekers are informed that if they make an appeal they will 
lose the right for voluntary repatriation with IOM. Voluntary 
repatriation means that the person will not be able to come back to 
Greece for the next 3 years. Alexandra gave the example of an 
Afghan who has been in Moria for 3,5 years waiting for the appeals 
decision. Asylum decisions are often handed over to the Director 
of the camp and then posted on a wall. As a consequence, some 
people have lost their right to appeal due to lack of proper 
information. 
Moreover, Alexandra Tzanedaki highlighted that although there 
have been official complaints to the Public Prosecutor regarding 
children’s prostitution and a file has been opened, the alleged 
perpetrators have not been convicted. 
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Alexandra speculates that perhaps this is because victims are 
reluctant to go through the criminal proceedings until the end, 
since, first of all, ‘survival sex’ is for them the only way to meet 
their basic needs and secondly, because they feel unprotected 
legally and physically. There is also the tendency not to upset the 
local society. In addition, children have been forced to steal and to 
sell drugs in order to avoid been beaten. The prolonged stay on the 
island leads children to misery.
She also mentioned that there have been incidents of children 
being exposed to sexual abuse, especially when their caretakers 
are queuing for breakfast. She noted that people have to wait for 
3-4 hours to be served, therefore they tend to make a line at 2 a.m. 
in order to get breakfast and right after they have to queue again 
for lunch. In the meantime, their children are exposed to all kinds 
of dangers. 
As short-term solutions, Ms. Tzanedaki suggested that asylum 
procedures have to be simplified so that people know if they can 
stay or not and not to wait for long periods in this ‘prison 
surrounded by water’. Dublin procedures have to be faster and 
rejections should be legitimate and not arbitrary. There is a need 
for more guardians, lawyers and doctors. Children should not be 
kept in Moria at all. They should be hosted in another shelter far 
away from the camp. For the long term, the EU should create a 
permanent mechanism for the immediate relocation of children in 
Member States where they have family who can support them. 
Finally, Alexandra mentioned that we need a long-term strategic 
plan for the integration of refugees, and referred to the fact that 
recognised refugees lose their home and allowance 6 months after 
the recognition. Having no work to sustain themselves they will 
have no other solution but to become criminals, she concluded. 
VI.   Interview with Mr. Spyros Apergis, 
Independent appeals committees
Spyros Apergis was, at the time of this interview, a member of an 
independent appeals committee, proposed by UNHCR according to 
law. 
According to Mr. Apergis, the EU-Turkey Joint Statement does not 
have a legal status in any Member State. Yet, a decision of the 
director of the Asylum Service, which establishes the geographical 
limitation for refugees arriving at the islands of the east Aegean 
Sea, presented this Statement as serving public interest. He 
further explained that the alleged reason why in 2018 the 
government decided to change the composition of the appeals 
committees is because the previous committees used to issue 
positive decisions regarding Syrians, which was not the purpose of 
the EU Turkey Joint Statement. 
The purpose of the safe third country concept as it has been 
evoked ever since by the Greek administration was the 
implementation of the EU-Turkey Joint Statement and the 
rejection of asylum claims of Syrians who come to Greek islands, as 
inadmissible .
In particular, he stressed that following the negative decisions of 
the Greek Council of State on the appeals of asylum seekers who 
challenged the EU-Turkey Statement, the Independent Appeals 
Committees have been rejecting the appeals of Syrians coming 
from the islands in the majority of cases. There are some Syrians 
who were exempted: those considered to be vulnerable according 
to law and the relevant procedures. He added that although legal 
aid at second instance is mandatory, not all of them have legal aid 
in practice. There are not enough lawyers to cover this need. As a 
result, some appeals committees postpone the examination of the 
case if there is no lawyer, but if they get back to this case and there 
still is no lawyer available, there is a problem.
Mr. Apergis criticised the fact that decisions at second instance 
are delayed; it takes them, at an average, 5 to 6 months to issue a 
decision for a case coming from the islands and more time if it is a 
case of the mainland. More committees are needed because the 
workload is huge, with more adequate and permanent staff, 
supporting the Committees. He further added that often the 
quality of the interviews at first instance is low, especially those 
from certain islands of the east Aegean sea and a second interview 
is much needed. It is at the discretion of the appeals committees to 
decide whether to invite the applicant again but in most cases, this 
does not happen. 
Some first instance interviews are bad for numerous reasons, 
namely because they are not trained suitably, they make 
questions without following up in certain critical questions, they 
mention that a fact was not proven without having asked about it, 
they misuse the credibility criteria of UNHCR, while EASO tends to 
lead the applicants during the admissibility assessment that takes 
place at the islands. Moreover, EASO usually issues negative 
opinions and considers Iraqis and Afghans as inadmissible, based 
on the safe third country concept.
Regarding vulnerability assessment, Mr. Apergis found that it is 
used, in fact, as a political tool, allowing the authorities to reduce 
the burden of the overburdened islands. Therefore, the number of 
vulnerable people follows the necessity to transfer the same 
amount of persons to the mainland. 
Mr. Apergis criticised the unofficial access of applicants to the 
Asylum Service through Skype, as a precondition to their official 
registration, since this method does not provide a legal permit of 
stay until the official registration, and, therefore, there is no 
security against arrest and deportation. 
Concerning unaccompanied minors, Mr. Apergis found that there 
are not enough guardians and as a result most minors are not 
represented by them in asylum proceedings. Since they are often 
homeless, residing in parks, police stations or so-called safe 
zones, they have limited possibility to have just and effective 
access to the asylum process. 
As short-term solutions, he found that: infrastructure on the 
islands has to be improved, the first reception service and the 
asylum service need to hire more permanent and suitably trained 
staff, the geographical limitation needs to be abolished, the army 
should no longer be responsible for the administration of many 
camps, the civil Service of the Reception and the Identification, a 
service of the Ministry of the Migration Policy, should undertake 
entirely the administration of the camps and asylum seekers 
should be hosted in apartments in the cities.
 
As long-term solutions, he suggests replacing the EU-Turkey 
Statement with a mechanism for the analogous distribution of 
refugees in Europe, and the creation of hotspots in third countries 
where, according to a pre-screening, persons in need of 
international protection would be able to obtain a visa to come to 
Europe and apply for asylum. In this case, trafficking will no longer 
be needed as a solution for travelling refugees to Europe and 
deaths at the Mediterranean Sea will eventually be considerably 
reduced.
VII.   Interview with Mr. Kostas Chrysogonos, 
Greek MEP, EU Parliament
Mr. Chrysogonos found that reality is extremely harsh for refugees 
arriving in Europe. The political crisis in the Middle East and the 
economic crisis in Europe and most of all in Greece have created an 
environment that is not suitable for the reception of these 
persons. Refugees are suffering because of lack of infrastructure, 
lack of funding and the difficulty of EU Member States to find 
consensus. As a result, we have refugee camps that do not offer a 
dignified stay, criminal groups operating in these camps, a rise in 
contagious diseases. Greece and Italy have been affected most by 
this crisis. These countries’ inadequate response at an 
administrative level has raised criticism from other EU Member 
States, which however are not willing to share the burden. 
The EU is currently focused on limiting migration flows by 
cooperating with third countries that do not have a humanistic 
approach on migration. On the contrary, they use migration to 
blackmail the EU in order to have financial benefits. As a matter of 
fact, Turkey is threatening to open the borders and flood Europe 
with refugees, in order to receive funding. 
With regard to solutions, Mr. Chrysogonos stressed that in times 
of economic crisis, when the EU coherence is tested, at a political 
level we need more solidarity and prioritisation of human rights 
and human lives. At an economic level, we need to release the 
appropriate funds in order to create shelters of good quality, 
provide sufficient medical aid and food. At a practical level, we 
have to be flexible in decision-making, in order to provide true 
assistance to refugees. In any case, we have to resist populism and 
opportunism and plan for the future because this issue will 
persist.
VIII.   Interview with Mr. Dimitrios Pagidas, 
EASO, Head of Sector Operations in Greece
 
First of all, Mr. Dimitrios Pagidas presented the role of EASO in 
Greece. He explained that since 2016, EASO assumed an 
operational role, initially with the Relocation program and after 
the EU-Turkey Statement; they participate in border 
procedures according to the provisions of the law. As of 2018 and 
following the amendment of the law, they are also conducting 
asylum interviews in the mainland (regular procedure). In the 
same context, they are currently launching a pilot project in 
Lesbos, interviewing asylum seekers of the regular procedure, in 
order to unburden the case workers of the Greek 
Authorities involved in borders procedures.
Moreover, EASO has employed, through service providers, the 
majority of the registration staff. They have been trained and then 
seconded to the Greek authorities. EASO also provides 
interpretation in missing languages. Member State experts 
provide info sessions before registration but this system will be 
replaced by the employment of regular staff.
Asylum interviews are conducted by foreign experts or Greek 
people who have been duly trained. In the islands, almost all 
interviews are conducted by EASO. They use English as working 
language in order to provide quality assurance. In fact, there is 
one team leader for 4-5 case workers, co-signing the opinions and 
they often send to HQ 30-40 cases in order to monitor if there are 
any new trends. Mr. Pagidas specified that EASO case workers use 
the interview template of the Asylum Service and that they only 
draft opinions. Decisions are drafted/taken by the Greek 
Authorities. The staff seconded at the Asylum Service are Greek 
speaking.
With regard to vulnerability, Mr. Pagidas stated that although the 
number looks big it corresponds to reality because if one person is 
considered vulnerable, the whole family would follow. In addition, 
prolonged stay at the islands could contribute to vulnerabilities. 
He explained that there are different categories of 
vulnerability, according to the law, all exempted from the border 
procedure (thus the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement). 
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Whenever vulnerability is evoked during the asylum examination, 
EASO forwards the person to KEELPNO and the Asylum Service. 
However, since there are not enough doctors, vulnerability 
assessment is delayed. Even the last call for doctors was not 
successful. Finally, transfers of vulnerable people are also taking 
time, because there are not enough places in the mainland to 
receive them. Although 15.000 new places were created, arrivals 
were up to 30.000, he stated.
Mr. Pagidas also referred to press statements implying that EASO 
considers Turkey to be a safe third country and firmly denied such 
an allegation. He stressed that EASO does not decide if Turkey is a 
safe country for asylum seekers. EASO is only interviewing asylum 
seekers and handing their opinions, including country of origin 
information, to the Greek authorities to decide. He further 
explained that the Asylum Service tends to accept their opinions 
on eligibility (decision on the merits) but sometimes they do not 
accept their opinion on admissibility. More specifically, Greece 
considers that only Syrians may be safe in Turkey because they are 
given a temporary status, whereas nationalities such as Iraqis and 
Afghans are considered not safe because they only have ‘access’ to 
the procedures and no further protection guarantee. 
He also referred to the long delays in the examination of appeals, 
since the appeals committees adjourn only twice per month and 
the judges who participate are not working full time on asylum 
cases. EASO, for reasons of impartiality, is only seconding staff to 
the Appeals Authority that are directly commissioned by the 
Authority without EASO playing a role or controlling the staff. They 
hope that the increase of the number of the committees from 12 to 
20 is going to help. 
Mr. Pagidas added that although it is easy to measure the backlog 
at the borders, it is practically more difficult in the mainland, since 
it highly depends on access to registration. The registration 
system works through Skype, where specific hours for each 
nationality/ ethnic group to make their request are announced.  
Mr. Pagidas did not make any assessment as to the efficiency of 
this pre-registration procedure.
IX.   Interview with Ms. Kostadinka Kuneva, 
Greek MEP, EU Parliament 
Ms. Kuneva first emphasized the importance to improve the living 
conditions of people before they come to Europe. She suggested 
that we need to invest in economic development, peace and 
protection against climate change. She mentioned that there are 
800.000 people in northern Syria, close to the borders with 
Turkey, and that we could support in rebuilding their lives instead 
of acting retroactively.
She also highlighted the need to increase the numbers under the 
EU resettlement scheme, so that people can come to Europe legally 
without depending on smugglers. She added that their lives could 
improve only if they would be distributed by analogy in all Member 
States and that it is time for the Commission to take measures 
against countries that do not respect this. 
Regarding the geographical limitation, Ms. Kuneva mentioned 
that unfortunately the EU Commission has completely endorsed 
Turkey’s interpretation on the EU-Turkey Statement. More 
concretely, the Greek government has repeatedly asked Turkey 
and the EU to allow them to transfer asylum seekers to the 
mainland, where there are more human and technical resources 
but Turkey was against that option, insisting that all those who 
arrive on the Greek islands should stay there during the 
examination of their asylum claim. The Commission has accepted 
Turkey’s position although Greece has made several requests 
asking help to change this pattern. As a result, reception and 
identification centres are overcrowded and there are huge delays 
in the examination of asylum claims. 
Concerning the safe third country, Ms. Kuneva mentioned that the 
implementation of this concept should guarantee the individual 
character of the asylum examination. In any case, we need to 
create a European list of safe third countries. Although the 
Commission and Parliament have supported this idea, Member 
States blocked this decision at a Council level. In the same sense, 
there should also be common vulnerability criteria in all Member 
States in order to avoid asylum shopping. 
Ms. Kuneva believes that EASO’s participation is indispensable 
because migration is a European issue and not only a national one. 
Although during the refugee crisis the number of asylum case 
workers increased, it is still not enough to proceed timely with the 
examination of all the claims. Since 2015, the Commission 
promised to send many experts to Greece to do the asylum 
interviews. It was observed that those who were proposed to come 
and help Greece were often not approved by EASO because they 
lacked the necessary skills. Yet, this has created tensions with 
other Member States claiming that they send officers that Greece 
rejects. A central examination of asylum by European organs 
would solve the problem. 
Ms. Kuneva also referred to the EU Council Conclusions of 2015146 
offering the possibility to examine asylum claims at the borders 
and transit zones of other Member States and not only at the EU 
external borders, something that has never applied.
146 tinyurl.com/councilconclusionsonmeasures. 
As for the protection of unaccompanied minors, Greece together 
with UNICEF set as a prerequisite for shelters not to host more than 
30 children. However, the 300 places that were initially available 
could not cover the 3.700 children that are currently in Greece. 
Greece managed to create more than 2.000 places in shelters and 
safe zones but, taking into account that 200 children arrive every 
month, it becomes obvious that there will never be enough space. 
The Greek government is constantly asking from Member States to 
take unaccompanied minors, additional to the numbers of 
relocation. 
Concerning the delays in the examination of asylum claims, Ms. 
Kuneva mentioned that Greece has tripled the case workers at the 
Asylum Service but still, as long as it is the first reception State 
responsible to examine all the cases, there will always be too many 
claims. Ms. Kuneva also stressed that some NGOs give hope to 
asylum seekers who do not fulfil the criteria to be recognised as 
refugees, encouraging them to make an appeal. This is to the 
detriment of people who are truly in need of protection. 
Finally, Ms. Kuneva mentioned Article 80 TFEU that states:
‘The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their 
implementation shall be governed by the principle of 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its 
financial implications, between the Member States. 
Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted pursuant to 
this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give 
effect to this principle.’
She expressed her disappointment because, as she said, she 
submitted a question to the Commission regarding the 
implementation of this Article in the context of asylum and 
migration, but she did not receive any answer.
 
X.   Interview with Ms. Emmanouella Tsapouli, 
UNHCR
 
Ms. Emmanouella Tsapouli first stressed that the Greek Asylum 
Service is responsible for asylum procedures in Greece. EASO has 
been supporting the authorities by conducting asylum interviews 
first at the borders procedures and nowadays also in the regular 
procedures. In Lesbos they interview vulnerable asylum seekers of 
the regular procedure. She emphasised that due to the great 
volume of applications, their support is really needed but the 
Asylum Service should establish a clear framework of operations, 
setting explicit conditions and obligations for EASO to fulfil as 
long as they participate in asylum examination.
Concerning the difficulty in accessing asylum in the mainland, Ms. 
Tsapouli mentioned that the current Skype system is problematic 
and needs to be replaced by a more technologically advanced 
system, as in the Netherlands. 
More offices and staff are also needed. There is a special 
registration office for vulnerable people in Frourarheio but this 
does not guarantee their fast access to asylum. Almost 80% of the 
asylum seekers of the islands are considered vulnerable. These 
persons used to be transferred in Athens but are nowadays 
examined at the islands under the regular procedure because the 
mainland is also overburdened and their transfer would further 
delay the procedures since their interview would have to be 
rescheduled.
In general terms, access to asylum highly depends on the 
availability of interpreters for the applicant’s language. In Evros 
many people go unregistered. 
With regard to the quality of the asylum interviews, Ms. Tsapouli 
noted that as the Asylum Service expanded its capacity, the 
quality of the interviews lowered. Cases are difficult, time is 
pressing and training is still missing. The authorities find it hard 
to meet local needs. EASO’s interviews on admissibility tend to be 
problematic, missing documentation. 
The concept of safe third country applies only at the border 
procedures and concerns refugees of a recognition rate above 
25%. The Asylum Service considers only Syrians to be 
inadmissible. However, this does not concern more than 2.000 
persons, since most of them are found to be vulnerable or Dublin 
cases. In any case, Greece should have asked the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling. Asylum seekers of a recognition rate below 
25% may also be returned to Turkey if they are considered not 
vulnerable. 
Moreover, UNHCR believes that there should be a permanent 
relocation system to balance the situation. This was a system 
proved to be beneficial but Member States refused to support it. In 
accordance with Council Decisions 2015/1523 and 2015/1601 the 
relocation scheme was officially ceased at the end of September 
2017, but the Relocation Unit continued operations on pending 
cases until the end of 2017. At the same time, family reunifications 
through the Dublin Regulation should be facilitated. Right now, 
Member States tend to dismiss requests easily because deadlines 
are too strict. This affects children disproportionately, as they 
lack proper and timely information about their right, they are hard 
to locate and they cannot provide the required documents within 
the time limits.
Finally, Ms. Tsapouli noted that Law 4540/2018 is restricting 
certain procedural rights, such as the right to appeal at the 
borders, the possibility of expulsion in case of an abusive 
subsequent asylum application, overdue asylum applications 
requiring documentation and interruptions of asylum claims.
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XI.   Interview with Mr. Vassilis Papadopoulos, 
Greek Council for Refugees, Director of the 
legal service
Mr. Vassilis Papadopoulos first mentioned that many asylum 
seekers go unregistered in Evros because of administrative 
reasons or lack of interpretation. Often, when a pre-removal 
centre is full of people, the authorities release them without 
registration. Turkey does not accept the return of asylum seekers 
from Evros or the mainland. They only take people back from the 
islands, implementing the EU-Turkey Statement. In Evros, the 
Greek-Turkish protocol of readmission is applicable but not 
applied in reality.
Furthermore, he stressed that safe third country is a concept that 
is used only at the border procedures and in small numbers; in 
reality, most applicants at the islands are considered to be 
vulnerable, therefore they are returned to Turkey based on the safe 
third country concept. However, the concept is very risky because 
the authorities can apply it broadly if they wish. If this happens, 
the consequences for asylum seekers will be tremendous. 
EASO is doing an unofficial vulnerability assessment when it 
examines admissibility. Admissibility examination only takes 
place at the islands and not in the mainland. The Asylum Service 
accepts inadmissibility only for Syrians, although EASO suggests 
other nationalities as well. Assessments are forwarded from EASO 
to HCDCP and then to the Asylum Service which decides to lift the 
geographical limitation. If this limitation is not respected by the 
applicant, the person is forcibly returned to the borders and the 
examination of his asylum application is terminated. The 
geographical limitation does not rely on specific criteria and there 
is no time limit or any legal means to challenge the decision. 
Regarding the pilot project, leading to detention of asylum 
seekers of specific nationalities, Mr. Papadopoulos specified that 
although it is problematic in theory, in reality it does not affect 
many persons because of lack of capacity; pre-removal centres are 
already overcrowded.
Concerning Dublin transfers, Mr. Papadopoulos explained that 
there is an erroneous calculation of the 3-month deadline from the 
moment of the arrest at the borders. While in other Member States 
asylum applications are registered already upon arrest, therefore 
the Dublin deadline begins at this stage, in Greece the Asylum 
Service is notified about new arrivals but the registration takes 
place much later. In order to solve this problem, he mentioned the 
need to reform Law 3386/2005 regarding responsibility for border 
arrests. More concretely, we need a legal reform that will allow the 
Asylum Service to take responsibility for each person from the 
moment they are arrested at the borders and express the will to 
apply for asylum. This way, the deadline for submission of a Dublin 
transfer could possibly start from the moment of the arrest.
Regarding age assessment, he admitted that there are many 
minors kept together with adults and vice versa. He explained that 
there is no NGO to assist the person, the first reception service 
tends to accept the pre-registration of Frontex, which looks at the 
child’s papers, expresses an oral opinion on their validity and 
hands them over to HCDCP. There is no written procedure.
He further added that the cessation of relocation created several 
problems in the mainland. Shelters are overcrowded. In the 
absence of an integration strategy, recognised refugees cannot 
find a job and therefore they continue to occupy places in the 
shelters for asylum seekers. Push-backs continue irrespective of 
the existence of legal documents. Mr. Papadopoulos suggested 
investing in the integration of recognised refugees and in the 
monitoring of push-backs.
XII.   Interview with Ms. Konstantina Tsekeri, 
Defence for Children International, Greek 
section
Ms. Tsekeri mentioned that children are too dependent on their 
smugglers. As a result, they prefer to travel illegally and are 
reluctant to initiate asylum procedures. In order to solve this 
problem, she suggested better information at the entry points and 
the possibility for them to apply for asylum in embassies in their 
country or origin. 
In addition, there is no guardianship system in Greece. Greece 
announced the employment of only 20 guardians. For the time 
being, NGOs partially cover this need. However, NGOs are 
understaffed and even if a guardian is appointed, there is no 
monitoring of their work. As a result, she tends to observe several 
mistakes concerning the representation of children at the asylum 
procedures. More concretely, guardians do not provide sufficient 
information and preparation to the children about the asylum 
procedure. There is no proper psychological and social support for 
these children either. She gave the example of severely 
traumatised children who have not been assessed for torture. 
Ms. Tsekeri added that some children from 15 to 18 years old have 
wrong age assessment. However, they are not delivered this 
decision and as a result, they have no legal remedy against it. In 
Moria, some children with wrong assessment are detained with 
adults in order to be returned to Turkey.
In Greece there are 3.800 unaccompanied minors. Most of them are 
homeless because there are not enough shelters. The authorities 
try to choose the most vulnerable amongst vulnerable children in 
order to provide them with shelter. These children are exposed to 
sexual exploitation and labour exploitation. Some children are 
staying with adults who offer them roof and food in exchange for 
sex. 
In addition, ‘protective custody’ means that many children have to 
reside in hospitals or police stations because there is no 
alternative than homelessness.
Greece does not have a holistic approach regarding asylum 
seekers in Greece. This issue is treated in an arbitrary manner, as a 
response to a crisis and not a long-term investment. Greece has 
received considerable funds that could have been used more 
effectively. However, even the best system would never be 
enough. The EU should promote a sharing of responsibilities 
through relocation. According to Ms. Tsekeri, Greece does not 
advocate enough this need for sharing responsibilities. 
XIII.  Interview with Ms. Anastasia 
Christodoulopoulou, Vice-president of the 
Greek Parliament
Ms. Christodoulopoulou was a vice-Minister for Migration at the 
outbreak of the refugee crisis back in 2015. She mentioned that 
the Global Compact on Refugees147 stresses the need for all 
countries to find a commonly accepted solution for refugees. 
However, as she commented, it is not legally binding. As a result, it 
cannot coerce States to share the responsibilities. She regretted 
the Commission’s inability to pressure Member States to accept 
relocation, which was legally binding. She further commented that 
if relocation and resettlement are voluntary and temporary 
measures, they could not be successful. 
Ms. Christodoulopoulou stressed that because of the Dublin 
Regulation and the EU-Turkey Statement, thousands of asylum 
seekers are trapped in Greece against their will. No matter how 
much solidarity society has shown, and how much the State has 
tried tο improve the reception centres, there are still 
inadequacies. However, since refugee recognition rates are quite 
high, we are mostly talking about a reception problem. The 
provision of reception spaces has proven to be challenging, 
because, as she mentioned, many Mayors were against it and also 
because EU funds were not available for persons who did not want 
to apply for asylum in Greece. 
She further mentioned that due to the legally ambiguous 
EU-Turkey Statement, newcomers in Greece would lose their 
refugee rights. It paved the way for the return of those who did not 
want to apply for asylum. 
Ms. Christidoulopoulou explained that the Asylum Service is still 
understaffed to meet the challenge and that there is a need for a 
procedure for faster transfer of vulnerable asylum seekers to the 
mainland.
147  UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Towards a global compact on 
refugees: a roadmap, Geneva: UNHCR, 4 April 2017.
Finally, she commented on the reform of the CEAS, that the 
Commission’s proposals are unfortunately still supporting the 
Dublin Regulation, although it proved to be ineffective for asylum 
seekers. The proposals are strict, since they expand the 
possibilities for administrative detention, they render ineffective 
the right to an appeal, they punish asylum seekers who change 
countries, and they make safe third country a mandatory concept, 
something that is against the Geneva Convention. She concluded 
that we need to safeguard the European acquis, by promoting 
human rights and refugee rights according to international law.
Conclusion Part II
As it appears from the interviews, all interviewees have agreed 
that the situation for asylum seekers in Greece is critical. Taking 
for granted that more and more people will remain stuck in Greece 
in the coming years, they all concluded that the procedures have to 
become fast and efficient. They all stressed the need to make a 
long-term planning and pay more attention to integration. 
Moreover, they all agreed on the need to better protect children. 
Some suggested removing them from the hotspots, or relocating 
them to other Member States.
However, these interviews also highlight some major differences. 
First of all, there is a difference in perspective between Greek 
administration/politicians and non-Greek interviewees/the EU 
(Dutch Embassy, EASO, Dutch MEP). From the Greek point of view, 
asylum should be regarded as a European issue that demands a 
European solution. These interviewees suggested that the Greek 
efforts will never be enough if there is no change in European 
politics. More concretely, they have provided various ideas: a 
reform of the Dublin Regulation to include a permanent relocation 
mechanism, a request from the EU to support the abolishment of 
the geographical limitation, the creation of a centralized European 
system to deal with asylum applications. The common 
denominator is the need for the EU to take more responsibility on 
asylum in Greece and not to consider this as a strictly national 
issue. They all highlighted the importance for the EU to deal with 
the root causes of migration, instead of searching for temporary 
solutions.
The interviewees who do not represent the Greek State had a 
different approach. They emphasized the need for Greece to take 
more responsibility and act more efficiently, implying or directly 
stating that it is Greece that is primarily responsible for all these 
people. This responsibility has been described as the need for fast 
decision-making procedures and the return of those who do not 
qualify for international protection (Dutch Embassy), or as the 
need to improve capacities and infrastructure with more long-
term planning. 
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This difference in perception is indicative of the Greek effort to 
show that asylum is a European issue and of the negation of other 
Member States and the EU to adhere to this vision. The solutions 
that have been proposed also follow this suggested pattern of 
responsibilities.
The international organisations and NGO’s have not taken any 
position regarding responsibility. They focused on more technical 
aspects of the asylum procedures in Greece.
The Dutch Embassy was the only entity suggesting that a better 
implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement will reduce arrivals in 
Greece. The rest of the interviewees either did not react to this or 
expressed their doubts as to the efficiency of this Statement to 
limit new arrivals. 
Regarding the geographical limitation, some new elements were 
added. Ms. Kuneva, the Greek member of the European Parliament, 
suggested that this limitation is based on Turkey’s interpretation 
of the EU-Turkey Statement, supported by the EU. The Dutch 
Embassy stressed that the low number of returns jeopardise the 
Statement. Asylum seekers would not have to wait as long on the 
hotspots if Greece would examine their claims faster.
The Greek Ministry for Migration explained that this low number of 
returns is due to the unwillingness of Turkey to take back asylum 
seekers and second that it is hard for the Greek authorities to trace 
rejected asylum seekers in order to actually return them to Turkey. 
In any case, the impossibility of asylum seekers to leave the 
islands was criticised by Ms. Sargentini, Dutch MEP, claiming that 
it stems from Greece’s intention to discourage new arrivals and the 
EU’s unwillingness to share the burden.
 This geographical limitation is prolonged, as stated by Ms. 
Tzanedaki, because of the delays in the examination of asylum 
claims. The Director of the legal service of GCR noted that the lack 
of doctors and lawyers delays the asylum procedures in the 
hotspots. Mr. Apergis, member of an Asylum Appeals Committee 
added that the Appeals Committees are also taking too much time. 
This was confirmed by EASO. Mr. Pallis, Greek MEP and Mr. 
Papadimitriou from the Ministry for Migration did not see any 
alternative to the geographical limitation. From the Greek 
perspective, this measure can change only if the EU would change 
its policies and rely on relocation.
Regarding the safe third country concept, the interview with the 
UNHCR representative confirmed that it is only applied to Syrian 
asylum seekers in the border procedures. UNHCR explained that 
for other, non-Syrian, nationalities with a high recognition rate 
such as Iraqis and Afghans, the Asylum Service does not declare 
their application inadmissible, although EASO case workers seem 
to propose the opposite in their opinion. 
As EASO explained, Greece does not qualify Turkey as safe for 
these nationalities, because unlike Syrians who are granted 
temporary protection in Turkey, other nationalities getting 
protection is more difficult. This answer implied that unlike 
Greece, EASO is satisfied with the protection that Turkey offers to 
non-Syrians. 
The Vice-President of the Greek Parliament criticised the third 
safe country concept, stressing that it is not in conformity with 
the Geneva Convention of 1951 and international human rights law. 
Mr. Papadopoulos expressed his concerns that if the authorities 
apply this notion broadly in the future, it will have severe 
consequences for the right to seek asylum. UNHCR held a more 
moderate result-based approach; since in practice the majority of 
applicants avoid their return to Turkey because they are 
considered vulnerable or waiting for a Dublin transfer, UNHCR is 
not deeply concerned about the implementation of this concept. 
To conclude, this concept was not praised by any interviewee, 
although some, as previously noted, have tried to downsize its 
effects.
Concerning vulnerability assessments, interviewees have 
highlighted that this evaluation has acquired a different purpose 
than the one that was initially envisaged; instead of selecting the 
asylum seekers who need special care, it has rather become a 
political tool, a ‘safety mechanism’ that allows the authorities to 
transfer a number of applicants from the islands to the mainland, 
thus bypassing the geographical limitation. This has a negative 
impact on persons who are truly vulnerable, according to the Dutch 
Embassy. Moreover, the interviewees emphasised the incapacity 
of the authorities to conclude such assessments in a timely 
manner, something that contributes to the prolonged stay of 
applicants on the islands. This assessment was presented by Greek 
MEPs as the only possible solution as long as the geographical 
limitation is maintained. 
With regard to the role of EASO, all interviewees consider it 
necessary for the Agency to participate actively in the Greek 
asylum procedures. The reason behind this opinion is the limited 
capacity of Greece to deal effectively with such a large volume of 
applications in a timely manner. UNHCR stressed however that it is 
important for Greece to regulate the participation of EASO, by 
introducing safeguards and delimitations. This ‘conditional 
acceptance’ of EASO is supposed to guarantee that the Agency will 
not become a deciding authority, thereby allowing Greece to have 
the last say on asylum applications. As an example of such a 
condition, Mr. Pallis urged for the opinions of EASO to be issued in 
Greek.
EASO itself underlined its subordinate role to the Greek 
authorities, highlighting that the case workers are deployed to the 
Asylum Service, they use the Service’s template and they only 
issue opinions. 
They explained that opinions are in English so as to allow EASO’s 
internal monitoring. At the same time, EASO refuses the allegation 
that it takes position on the safety of Turkey. However, the 
disagreement of EASO deployed case workers with Greek asylum 
officers on the admissibility of certain nationalities due to safe 
third country considerations is a sign that perhaps the Agency 
does not take a decision on the safety of Turkey but in some cases, 
it highly suggests Turkey being a safe third country. 
Moreover, the expansion of EASO’s role to regular procedures may 
lead to the expansion of this concept to cases on the mainland.
Concerning the protection of child asylum seekers, all 
interviewees who expressed themselves on this topic were in 
favour of their removal from the hotspots. Some interviewees like 
Ms. Tzanedaki proposed the creation of more suitable shelters 
outside the camps, whereas the Ministry for Migration went 
further, suggesting their immediate relocation to other Member 
States. 
Defence for Children International and Spyros Apergis of the 
Asylum Appeals Committees criticised the lack of State guardians 
and lawyers to represent these children in the asylum procedures. 
Their placement under protective custody and their homelessness 
were presented as factors that lead to their abuse and 
exploitation. Ms. Tzanedaki linked child prostitution with the need 
to survive and urged the authorities to protect children from any 
sort of abuse. 
GCR stressed that there are no legal remedies to challenge age 
assessments. In addition, due to a strict application of deadlines 
by receiving States, many children lose their right to family 
reunification under the Dublin Regulation. The latter was 
confirmed by UNHCR. The interviews show a great deficiency in 
child protection in Greece, for which Greece needs to invest in 
infrastructure and human resources while in the meantime their 
transfer to other States under the Dublin Regulation or relocation 
schemes should be promoted.
Regarding the quality of asylum procedures in Greece, it was 
suggested that despite the progress asylum examination is still 
lengthy. The member of the Asylum Appeals Committees admitted 
that it takes too much time for them to reach a decision. He 
explained how the need to speed up asylum examination at first 
instance has downgraded the quality of these interviews. The need 
for improvement was also stressed by UNHCR. 
These interviews have also revealed the general lack of legal aid in 
Greece, something that also has grave consequences for the legal 
representation of minors in asylum procedures. NGOs try to fill the 
gap, but as it has been noted by the Dutch Embassy and a Greek 
MEP, they sometimes lead applicants, by telling them what to say.
Moreover, the lack of human resources and infrastructure on the 
islands was presented by EASO as a main challenge that delays all 
the procedures. On the mainland, the authorities provide pre-
registration through Skype in order to facilitate access to the 
asylum procedure but this system was found unworkable. More 
concretely, Mr. Apergis suggested that it does not adequately 
safeguard applicants against deportation. UNHCR also 
emphasized that we need a more technologically advanced, more 
inclusive system. Finally, Ms. Tzanedaki presented the tragic 
situation for many applicants in Lesbos who have to wait for years 
for a final decision. She expressed the need for a fast decision on 
their status and for greater support for their registration and 
submission of appeals by state guardians and lawyers. For all 
those applicants who have had to wait for years in order to get a 
decision, Mr. Pallis and Ms. Sargentini suggested granting 
humanitarian or even refugee status.
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6. Part III: Conclusions
 
Conclusions
As mentioned in the introduction, the aim of this research is to 
identify the core challenges that asylum seekers face nowadays in 
Greece; whether their reception and the way their asylum claims 
are dealt with are in conformity with the CEAS; who are responsible 
for any shortcomings; and finally, to report solutions proposed by 
organisations, politicians and authorities dealing with migration 
in Greece. In this third part we will draw the main conclusions on 
these topics of interest. 
I.  Asylum Procedures
 
In the first Part, two different asylum procedures have been 
identified: the regular procedure that takes place on the mainland 
and the border procedure at the islands. Both procedures are quite 
lengthy. The border procedure is applied in cases of applicants 
subject to the EU-Turkey Statement, i.e. applicants who have 
arrived on the Greek Eastern Aegean islands after 20 March 2016 
and have lodged applications with the RAO of Lesbos, Chios, 
Samos, Leros and Rhodes, and the AU of Kos. On the contrary, 
applications lodged with the Asylum Unit of Fylakio by persons 
remaining in the RIC of Fylakio in Evros are not examined under the 
fast-track border procedure. In 2018 the total number of 
applications lodged before the RAO of Lesbos, Samos, Chios, Leros 
and Rhodes and the AU of Kos was 30.943. This represented 42,9% 
of the total number of applications lodged in Greece that year. The 
border procedure is relatively faster but not fast enough and they 
lead to the risk of return to Turkey for applicants of certain 
nationalities, while their asylum claims are not properly dealt 
with. The safe third country concept is invoked at first and second 
instance decisions in certain cases. In the regular procedure this 
concept is not applied as such, but applicants still have to wait 
years for a final decision to be made.  
The pre-registration system through Skype was presented by 
some organisations as inaccessible and ineffective. There are very 
few State lawyers available, thus rendering legal aid ineffective. 
As discussed in the interviews, Greece has made a considerable 
effort to accelerate the asylum procedures, especially at the 
borders. This, according to UNHCR, has happened to the detriment 
of the procedural rights and guarantees required according to 
Directive 2013/32/EU. Although the examination at first instance 
under the border procedure has somehow become faster, it seems 
that the new appeals committees are taking a lot of time. As a 
result, asylum seekers have to wait for years at the hotspots in 
order to receive a final asylum decision. 
This long period of uncertainty leads to excessive distress. It is 
required by Directive 2013/32/EU that people should be informed 
as soon as possible if they are entitled to stay. Some interviewees 
suggested that these people who have waited for years in the 
hotspots should be granted refugee status or humanitarian status 
without going through the asylum procedure. 
The reform of the asylum appeals committees presented in Part I 
was criticised by some interviewees, including a member of such 
committees, as unlawful. The interviews confirmed that this 
reform served the EU-Turkey Joint Statement and led to the 
rejection of many applications of Syrians in this respect.
Moreover, the Skype appointment system for registration of the 
asylum application was criticised as ineffective and interviewees 
proposed its replacement with a technologically more advanced 
system that would not deprive asylum seekers of their access to 
the procedure.  
Different opinions were expressed during the interviews 
regarding legal aid. Most of the interviewees mentioned the 
absence of State funded lawyers, especially at the borders, which 
is a violation of the right to have free legal representation during 
court procedures as laid down in Articles 19 and 20 Directive 
2013/32/EU. NGOs try to cover some of the cases, but they are 
understaffed. As a result, most of the available lawyers choose to 
defend children under the age of 15. Therefore, children from 15 to 
18 and adults are often not legally represented. The Dutch Embassy 
however believed the opposite to be true; that there are in fact too 
many NGO lawyers and that they guide asylum seekers on what to 
say. They would provide asylum seekers with false hope. This was 
also criticised by a Greek MEP as unethical and unfair. We observed 
that as a result there is indeed a gap in legal representation, 
partially covered by NGOs. The latter sometimes seem to provide 
services in order to allow as many applicants to remain in Greece as 
possible.  
As it has already been discussed, the existence of two procedures, 
the fast-track border procedure and regular procedure lead to 
unequal treatment of asylum seekers. This is fuelled by the 
presence of case workers seconded by EASO, the modus operandi 
of which is allegedly not fully adapted to the Asylum Service 
guidelines. Interviews showed that not only there are two asylum 
procedures by law, but also that the treatment of asylum seekers is 
very differentiated, not only in terms of deadlines and modalities 
but more so in substance. 
Vulnerability is the main factor that dictates who can have a 
decision on the merits at the border, while this is not the case on 
the mainland. 
Concerning the quality of first instance interviews, a member of 
the Asylum Appeals Committees found that decisions at first 
instance are often of low quality. Other interviewees referred to 
the high recognition rate in Greece as a sign of tolerance and 
hospitality. The respondent from the Dutch Embassy was of the 
opinion that the low number of returns undermines the EU-Turkey 
Statement. These considerations indicate that although Greece 
takes responsibility for the implementation of a Statement 
promoting returns, in reality most asylum seekers are able to stay.
 Asylum applications by Syrians examined according to the fast-
track border procedure are probably rejected as inadmissible, 
unless they are considered to be vulnerable. Those who reached 
the mainland do not run the same risk and will receive a refugee 
status. Those applicants of whom the applications have been 
rejected need to choose between voluntary repatriation with IOM 
or making use of the right to appeal. As a consequence, applicants 
are discouraged to appeal against the first instance decision.
Moreover, we saw in Part I that the pilot project may lead to 
discrimination of asylum seekers based on their nationality. The 
police detains almost immediately persons who have expressed 
their desire to ask for asylum because they have a specific profile 
resulting in differential treatment based on nationality and/or the 
person’s individual status. In practice, it is not commonly applied 
because of lack of space in detention centres. However, if the 
situation changes, the application of this measure will have major 
consequences on the rights of asylum seekers who will be 
detained. 
The lack of infrastructure and human resources was presented by 
several interviewees as a major reason for the delays in 
examination of the asylum procedure It was suggested that Greece 
should make full use of the EU funds to create long-term solutions.
To conclude, it seems to be difficult to strike a balance between 
efficiency and quality of the asylum procedure. This research has 
shown that asylum procedures in Greece are still inadequate and 
inefficient. It is time for the authorities to strike a fair balance of 
the two and deploy all technical means, extra training of 
employees, and additional staff in order to decide quickly and 
fairly on asylum applications. In addition, asylum procedures 
should guarantee the equal treatment of asylum seekers in Greece. 
Persons having the same nationality should not be treated 
differently depending on where they apply for asylum . 
According to Article 8 Directive 2013/32/EU asylum seekers need 
to get access to legal information and counselling upon arrival in 
the language they understand in accordance with their needs for 
special procedural guarantees. 
Access to free legal assistance and independent interpreters is 
required by Article 19 and 20 Asylum Procedures Directive and key 
to ensure the right to seek asylum and to apply for asylum, 
especially for those channelled directly into fast-track procedures 
and pre-removal centres.
Moreover, the pre-registration system should be replaced with a 
technologically more advanced system that provides access 
timely and indiscriminately. In order to fulfil the requirements of 
the CEAS, the authorities should develop a truly impartial and 
independent asylum examination at second instance, with 
fulltime experts that would reach decisions in a timely manner and 
not circumvent to political pressure. In addition, there is a need 
for more Greek lawyers to make sure every asylum seeker can make 
use of legal aid. As it has also been highlighted in the interviews, it 
is necessary to clear the status of people who have been waiting 
for a long time without delay and to provide full access to asylum. 
In order to be able to detect problems with access, push-back 
practises should be properly investigated.
 
IΙ.  The Geographical Limitation
 
As pointed out in Part I, the geographical limitation was 
introduced to implement the EU-Turkey Statement by means of 
administrative decisions of the Asylum Service. The Greek Asylum 
Service has endorsed the measure as serving public interest. The 
adoption of this measure has caused the overcrowding of Eastern 
Aegean islands and the reception of thousands of asylum seekers 
in dire conditions. Moreover, this limitation in conjunction with 
Law 4375 of 2016 has created a separate border procedure only on 
six islands of the Aegean. In part I, we concluded that with the 
adoption of the geographical limitation, Greece assumed 
responsibility for the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement. 
However, the interviews have challenged this assumption. Greek 
politicians explained that it is in fact Turkey that has imposed this 
measure, tolerated by the EU Commission. According to Greek 
MEPs, the Greek government has asked the EU Commission to 
intervene in favour of the abolishment of this measure, but with no 
result. The refusal of Turkey to take back rejected asylum seekers 
from the mainland and Evros supports this view.  
Returns to Turkey are very limited. As a result, asylum seekers are 
not discouraged from coming to the EU through Greece. As we 
already saw in Part I, only 1.690 persons have been returned from 
April 2016 until the end of August 2018 under the EU-Turkey 
Statement. The Greek administration explained the low return 
numbers, suggesting that Turkey often finds excuses so as not to 
take asylum seekers back and that this is something the Greek 
government tries to solve at a high diplomatic level. They also 
added that it is difficult to locate rejected asylum seekers who hide 
in order to avoid their subsequent deportation.  
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The bad reception conditions on the islands were also described by 
a Dutch EU MEP as a consequence of the unwillingness and 
incapacity of Greece to provide long-term sustainable solutions. 
This was presented as something that was to be expected because 
the refusal of EU Member States to support relocation left Greece 
with no other option but to refuse to invest in terms of 
infrastructure and human resources, as a means of deterrence to 
new arrivals.  
However, in Part I we saw that the border procedures on the islands 
are introducing stricter deadlines for the examination of asylum 
claims, in an attempt to accelerate the process. The interviews 
have shown that these reforms have not been successful in these 
terms. Asylum seekers are still forced to remain on the islands for 
an excessive amount of time. Final asylum decisions are delayed. 
Vulnerability assessments are also delayed due to limited human 
resources. The Minister of Migration acknowledged the need to 
upgrade the services. He stated that the bureaucratic EU 
procurement decisions lack flexibility, therefore it is hard to 
respond to all the needs in a timely manner. 
Greek politicians and representatives of the Ministry of Migration 
pointed at the need to deal with the root causes of migration, and a 
central EU governance system for asylum, where European organs 
would decide on all applications in Europe and provide an 
analogous distribution according to the capacity for integration in 
each Member State. Some interviewees suggested an open border 
policy, with the possibility to apply for asylum at the embassies of 
third countries, the creation of legal pathways and humanitarian 
visas. 
For asylum seekers who have to wait very long for their case to be 
assessed, the Dutch MEP suggested granting them refugee status, 
as it has also been proposed in the Netherlands by her political 
party: the Green Party. A Greek MEP had a similar view. Such 
proposals are based on the conviction that refugees should not 
pay for the State’s inability to examine their case in a timely 
manner.
In conclusion, it seems that the geographical limitation is a system 
imposed not only by Greece, but by the EU and Turkey as well. The 
reference to the EU-Turkey Statement in the administrative 
decisions of the Asylum Service, ordering the geographical 
limitation leads to the assumption that Greece has full 
responsibility for this measure. Yet, the interviews show 
something else; that the Greek authorities were pressured to 
adopt this measure to facilitate the implementation of the 
EU-Turkey Statement. If not, this Statement would collapse and 
there would be no returns of asylum seekers to Turkey.  
Greece technically imposed this measure by means of an 
administrative decision of the Director of the Asylum Service, but 
behind this decision lies the refusal of Turkey to receive asylum 
seekers from the mainland and the fact that the EU is tolerating 
this refusal. This observation leads us to two conclusions: 1) 
Greece wants an adequate implementation of the Joint Statement 
(some returns have to take place), 2) the geographical limitation 
is allegedly indirectly supported by the EU. 
In practice however, the number of returns to Turkey is still low. 
This proves that the geographical limitation is not only unlawful 
but also inefficient. If return to Turkey is not guaranteed, what is 
the purpose of this measure? It seems that the only purpose truly 
served is the restriction of movement of thousands of asylum 
seekers on the islands, depriving them of the possibility of any 
secondary movement. Therefore, the EU and Greece need to 
abolish the geographical limitation. The excessive use of 
declaring asylum seekers vulnerable proves that this limitation 
has become redundant. It is time to create a reception system on 
the mainland that meets basic human standards where (truly) 
vulnerable people will be supported in the best possible way. 
From the above, it seems that the EU-Turkey Statement has not 
managed to achieve its goal, namely the return of asylum seekers 
to Turkey. More so, it has caused the prolonged stay of asylum 
seekers on six islands of the Aegean Sea where the conditions of 
living are inhumane. Therefore we conclude that the EU-Turkey 
Statement is not only inefficient in this regard, but also leads to 
human rights violations.  
Channelling of asylum applicants into different procedures must 
never hinder access to the asylum procedure. Greek authorities’ 
immediate channelling of certain profiles into fast-track 
procedures, which are aimed at ensuring swift return of third-
country nationals, who are not entitled to protection in the EU, 
poses a threat to these persons’ access to the asylum procedure.
 
IIΙ.  Turkey as a Safe Third Country 
 
In Part I we saw that the safe third country concept was included in 
Greek legislation to transpose Directive 2013/32/EU. The Greek 
law does not require for a country to be regarded as safe to have 
fully ratified the Geneva Convention of 1951. This conclusion, 
which was also highlighted by the Greek Council of State, is 
contrary to the current provisions of the EU legislation. The safe 
third country concept has been applied unequally, in terms of 
geographic location and nationality, affecting mostly Syrians who 
arrive on the islands.  
In the absence of an EU list or a national list of safe third countries, 
the recognition of Turkey as a safe third country was presented by 
interviewees as a national decision, deriving from the EU-Turkey 
Statement. So far, this concept has only been used for asylum 
seekers in the border procedure during the admissibility check. 
These checks are conducted by case workers seconded by EASO to 
the Asylum Service. In the border procedures, an admissibility 
check takes place during the asylum application, something that 
does not happen in regular procedures.  
Moreover, as it has been explained by interviewees including 
EASO, although case workers are seconded by the Asylum Service, 
they sometimes have a different view regarding asylum seekers of 
high recognition rate who are not Syrians. More concretely, they 
tend to regard Iraqis and Afghans as inadmissible, whereas the 
Greek officers who sign the final decision tend to disagree, arguing 
that Turkey is not a safe country for them since asylum seekers 
with these nationalities only have access to protection procedures 
in Turkey and will not receive a temporary status. EASO clarified 
that it does not decide on the safety of Turkey. The decision has to 
be taken by the Greek State. EASO only conducts the interview, 
provides information and issues an opinion. However, Greek 
officers who take the final decision have to rely on interviews that 
have been conducted out of their sphere of influence. For this 
reason, it is not unrealistic to consider that their decisions are 
strongly influenced by the interview process that they were not 
able to control. 
The country of origin of the applicant plays a key role with regard 
to the admissibility of asylum applications. More specifically, as it 
has already been stated, case workers deployed by EASO seem to 
have a different opinion than the Greek Asylum Service concerning 
the admissibility of applications of Iraqis and Afghans. EASO 
claims that they do not decide on asylum, they only issue an 
opinion. However, two main considerations can be made: 1) 
although EASO officially does not decide on the question if there is 
a safe third country for the asylum seeker, it prepares the legal 
ground for such a decision to a large extent, 2) apart from the fact 
that EASO case workers keep a different approach regarding some 
nationalities, they do not have any other information as to the 
criteria that EASO and the Asylum Service rely upon in order to 
assess asylum applications. As mentioned in Part I, the decision-
making criteria as standard operating procedures are blurred and 
inaccessible to the public. Therefore the transparency of the 
procedures must be questioned.  
The absence of objective, publicly available criteria to decide on 
the safety of Turkey has negative consequences on the right of 
asylum seekers to be heard in quasi-judicial proceedings that 
define their right to stay. 
Although Directive 2013/32/EU does not require the integration of 
such criteria into a legal document, it does require, as we have 
seen in Part I, that the decisions should respect some specific 
requirements, based on international law and human rights. If 
such criteria are not publicly available, this gives room to 
arbitrariness. The arbitrariness of the decisions was confirmed by 
the interviews showing that the concept applies unequally to 
Syrians. 
The safe third country concept was presented by Greek MEPs as 
contrary to the right to seek asylum as laid down in the Geneva 
Convention, because it introduces an absolute assumption of 
safety that is extremely hard for refugees to rebut. In reality, it 
seems that it does not currently affect many asylum seekers 
because, as stated by some interviewees, most of them are 
considered vulnerable and therefore are exempted from the 
possibility to be returned to Turkey. Yet, according to the Dutch 
Embassy, vulnerability criteria are too broad, thus leaving a large 
margin of appreciation to the Greek authorities. 
In conclusion, although the Greek law provides specific safeguards 
for a country to be considered safe, in Greece the safe third 
country concept leads to different treatment of asylum seekers, 
depending on their geographical location and the asylum 
procedure. As a result, a Syrian in Athens will have much more 
chances to receive international protection than a Syrian of the 
same background in Lesbos. There is no credible explanation as to 
why Syrians with the same asylum claim, background and fear of 
persecution will be treated differently in Athens than in Lesbos, 
since the legal requirements are supposed to be the same.
Furthermore, EASO has denied any responsibility for the decision 
if the safe third country concept applies to each applicant and 
Greece does not decide on the basis of specific, objective and 
publicly accessible criteria. The safe third country concept is 
vague and applied in an almost arbitrary way. The differences 
between admissibility opinions of EASO and the final decisions of 
Asylum Service officers support this allegation. 
Moreover, the lack of sufficient lawyers on the islands makes it 
even harder for asylum seekers to rebut the safe third country 
presumption. In order to rebut this presumption they have to rely 
on their personal circumstances, their vulnerability. Decisions 
rejecting the asylum application on the basis of a ‘safe third 
country’ exception are largely limited to repeating the provisions 
of Directive 2013/32/EU and Greek law, without fully assessing 
individual circumstances. This differs from the possibility of 
rebuttal of the safety of a third country and possibly – in the end – 
of the non-refoulement principle (Art. 33 RC, Art. 3 ECHR, Art. 4 
EU-Charter).
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Instead of considering Turkey to be a safe third country, all asylum 
seekers should have the possibility to present their claim and have 
it assessed according to Directive 2011/95/EU and the Geneva 
Convention without having to prove themselves vulnerable to 
escape return to Turkey.
IV.  Vulnerability
In Part I, we found vulnerability to be based on the Greek and EU 
legislation as a legitimate reason for special reception conditions 
of vulnerable applicants. In the Greek context, we saw that the role 
of vulnerability has expanded. Vulnerability became the only 
argument for Syrians examined under the borders procedures to 
challenge the dismissal of their request for international 
protection as inadmissible. It constitutes the only argument 
against the safety of Turkey. Moreover, from an exceptional 
measure of emergency, assessing asylum seekers as vulnerable 
became the norm. 
As EASO explained, there are some vulnerability criteria leading to 
the non-return of asylum seekers to Turkey. EASO stated that 
although the numbers of vulnerable people are high, they 
correspond to reality because they extend to the whole family of 
the vulnerable person and because the prolonged stay in 
deplorable conditions on the islands makes people vulnerable by 
default. The Ministry of Migration confirmed this statement. 
According to UNHCR, since most applicants are vulnerable, only 
2.000 Syrians are currently expected to be returned. The Dutch 
Embassy had a different view suggesting that vulnerability 
criteria are not well-defined. They proposed the adoption of a 
stricter approach in order to safeguard the validity of vulnerability 
assessment. The EU Commission has not taken a position on this 
issue, but they do insist on increasing the return rate, as was 
stated by the Greek Ministry for Migration Policy. 
As explained in Part I, the Greek law excludes vulnerable asylum 
seekers from the border procedures. Therefore, the exemption 
from the border procedures of Syrians/applicants on the islands 
based on vulnerability is lawful. However, as the interviews have 
shown, their vulnerability is not really an exception, it has become 
the norm. This is a sign that vulnerability serves another purpose 
than what was intended by the law. Indeed, vulnerability was 
described by interviewees as a political tool, the only way to 
reduce the burden of the islands. 
Furthermore, since many persons are in need of a vulnerability 
assessment and there is a lack of doctors, the recognition of 
vulnerability is delayed. Also, there are delays in the transfer of 
vulnerable asylum seekers to the mainland due to limited 
reception capacities on the mainland. As a result, many vulnerable 
asylum seekers are nowadays examined on the islands and living 
under harsh conditions. 
Interviewees did not suggest any particular solution regarding 
vulnerability, apart from making sure that more doctors are 
available on the islands. The issue was linked to the geographical 
limitation and the absence of any alternative.
If vulnerability was conceived as a mechanism to reduce the 
burden of the islands, the goal is far-fetched because most 
vulnerable people still have to remain on the islands. Their transfer 
to Athens is extremely delayed. Then, the only advantage of this 
concept is the possibility for vulnerable people to avoid their 
return to Turkey. This option forces asylum seekers to prove or 
create their precarious state. As it was acknowledged by 
interviewees, some NGOs tend to advise applicants what to say in 
order to be considered vulnerable. This is a sign that the 
mechanism may not be what it claims to be: an emergency exit for 
those who desperately need help. It is a sign that this is the only 
way for people to have their claim considered in a timely and 
dignified manner.
 It is doubtful whether the means justify the end. The fact that, as 
interviewees have stated, vulnerability is also a result of 
prolonged stay at the hotspots, means that there is a vicious circle 
of having to wait in order to prove vulnerability, and becoming 
vulnerable because of the long waiting periods. Nevertheless, this 
unattractive situation may discourage more asylum seekers from 
travelling to Greece. 
Claiming vulnerability seems to be the only option for some 
asylum seekers to avoid being returned to Turkey. Nevertheless, a 
claim based on vulnerability will only be successful if asylum 
seekers can rely on personal factors such as illnesses. As a result, 
the Greek procedure moves away from the criteria for international 
protection as described in Directive 2011/95/EU and towards a 
more ‘philanthropic’ approach, not referring to a specific legal 
basis. However, one could state that not offering sufficient 
protection to vulnerable people could in the end amount to 
inhuman treatment, as provided in Article 3 ECHR. 
In conclusion, it seems that vulnerability will continue to be 
broadly used in the border procedures, as long as these procedures 
continue to exist. Vulnerability assessment will therefore not be 
used as a protection mechanism for applicants who require special 
care, but instead remain a mechanism for the gradual evacuation 
of the islands. 
Vulnerable asylum seekers must be identified and be provided with 
access to the asylum procedures in accordance with their special 
needs as prescribed in Directive 2013/33/EU and Directive 
2013/32/EU.
V.  The Role of EASO
As we have seen in Part I, after the EU-Turkey Statement EASO has 
acquired a much more active role in supporting the Greek 
authorities with the processing of asylum claims. Greek law 
enables the Agency to participate not only in the border procedure 
but also in the regular asylum procedure. Although the mandate of 
EASO is described in the Regulation, the Agency does not support 
such a role in the national asylum procedures; the EU Ombudsman 
and the Agency insisted that they only help the Greek authorities. 
They do not decide on asylum claims. The research interviews were 
amongst others aimed at clarifying how interviewees regard the 
role of EASO. 
 
The participation of EASO in the Greek asylum procedures was 
seen by most interviewees as necessary, taking into account the 
understaffed Greek services and the lack of capacity. UNHCR 
stressed that the EU definitely needs a framework for this 
participation. The authorities have to clarify under which 
conditions EASO can operate, and what the Agency can and cannot 
do. It was also suggested by MEPs that EASO should hire 
permanent Greek speaking staff and that the salaries should 
somehow be balanced to those employed by the Greek State. This 
condition would be in accordance with Law 4540/2018 that allows 
only Greek speaking EASO staff to participate in the asylum 
procedures.
EASO views its role as supportive to the Greek State which is 
ultimately the deciding authority. In this way, EASO maintains its 
subordinate role in accordance with EU Regulation 439/2010. In 
order to better illustrate this consideration, EASO emphasised 
that the case workers who are chosen and paid by them are 
seconded to the Greek Asylum Service which provides for the 
interview template and signs the final decision. Nevertheless, the 
fact that these case workers tend to suggest the rejection of 
asylum claims based on admissibility considerations for specific 
nationalities but the Asylum Service refuses to endorse their 
suggestion is a sign that these case workers are not entirely 
following the guidelines of the Asylum Service. It is a sign of their 
concomitant dependence on EASO. 
Until now, EASO conducted interviews in the border procedures, 
performing an admissibility check. It remains to be seen how this 
work model will expand to the rest of the country.
Some interviewees suggested that migration is a European issue 
and not a strictly national one. They propose for EASO to take over 
the asylum process on behalf of all Member States and to 
distribute asylum seekers over Member States accordingly. 
However, politicians suggested that this is far from a realistic 
option for the near future. Interviewees expressed their doubts 
that there will be a reform of the EASO Regulation presented in 
Part I. 
Therefore, the expanding competences of the Agency are not 
expected to be legitimised by a concomitant change of its legal 
status. However, this reform was invoked by the EU Ombudsman as 
one of the arguments that supports the activity of EASO in Greece. 
We can conclude that all parties support EASO’s role under certain 
conditions, although EASO’s responsibilities vis-à-vis refugees in 
Greece are somehow unclear. It seems that EASO’s role is 
indispensable but it needs to be better regulated and that the 
conditions have to be made clear and in accordance with the CEAS. 
Such conditions would increase transparency in decision-making 
and the establishment of a clear and publicly available set of rules, 
as standard operating procedures, that define the role and 
responsibilities of each party.
The European Ombudsman has warned that in light of the 
Statement of the European Council of 23 April 2015 (EASO teams in 
frontline Member States may participate in joint processing of 
asylum applications, including registration and finger-printing), 
EASO is being encouraged politically to act in a way which is, 
arguably, not in line with its existing statutory role. However, for 
the European Ombudsman EASO’s expanded role was justified 
since it is the Greek Asylum Service that takes the final decision on 
asylum claims.
 The proposed amendment of the EASO Regulation that has already 
been described in Part I, will allow the Agency to conduct asylum 
interviews if Member States are not able to respond adequately. 
However, as interviewees have indicated, such amendment is most 
likely not going to be introduced. 
VI.  Child Protection
In Part I, we saw that Greece adopted a new law on guardianship. 
This law requires that all unaccompanied migrant children are 
provided with a State guardian to represent them in the asylum 
procedures, to facilitate family reunification and to make sure the 
child would have an adequate home and access to basic rights. We 
also saw that age assessment is not executed in a unified way in 
Greece. In addition, due to a strict interpretation of Dublin 
deadlines, many children lose the possibility to be reunited with 
family Members abroad. It was also mentioned that there are 
limited places in shelters. As a consequence many children remain 
homeless or stay in protected custody. Unregistered and homeless 
children do not have any guardian and lack proper guidance to 
follow the asylum procedures. The interviews confirmed these 
allegations and added some other important considerations, 
stating that for these children the risk of abuse is very high.
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As stated by NGOs and First reception Service staff, 
unaccompanied or separated children run a high risk of abuse both 
on the islands and on the mainland. There are numerous cases 
known of children who are sexually abused or who choose to 
become sex workers in order to receive protection and money to 
survive. These children are also forced to commit crimes. The 
incidents of sexual exploitation of minors, as they have been 
investigated by the Greek authorities, seem to lead to no 
convictions. This allegedly happens because there is no safety 
mechanism to protect migrant children who are victims in criminal 
proceedings. Their prolonged stay in camps such as Moria or in the 
streets makes them extremely vulnerable.
Moreover, as stated by the DCI and Spyros Apergis from the Asylum 
Appeals Committees, the guardianship system that the State is 
currently elaborating is inadequate. More State guardians are 
needed as well as a strong monitoring mechanism to make sure 
that these guardians act in the child’s best interest.
As a solution, the Dutch Embassy suggested not to keep children in 
protective custody or in Moria; Ms. Tzanedaki from the Reception 
and Identification Authority suggested to create more shelters 
providing proper psychological and social support outside of 
Moria. The Ministry of Migration requested other Member States 
for relocation of children with very few results. Relocation of 
children is not specifically addressed by means of national or EU 
law. The EU would need to enforce this mechanism either 
depending on the current inoperable relocation scheme148 or by 
creating a new one. The creation of additional shelters requires 
political will and additional investment at a national level. 
Furthermore, the RIS claimed that Dublin transfers are very 
problematic because of the deadlines and the very high conditions 
that receiving Member States demand in order to reject children. It 
also proposed that age assessment should be conducted in a way 
that allows it to be legally challenged. These allegations show that 
the legal interpretation of the relevant Articles of the Dublin 
Regulation stated in Part I have indeed serious consequences for 
the right of children to family reunification. Greece would need to 
better implement the Dublin Regulation in order to make Dublin 
transfers more effective and to harmonise age assessment 
methods, whilst providing a legal remedy.
Regarding child exploitation, the lack of adequate shelters and 
sufficient guardians makes children extremely vulnerable. The 
creation of shelters away from the hotspots was proposed as a 
short-term solution. The relocation of children to other EU Member 
States was suggested by the Ministry for Migration Policy as a 
long-term solution. In any case, children should be protected from 
sexual and physical abuse, legally and physically. 
148  Council Decisions (EU) 2015/1523 and 2015/1601.
For this reason, the authorities should prioritise the child’s best 
interests, making sure that all children are hosted in adequate 
shelters, that they all have a guardian and that such conditions are 
created that no abuse can take place. Until this becomes reality, 
the adoption of a new law protecting abused children who seek 
justice is of the utmost importance. Under Greek law, any authority 
detecting the entry of an unaccompanied or separated child to the 
Greek territory shall take appropriate measures (e.g. informing 
the General Directorate of Social Solidarity which is responsible 
for further initiating and monitoring the procedure of appointing a 
guardian to the child and ensuring that his or her best interests are 
met at all times). In practice the system of guardianship is not 
functioning. This infringes the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.
VII.  Who Bears Responsibility?
One of the main purposes of this research was to identify who is 
responsible for the challenges that asylum seekers face nowadays 
in Greece, and consequently, who can provide solutions. As 
explained below, responsibility is not reserved for one actor. On 
the contrary, it is shared amongst all the stakeholders included in 
this research, to the extent that they are allowed to act within their 
own sphere of competences. It is therefore important that the EU, 
the Greek State and organisations that protect refugees take 
responsibility within their mandate. The EU has to fully implement 
the CEAS and – out of the principle of solidarity – assist Greece. 
Also policies and initiatives need to allow asylum seekers: 
•  to move freely (so abolish the geographical limitation),
•  to have full access to asylum procedures without 
discrimination and without the presumptions of the safe third 
country, 
•  to be physically protected according to their own personal 
needs,
•   to have a fair and efficient examination of their asylum claim in 
a timely manner,
•  to have access to a legal remedy.
In Part I, we saw Greece adopting decisions as being responsible 
for the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement. At the same 
time, EASO refused to take the same responsibility, by invoking its 
subordinate role. It has also become apparent that although 
Greece made considerable efforts to increase the capacity of the 
relevant services, the procedures are still inadequate to face the 
enormous amount of applications and to provide protection to all 
unaccompanied children. 
However, as can be concluded from the interviews, since 2016 
Greece somehow felt obliged to adopt a series of legislative 
measures in order to secure the EU-Turkey Statement, without the 
real willingness to do so. Greek MEPs suggested that Greece was 
not in favour of the geographical limitation at the hotspots, but 
that the EU did not support them in changing this scheme. 
Therefore, Greece indirectly claimed that the EU is also 
responsible for the current situation. The decline of relocation was 
also presented as a refusal of responsibility sharing by other 
Member States. From the above, it can be concluded that Greece 
assumes to have an undesirable responsibility. 
Almost all interviewees from the political sphere of Greece stated 
that asylum is a European issue and that it should be treated 
accordingly. More concretely, they found the Dublin Regulation is 
unfair, placing an incredible burden on Member States at the EU’s 
external borders. Because of this regulation, no matter how much 
the services are improved, the number of asylum seekers in these 
Member States will always be quite high. The numbers of arrivals 
in 2018 are already higher than those of the previous year.
From the Greek perspective, the EU should force Member States to 
accept relocation and to make this a permanent system of burden 
sharing, in accordance with the principle of solidarity. In addition, 
the granting or refusing asylum should be decided upon by the EU 
and not by Member States.
EASO and the Dutch Embassy had a different view, insisting that 
the Greek State is ultimately responsible for asylum seekers 
present on its territory. This organisation repeated that Greece 
should avoid treating asylum as a temporary phenomenon and 
make reception and integration a top priority, supported by long-
term planning.
This research suggests that in the current legal system, Greece is 
responsible to provide immediate solutions for the asylum seekers 
and refugees who are in its territory. This responsibility demands 
an even greater capacity and infrastructure, more efficient 
services, less reliance on NGOs to provide basic services such as 
interpretation and guardianship, long-term strategic planning 
and fast, high quality of decision-making for asylum claims, 
effective protection of children, indiscriminate treatment of 
asylum seekers, easy access to the procedures. These 
improvements rely on an optimal use of EU funds and technical 
assistance. 
Although Greece is responsible for the final decisions regarding 
asylum seekers, these decisions indeed depend on the continuous 
financial and technical support from the EU. This support should be 
seen in the general context of external relations with third 
countries such as Turkey, migration management and border 
control. Even if the EU is not the main actor in the Greek state of 
affairs, it indirectly shapes its asylum policies. In this regard, it 
shares a responsibility to support policies that are in conformity 
with EU law; so respect and promote fundamental rights and 
values, as they have also been enshrined in the Refugee 
Convention, the EU Charter and the ECHR. Policies that do not 
respect human dignity, equality, efficient access to justice and 
the rule of law should not be supported.
If the EU does not adopt and impose a permanent system of 
relocation for a fairer distribution of asylum seekers over Member 
States and insist on the closure of borders, prolonged isolation in 
the hotspots, limited Dublin transfers and no relocation, it is 
highly unlikely that the situation for asylum seekers in Greece will 
considerably improve, no matter how much national services may 
become more efficient .
Finally, because of the limited capacity of Greece to have a 
comprehensive response to the refugee crisis, NGOs have taken up 
a large part of responsibilities and competences that belong to the 
State. These are, inter alia, interpretation, healthcare, legal 
assistance. As a consequence of their extended involvement in 
asylum and migration, NGOs become de facto responsible within 
their own mandate to safeguard the rights of asylum seekers in 
Greece without discrimination. Because of their active role in 
migration, NGOs should be able to communicate to the State and 
the EU any systemic deficiencies that render inefficient the 
protection of asylum seekers in Greece. For this purpose, they 
should by all means be encouraged to provide feedback. Their 
monitoring should not have a negative impact on the 
sustainability of their activities.
In conclusion, this research has shown that there is a joint 
responsibility vis-à-vis asylum seekers in Greece. This 
responsibility demands a change in the current policies in order to 
make them more efficient and most importantly, more respectful 
of the fundamental rights of asylum seekers. In this regard, all 
actors involved should work together on the basis of a clear and 
transparent operation plan that respects human dignity. 
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7. List of Abbreviations
AU  Asylum Unit
AUs Asylum Units
Art. Article
ASEP  Greek Supreme Council for Civil Personnel Selection
CEAS Common European Asylum System
CJEU  Court of Justice of the European Union
DCI  Defence for Children International
Directive 2011/95/EU  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification 
of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status 
for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted
Directive 2013/33/EU  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception 
of applicants for international protection
Directive 2013/32/EU  Directive of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection
EASO European Asylum Support Office
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
GAS Greek Asylum Service
GCR Greek Council for Refugees
HCDCP Hellenic Centre for Disease Control and Prevention
IOM International Organization for Migration
JHA Council Justice and Home Affairs Council
MEP Member of the European Parliament
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NHRC National Human Rights Committee
NCSS National Centre for Social Solidarity 
Par. Paragraph
RAO Greek Regional Asylum Offices 
RIC  Reception and Identification Centre 
RIS  Reception and Identification Service
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
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Annex I
Research for the Dutch Refugee Council
The main challenges that asylum seekers face in Greece
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List of topics for the interviews
1. The impact of the geographical limitation on the examination of asylum claims 
2. How the “safe third country” concept applies in the Greek asylum system 
3. The impact of the vulnerability assessment in asylum procedures
4. EASO participation in the asylum procedures
5. The de facto profiling of asylum seekers based on their nationality
6. The negative impact of current age assessment methods and Dublin transfers to the right of children to seek asylum
7. Limited access to asylum in the mainland and at the borders
8. The main challenges that asylum seekers face in Greece
9. Who is responsible to provide solutions on a national/European Level?
10. Which short-term and long-term solutions do you see?
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